🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

The Bundesgerichtshof – Germany’s highest court of civil jurisdiction – has handed down its first ruling on private climate liability and dismissed the widely discussed lawsuits against BMW and Mercedes. These strategic lawsuits were based on a very specific claim that is hard to replicate in other legal systems. Nevertheless, the rulings contain general considerations that, from a comparative law perspective, reveal a remarkable degree of judicial restraint.

A European first in Karlsruhe

On the 23^rd of March 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) dismissed two climate lawsuits against BMW and Mercedes-Benz. The cases were brought by three private citizens, who are also the directors of the interest group Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH). They sought, unsuccessfully, a ban on the global marketing of passenger cars with internal combustion engines after October 2030.

With these rulings, the BGH has achieved a European first. While the Dutch and Italian supreme courts already issued interim rulings in corporate climate change cases, for the first time, a highest European civil court has issued a final judgment on the civil law mitigation obligations of companies. Although the legal basis and consequently the court’s reasoning are highly specific in nature, the BGH also touches upon some universal questions concerning the role of civil courts to rule on civil law responsibilities of corporations concerning their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The ruling will therefore attract attention in other jurisdictions where corporate climate cases are also being pursued, such as Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The private life of the Neubauer ruling?

The claim was based exclusively on the unlawful intertemporal interference with the claimant’s general right of personality protected by Sections 823(1), 1004(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB), which is based on the constitutional protection of the respective elementary right enshrined in Article 2(1), 1(1) of the German Basic Law (GG). This “Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht” encompasses the right to privacy, freedom, and self-determination (¶ 4 of the BMW judgement).

The claimants’ arguments can only be understood against the backdrop of the Federal Constitutional Court’s (BVerfG) famous “Klimabeschluss” from 2021 (BVerfGE 157, 30 – Neubauer). In Neubauer, the BVerfG established the concept of “intertemporal guarantees of freedom”. The court held that the German legislature is obliged to establish a GHG reduction pathway that (1) leads to climate neutrality while adhering to the remaining German emissions budget, and (2) fairly distributes the opportunities to exercise the fundamental right to (emissions-related) personal freedom across generations (see Art. 20a GG in conjunction with § 1 s. 3 KSG). Current regulations that allow GHG emissions today already pose an irreversible legal risk to future freedoms, because any exercise of freedom involving GHG emissions will be subjected to more stringent restrictions in the future. Such burdens may not be disproportionately shifted onto future generations.

The claimants in the BMW and Mercedes-Benz cases tried to transpose this line of reasoning into private law, and hence the horizontal relationships between private actors. Their underlying reasoning is that at least in the medium term virtually all human activities generate GHG emissions, meaning that the restrictive effects of future reduction measures will be felt across almost all aspects of the claimants’ (and, of course, others’) social and personal lives (¶ 4, 19–21). By continuing to place passenger cars with internal combustion engines on the market, BMW and Mercedes-Benz would consume too much of the remaining carbon budget too quickly. This, in turn, increases the likelihood and necessity of future climate regulation, which would interfere with the plaintiffs’ general personality rights (¶ 24). This subsequently amounts to an interference with their rights already today. That is because the level of emission reductions achieved today determines the extent to which intrusive and restrictive measures will need to be taken in the future (hence the term “intertemporal”).

At first glance, the claim might appear unduly complicated, as the GHG emissions of the car manufacturers “only” constitute a derivative interference. The direct interference with the claimant’s general right of personality lies in the future measures taken by the legislature. Strikingly, the claimants have not asserted any other infringements of their rights caused directly by the defendants’ GHG emissions (e.g., property or health). In that respect, the claim fundamentally differs from claims in other European corporate climate mitigation cases, which primarily deal with the autonomous responsibility of corporations to reduce GHG-emissions, given the direct effects of these emissions on fundamental rights. The same is true for the lawsuit against VW backed by Greenpeace, which is currently being heard at the Court of Appeal. In the BMW and Mercedes-Benz case, however, the claimants for strategic reasons deliberately chose to solely focus on the possible incorporation of the Neubauer doctrine into private law.

Judicial restraint by the BGH

Although the BGH takes as its starting point that civil law may also provide protection against the harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions by private actors (¶ 21), it sees no grounds for the proposed extension of the scope of the Neubauer doctrine. Several things stand out in the court’s reasoning, which at some points is very Neubauer-specific, and hence less relevant for other European climate cases. In relation to other, more universal points, however, some comparisons and lessons can be drawn.

A lack of legislative corporate carbon budgets

First of all, the BGH ruled that an advance interference-like effect is in principle not possible here, because there is no statutory carbon budget established for individual companies. According to the BGH, without such budgets, the legislatively allowed emissions today of the corporations do not inevitably lead to regulations tomorrow (¶ 28). Although this argument seems to follow the BVerfG’s case law closely, it also raises doubts. That is because in Neubauer, the BVerfG did in fact establish a carbon budget for the Federal Republic of Germany (something it later only refused to do for the federal states). It is therefore not necessary for a budget to be laid down explicitly in law. Rather, it is sufficient if such a budget can at least be derived from the facts and the legal framework. From this perspective, the BGH could possibly also have assessed the budget for BMW (which is not to say that such a budget can be established in the end, as the Shell-case illustrates, ¶ 7.91–7.96 of that ruling). Instead, the court merely pointed out that there is no statutory budgetary requirement, thereby adhering to a restrictive interpretation of the case law of the BVerfG and its own institutional competency to assess carbon budgets for (major) private emitters.

The meaning of governmental (in)action

Secondly, the BGH ruled that the responsibility for future GHG emission reductions and regulatory restrictions lies solely with the legislature. Therefore, any resulting interference with the claimant’s personality rights cannot be attributed to individual actors (¶ 44, 47). This argument is supported by compelling reasons: the car manufacturers have no formal political say in decisions related to future climate legislation. Still, the reasoning doesn’t quite sit right. One could also argue that through their GHG emissions corporations might factually and legally necessitate legislative action. Also, the pace of the corporation’s transition toward net-zero, does of course also influence the impact of such regulation.

Because of the specific (Neubauer) focus of the claims, these latter two elements, and the underlying question of the companies’ own responsibility, come across less clearly. For example, in the Shell-case, which is now pending before the Dutch Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal of The Hague ruled that corporations such as Shell do have an autonomous civil-law based responsibility to reduce GHG emissions, also because governments expect corporations to take this responsibility. The Court of Appeal in the Shell case has explicitly highlighted that this responsibility may be further shaped by human rights provisions and that its existence is not contingent on the acts of others, be it states or competitors (¶ 7.24–7.27 of that ruling). The BGH’s judgment – which, again, deals with a fundamentally different claim –, does not contain any such considerations. Instead, the court wants to leave the Neubauer doctrine exactly where it came from: in constitutional law. Also, the invocation of Article 8 ECHR, and the KlimaSeniorinnen ruling, did not change this (¶ 21).

The relevance of public law

An aspect that is more comparable, though, is the question to what extent civil law responsibilities can extend beyond what a company is already required to do under public law (so-called legalization or regulatory compliance defense). Notions on this question can be found in the Shell-case, the German RWE-case, and the interim rulings of the Cantonal Court of Zug and of the Corte Suprema di Cassazione. The BGH stresses as a starting point the autonomy of private law and that, accordingly, civil law obligations can go further than public law obligations (¶ 41). Yet, in this specific case it did not find a basis for accepting more far-reaching obligations.

First of all, the BGH stresses that an obligation to cease placing passenger vehicles with internal combustion engines on the market does not follow international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement (¶ 38). Secondly, such an obligation cannot be found in statutory law (especially not in the repealed Art. 22 of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD); ¶ 58).

Thirdly, the BGH finds that BMW’s compliance with the requirements of the Emission Reduction Regulation 2019 (EU) 2019/631, which in essence considers intra-European registrations of combustion engine vehicles to be generally justifiable until 2035, precludes any further obligations. The court holds that this Regulation conclusively governs precisely the conduct at issue in the proceedings, not least because according to its recitals, it is explicitly committed to the Paris Agreement. Although the BGH’s dogmatic reasoning on this point is questionable, the additional room left for national private law obligations to phase out cars with combustion engines might indeed be limited. However, also here the specific claim played a central role: possibly, a claim focusing directly on BMW’s GHG-emissions, and the reduction thereof, would have led to a different assessment. For example, in the Shell-case, the court concluded that the civil courts can establish mitigation duties, precisely because the (European) legislator has not intended to regulate such obligations of companies exhaustively through instruments such as the European Emissions Trading System 1 and 2, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the CSDDD, and thus has not sought to preclude supplementary private law duties of care (¶ 7.53 of that ruling).

The court’s institutional competence to assess corporate carbon budgets

Lastly, the BGH ruled it lacks the institutional competence to derive specific emission levels or reduction targets from the open wording of Article 20a GG. The bilateral framework of civil liability law would not be suited to the complex balancing of interests required for this purpose (¶ 45–46). Especially on this more universally approached issue, the BGH’s cautious stance, also compared to other European civil courts, becomes apparent.

On the one hand, there are good reasons for courts to exercise restraint in this type of climate litigation, which touches upon broad distributive questions. On the other hand, however, certain reservations can also be made regarding the BGH’s reasoning. The implicit message that, in the absence of statutory reduction targets, there is no role at all for the civil courts sits, in our view, uneasily with the core task of civil courts to adjudicate, on the basis of statutory law, the rights and obligations between the parties to the proceedings. This role must of course also be performed where such legal determinations have societal, political, and economic implications, potentially affect a wide range of conflicting interests, and involve technical and scientific knowledge.

In other cases and jurisdictions, civil courts have tended to argue along this line. Take, for example, the Shell-case. On the one hand, this judgment illustrates the challenges faced by civil courts when engaging with complex and uncertain knowledge regarding emission pathways and targets (¶ 7.76 of that judgment). In particular, the Court’s (unsuccessful) search for scientific consensus regarding the reduction percentage applicable to the oil and gas sector for Scope 3 emissions illustrates this point (¶ 7.82). On the other hand, the Court assumes as a starting point that civil courts do have the institutional competence to assess, on the basis of scientific knowledge and insights, the potentially applicable reduction targets.

Other examples can be found in the (Swiss) Holcim case, and the RWE case. In the Holcim case the court also took notice of the lower court rulings in the cases against Mercedes-Benz and BMW. A key defense by Holcim was that a claim based on the claimant’s personality rights seeking emissions reductions by Holcim does not belong in civil proceedings, but in the political arena (¶ 1.4 of that judgment). The Cantonal Court of Zug held, inter alia, that the political dimension of the case, its potential societal consequences, and the fact that numerous divergent third-party interests are at stake, do not affect the private-law character of the claims brought. It is not the court’s task to assess or determine climate policy in general (¶ 3.7.2), but rather to decide, on the basis of and within the framework of the private-law provisions invoked by the claimants, on Holcim’s obligations (¶ 3.7.3). Indeed, the court emphasized that it is the judiciary, and not the legislature, which is competent to rule on alleged violations of private law (¶ 3.7.5). Here too, of course, there are significant doctrinal differences with the Mercedes and BMW case. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Zug court, like the court in the Shell case, shows on a fundamental level a greater sense of receptiveness for corporate climate change litigation.

Outlook

The BGH has rejected a very specific, strategically chosen mitigation claim based on the concept of intertemporality, which is unique to German constitutional law. Against this backdrop, the BGH’s judicial restraint becomes more understandable, although it can also be critically examined in light of the approaches taken by other European courts in relation to universal questions of the institutional competency of civil courts to engage with GHG-reduction claims. More climate cases will (most likely) follow for the BGH, which take a different legal route than has been taken in the BMW and Mercedes-Benz case. Yet, these cases will also raise foundational questions about the position of private law and civil courts in climate governance. These questions are not going to disappear; rather, they will become increasingly pressing. It is hard to imagine how the BGH could avoid dealing with them in the long term.

The post The BMW and Mercedes Climate Cases appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Hungary is approaching the tenth anniversary of the Baka v. Hungary judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case concerned the premature termination of the mandate of Hungarian Chief Justice András Baka without legal remedy, shortly after the landslide victory of the Orbán-led Fidesz party in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Sixteen years after the removal of Chief Justice Baka, the execution of the judgment is still pending, and the landslide victory of the opposition Tisza party in the 2026 parliamentary elections put the removal of the incumbent chief justice back on the political agenda. In his victory speech held on the evening of the elections, future Prime Minister Péter Magyar called on Chief Justice András Zs. Varga to resign, claiming that, together with the President of the Republic, the Prosecutor General, and other leaders of key state institutions, he is a “puppet” of Orbán’s regime. Magyar also made it clear that they all “should leave voluntarily, otherwise they’ll be removed anyway.”

At first glance, the situation resonates with the Baka case: a politician representing a one-party sweeping constitutional majority steps up with the immediate demand to remove the incumbent chief justice. Yet, the context could not be more different.

In this blog post, I argue that the claim to end Chief Justice Varga’s mandate is legitimate and that the proper way to do so is by implementing the Baka judgment. My argument goes back to the old recipe of consistently upholding the principles of human rights and the rule of law, on which even a dark and least worthy chapter of the Hungarian judiciary could be brought to an end brightly and decently.

To understand why the proper execution of the Baka case in its entirety is intertwined with the removal of Chief Justice Varga, it is essential to see the radical changes in the Hungarian context between 2010 and 2026, mostly how overly politicised the role of the Chief Justice became, and how actively Chief Justice Varga contributed to suppressing the freedom of speech of Hungarian judges.

When a wise man points to the moon, only the fool looks at the finger

Back in 2011, when Chief Justice Baka was around the halfway point of his mandate, the ruling majority put forward a judicial reform that severely undermined judicial independence. Acting in his capacity as the president of the Supreme Court, after consulting the courts, he publicly criticised the planned reform on several occasions. Within a strikingly short period of time after raising concerns, he was removed from his office through legislative acts of constitutional rank, beyond judicial control. In its judgment, the ECtHR was wise enough to find that the premature termination of his office was a consequence of his criticism, and also claimed that his removal exerted a chilling effect not only on him, but on other judges, discouraging them from participating in public debate on issues concerning the independence of the judiciary. By establishing the causal link, the ECtHR made it clear that the removal of Chief Justice Baka is only the finger that points at something much bigger and more important: the political pressure on the freedom of expression of Hungarian judges. It is no coincidence that the Baka case is well-known and frequently cited for its doctrinal relevance of ensuring judges’ freedom of expression.

The execution of the judgment requires Hungary to take measures to guarantee the freedom of expression of Hungarian judges and ensure their irremovability, all key components of judicial independence, a fundamental constituent of democracy and the rule of law. As for the Chief Justice, the execution of the Baka judgment expressly requires granting judicial oversight of the decision on his removal. For nearly ten years, the Hungarian government was reluctant to execute the judgment, conveying deep concern from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Now there is a historic moment for its implementation, and in the perfect interplay of all elements, granting legal remedy to the Chief Justice against the decision on his removal will allow Hungarian courts to deliver a strong domestic judgment on guarantees of the freedom of expression of judges. It would be a waste to miss this historic opportunity.

How to turn the unworthiness procedure into a meaningful one

Under the currently effective rules, the Chief Justice can be removed from office “if, due to any act, conduct, or omission, he has become unworthy of the position”. The procedure may exclusively be initiated by the President of the Republic and voted on by the Parliament by a two-thirds majority. Currently, the legislation leaves it to political actors, without the involvement of a judicial body, to launch the unworthiness procedure and take the final decision on removal. In this construction, the Chief Justice fully depends on the will of a political majority and, at the same time, is totally unaccountable to the judiciary, allowing him to commit gross breaches of administrative powers without any legal consequence. For a balanced proceeding on the unworthiness of the Chief Justice, the Baka judgment must first be executed to relieve the process from political pressure. An independent judicial body must be granted the right to review the political decision on the removal. By reshaping the rules of the unworthiness proceeding, the accountability of the Chief Justice can be shifted from a purely political one to a purely professional one.

This remarkable shift enables the Hungarian judiciary to say the final word on the worthiness of Chief Justice Varga and hold him accountable for all acts, conduct, and omissions committed since his appointment in 2020. The solution avoids the risk of retroactive legislation, as the modified procedural rules can take immediate effect. The legal ground of unworthiness has been there from the first moment of Chief Justice Varga’s appointment, just as Hungary’s obligation to execute the Baka judgment. If Chief Justice Varga hoped that the Baka judgment would never be executed and that his worthiness would always depend on the politicians who elected him, it is time to prove him wrong.

Unworthy from scratch

The motion on removing Chief Justice Varga should focus on his personal role in undermining the independence of Hungarian courts, including the circumstances of his appointment. Varga became Chief Justice in 2020, responding to a political call. He undertook the mandate under personalised legislation introduced a few months before his election, allowing him to gain the position of a judge and head of panel without an ordinary appointment procedure. He had no concerns about becoming Chief Justice without any judicial experience, despite all prior concerns raised by the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Commission. He neglected the well-reasoned objection of the National Judicial Council, which warned him that his appointment “does not respond to the constitutional requirement according to which the person sitting at the top of the court system shall be independent from other branches and shall appear as impartial to an external observer.”

His taking office has drawn criticism from several international organizations. The UN Special  Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers interpreted it as “an attack to the independence of the judiciary.” The European Commission considered it “not in line with European standards,” referring to a landmark judgment of the CJEU. The European Council held that it creates “risks of political influence over the top court”. The Venice Commission claimed that it poses a serious risk of politicisation of the supreme court. His decision to undertake the mandate despite all prior warnings on harming judicial independence resulted in immediate detrimental consequences for the reputation of the Hungarian judiciary. His personal responsibility in the politically biased appointment, against clear objections and in breach of European judicial standards, cannot be overlooked and should be evaluated within the unworthiness procedure.

The power of unaccountability

Varga started office in January 2021, and quickly became the most powerful actor within the Hungarian judiciary through a series of legislative reforms. During his term, he visibly did not forget that he was appointed by one political power and could be removed by them at any moment. From the perspective of judicial independence, his performance as Chief Justice constantly called into question his worthiness for the position. Immediately after taking office, he unlawfully appointed a politician, a former state secretary, to the bench and selected a government loyalist as deputy. He maintained an unlawful secondment practice for years. His power to modify the case allocation scheme enabled direct interference in the adjudication of politically sensitive cases, also allowing him to reshape the final composition of panels at the Supreme Court. A remarkable part of the judicial reform introduced in 2023 to unlock Union funds can be translated as a response to his first two years as Chief Justice.

It was clear from the first moment that Chief Justice Varga’s election was intended to enhance internal pressure on judges. Responding to this need, he actively contributed to curtailing the freedom of expression of judges. His public statements and activities in his different roles – as an academic, as a member of the National Judicial Council, as a judge and judicial leader – all pointed towards an overly restrictive interpretation of the Hungarian legislation that fully contradicts the spirit of the judgment delivered in the Baka case. His constant attempts to silence Hungarian judges included challenging the Ethical Code of Judges before the Constitutional Court for expressly entitling judges to speak out in professional matters. His intention to retaliate against critical opinions at the Kúria resulted in the unlawful removal of a senior scientific advisor for making “worrying statements in relation to the Supreme Court and its President,” banning the publication of a study criticising his administrative activities, and the unlawful suspension of judge András Kovács from his position as head of panel. He initiated an extraordinary inspection in connection with the publication of a judicial decision, which revealed the pardoning scandal that outraged the Hungarian public and led to the resignation of two leading ruling party politicians: the President of the Republic and the former Minister of Justice. He recurrently attacked independent service courts for protecting the freedom of speech of Hungarian judges, contributed to the conclusion of the “agreement” that forced reforms against pay raise, labelled their sweeping protest and the demonstration of Hungarian judges as a political activity and not only failed to protect judges from being listed, getting doxed or attacked by smear campaigns in the propaganda media, but took every occasion to retaliate against them for speaking out.

In a state of the rule of law, the Chief Justice would have faced immediate consequences for the above, but not in the past 16 years’ Hungary. Chief Justice Varga could commit attacks against individual judges, judicial bodies, and the independence of the Hungarian judiciary as a whole, knowing that he held formally unaccountable judicial powers.

But first, implementation

The principle of separation of powers requires that politicians refrain from calling on a judge to resign. By the same logic, judges should also never consider a call to resign that comes from a politician. Politicians should neither directly appoint judges nor force them to resign. They are there to shape the laws that secure the independence of the judiciary. Implementing judgments of the ECtHR is the best baseline for that. Reshaping the procedural norms of the unworthiness procedure, as required by the Baka judgment, is enough to ensure that Chief Justice Varga is held accountable for contributing to the systemic breach of judicial independence. As no case law exists for the unworthiness of a Chief Justice, the outcome of the proceeding is less predictable than that of a political decision. Yet, the real value of this solution is that it leaves the decision in the hands of those to whom it really belongs: the Hungarian judges, entitling them to speak out in protection of their independence on and off the bench, and empowering them to finally live up to the standards of judicial independence in Europe.

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NS-Gedenkstättenarbeit ist inhärent politisch. Gedenkstätten können deshalb schnell zum Schauplatz (welt-)politischer Konflikte werden. Ein am 09.04.2026 im Eilrechtsschutz ergangener Beschluss des Verwaltungsgerichts (VG) Weimar erregte dabei jüngst bundesweit besondere mediale Aufmerksamkeit. Dem Beschluss lag eine durch die Stadt Weimar ausgesprochene Versammlungsbeschränkung für eine pro-palästinensische Gruppe zugrunde. Die Gruppe wollte am 12. April, dem Jahrestag der Befreiung des KZ Buchenwald, eine Mahnwache für die Opfer des Gazakriegs auf dem Gelände der heutigen Gedenkstätte Buchenwald abhalten.

Das VG Weimar musste in seinem Beschluss zwei Rechtspositionen miteinander in Einklang bringen: die Würde der Opfer nationalsozialistischer Gewaltherrschaft und den durch Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit garantierten Schutz zivilgesellschaftlichen Gedenkens. Ob der Maßstab des Gerichts eine verfassungskonforme und rechtssichere Grundlage für den Umgang mit Versammlungen an Gedenkstätten bietet, muss allerdings bezweifelt werden.

Die rechtliche Grundlage des § 15 Abs. 2 VersG…

Rechtsgrundlage der streitgegenständlichen Versammlungsbeschränkung ist § 15 Abs. 2 VersG. Mit dessen Einführung im Jahr 2005 wollte der Bundesgesetzgeber den versammlungsrechtlichen Gedenkstättenschutz stärken. Er regelt, dass Versammlungen an NS-Gedenkstätten mit historisch herausragender, überregionaler Bedeutung eingeschränkt werden können (örtliche Komponente), sofern anhand konkret feststellbarer Umstände zu besorgen ist, dass durch die Versammlung oder den Aufzug die Würde der Opfer beeinträchtigt wird (sachliche Komponente). Von der Möglichkeit, solche Gedenkstätten gemäß § 15 Abs. 2 S. 2 VersG gesetzlich zu benennen, haben die Länder mit Blick auf ehemalige Konzentrations- und Außenlager vielfach Gebrauch gemacht (so auch Thüringen durch § 1 Abs. 1 des Thüringer Gesetzes zum Schutz der Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora). Ob der „Gedenkstättenparagraf” der Behörde über § 15 Abs. 1 VersG hinausgehende Eingriffsbefugnisse in die Versammlungsfreiheit gestattet, wird in der Literatur unter Verweis auf die Normenhierarchie allerdings vielfach in Frage gestellt.

…als antinationalsozialistisches Sonderrecht?

Der offene Wortlaut des § 15 Abs. 2 Nr. 2 VersG fordert eine Beurteilung des Beeinträchtigungspotentials einer Versammlung aufgrund konkret feststellbarer „Umstände“. Dass die Würde der Opfer durch die Art und Weise der kollektiven Meinungskundgabe beeinträchtigt werden kann und deshalb Versammlungsbeschränkungen erlassen werden können, die an diese Versammlungsmodalitäten (hierfür lässt sich an das Abspielen von Musik oder das Anbieten von Essen denken) anknüpfen, ist anerkannt und soll hier nicht weiter vertieft werden (BVerfGE 111, 147 (156)).

Auflagen, die in ihrer Begründung an den Meinungsinhalt der Versammlung anknüpfen, sind nach der Kombinationslehre des Bundesverfassungsgerichts mit der Meinungsfreiheit (und damit auch der Versammlungsfreiheit) vereinbar, sofern sie nicht eine Meinung als solche verbieten und dem Schutz eines schlechthin ohne Rücksicht auf eine bestimmte Meinung zu schützenden Rechtsguts dienen (BVerfGE 124, 300 (322)). Nicht vom Gebot der Standpunktneutralität umfasst sind laut Wunsiedel-Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE 124, 300 (329 ff.)) Meinungen, die die nationalsozialistische Gewaltherrschaft billigen, verherrlichen oder rechtfertigen. Deren Äußerung gefährde per se den öffentlichen Frieden, weshalb ihr Verbot als „antinationalsozialistisches Sonderrecht“ zulässig sei. Mit § 15 Abs. 2 VersG reagierte der Gesetzgeber auf das Problem rechtsextremistischer Versammlungen an NS-Gedenkstätten. Unter Berücksichtigung dieses Gesetzeszwecks wird teilweise geschlussfolgert, dass § 15 Abs. 2 VersG ausschließlich rechtsextreme Meinungskundgaben umfasse und angenommen, dass § 15 Abs. 2 VersG überhaupt nur unter Hinzunahme dieser Einschränkung als „antinationalsozialistisches Sonderrecht“ verfassungsmäßig sei (Hong (2020) Rn. 520 ff.; vgl. BT-Drs. 15/5051, S. 4 f.) Auf diese verfassungsrechtlichen Bedenken ist das Bundesverfassungsgericht bisher trotz Gelegenheit nicht näher eingegangen.

Diese Lesart der Norm ist allerdings nicht im Wortlaut angelegt und dementsprechend umstritten; das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in einem Beschluss aus dem Jahr 2005 zu einer rechtsextremen Demonstration am Berliner Holocaust-Mahnmal jedenfalls eine inhaltsspezifische Meinungsbeschränkung durch § 15 Abs. 2 VersG nicht thematisiert. Das VG Weimar geht – ohne dies näher zu begründen – davon aus, dass § 15 Abs. 2 VersG verfassungskonform auch auf nicht-rechtsextreme Versammlungen anzuwenden ist. Nach diesem Verständnis kann gemäß § 15 Abs. 2 VersG die kollektive Kundgabe aller Meinungen, die die Opferwürde beeinträchtigen, unabhängig von ihrem konkreten Inhalt, also standpunktneutral, beschränkt werden (unveröffentlichter Beschluss des VG Weimar sowie die Entscheidung in der Hauptsache). Dass sich die Intention des Gesetzgebers bei Erlass ersichtlich darauf richtete, rechtsextreme Versammlungen verbieten zu können, ändert nichts an dem nicht nach politischen oder gesellschaftlichen Auffassungen differenzierenden Gesetzeswortlaut. Insofern stellt der dem Beschluss des VG Weimar zugrundeliegende Sachverhalt lediglich einen atypischen, vom Gesetzgeber nicht vorrangig bedachten Fall dar: Die Beschlüsse des VG Weimar zur Nutzung der Gedenkstätte Buchenwald sowie die jeweiligen Anschlussentscheidungen sind, soweit ersichtlich, die bisher einzigen Entscheidungen zu Versammlungsbeschränkungen, die sich auf § 15 Abs. 2 VersG stützen und gegen nicht-rechtsextreme Versammlungen richten.

VG Weimar: Gedenken kann Gedenken stören

Im Beschluss bejaht das VG Weimar die Rechtmäßigkeit der städtischen Versammlungseinschränkung. Das Gericht geht dabei über die – sich auf Folgenabwägung beschränkende und für Verfahren im vorläufigen Rechtsschutz typische – Doppelhypothese hinaus und stellt fest, dass die beabsichtigte Versammlung der pro-palästinensischen Initiative die Würde der Opfer beeinträchtige. Es erkennt dabei allerdings an, dass die Auflage, die Versammlung im mehrere Kilometer entfernten Weimar durchzuführen, einen intensiven Eingriff in das von Art. 8 Abs. 1 GG geschützte Selbstbestimmungsrecht darstellt, sieht diesen aber durch den Schutz der Opferwürde gerechtfertigt.

Dass es sich bei der Gedenkstätte um einen Raum handelt, der dem kommunikativen Verkehr eröffnet ist und eine etwaige Versammlung dementsprechend grundsätzlich vom Schutz des Art. 8 Abs. 1 GG umfasst ist, wird vom Gericht stillschweigend angenommen. Diese Annahme erscheint angesichts des in § 2 Abs. 1 des Thüringer Gesetzes über die Errichtung der Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora statuierten Stiftungszwecks, die Gedenkstätte der Öffentlichkeit „in geeigneter Weise“ zugänglich zu machen, plausibel.

Nach Ansicht des VG Weimar ist – im Anschluss an eine Entscheidung des Thüringer Oberverwaltungsgerichts (Beschluss vom 16.08.2019 – 3 EO 582/19) – von einer Verletzung der Opferwürde insbesondere dann auszugehen, wenn im Hinblick auf die Erinnerungsbetätigung „nicht das Opfer und sein individuelles Schicksal im Mittelpunkt steht, sondern der Gedenkende in der Ausübung seines Gedenkens”. In einem solchen Fall verkomme das Gedenken an die Shoah zum Feigenblatt für die eigene politische Positionierung. Dieses „Instrumentalisierungsverbot“ führt das Gericht zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass die begehrte Versammlung mit der Bezugnahme auf den Gaza-Krieg die Würde der in Buchenwald ermordeten Opfer verletze. Zudem beanstandete das Verwaltungsgericht das auf der Versammlung beabsichtigte Tragen einer „Kufiya“, weil das Kleidungsstück im Kontext des Terrorangriffs vom 7. Oktober 2023 „eng mit dem Streben nach der Vernichtung Israels und der Ausgrenzung von Jüdinnen und Juden verbunden“ und deshalb nicht bloß als Symbol des politischen Widerstands gegen Unterdrückung im Allgemeinen zu werten sei.

Zur „Würde der Opfer“ nach § 15 Abs. 2 VersG

Die Bedeutung des Schutzguts der Opferwürde ist in Wissenschaft und Rechtsprechung nicht abschließend geklärt, was sich in dem unbefriedigenden Umstand bemerkbar macht, dass in der Rechtsprechung – die Ausführungen des VG Weimars sind insoweit exemplarisch – überwiegend bloß von der „Würde der Opfer“ (zum Beispiel das Bundesverfassungsgericht; eine normative Anknüpfung explizit offenlassend BVerfGE 124, 300 (347)) die Rede ist, eine verfassungsrechtliche Anknüpfung allerdings unterbleibt. Einigkeit besteht lediglich dahingehend, dass der Begriff konkret–individuell an die (Todes-)Opfer nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft anknüpfen muss und gerade kein abstraktes Würdeverständnis in Form eines gesellschaftlichen „Grundkonsens“ herangezogen werden kann. Weil das Allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht nach herrschender Dogmatik mit dem Tod erlischt, kommt eine verfassungsrechtliche Anknüpfung – 81 Jahre nach Befreiung des Lagers – in den allermeisten Fällen daher nur über Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG („postmortales Persönlichkeitsrecht“) in Betracht.

Denkbar erscheint auch, mit dem VG Weimar eine Art gesetzgeberische Ausgestaltungskompetenz der „Würde der Opfer“ anzunehmen, die der thüringische Gesetzgeber mit § 2 Abs. 1 BuchenwaldGedStStiftErG TH wahrgenommen hat (vgl. VG Weimar mit Hinweis auf BT-Drs. 15/5051, S. 4, hierzu Enders/Lange, JZ 2006, 105 (111)).

In diesem Zusammenhang ist auf eine Unzulänglichkeit der Entscheidung hinzuweisen: Zur Bestimmung der Opferwürde verweist das VG auf die o.g. Entscheidung des Thüringer OVG aus dem Jahr 2019, übersieht dabei aber, dass sich der Stiftungszweck inzwischen geändert hat. Normierte § 2 Abs. 1 BuchenwaldGedStStiftErG TH a.F. noch, dass die Gedenkstätte insbesondere ein „Ort der Trauer und der Erinnerung an die zahllosen Opfer“ sei, sieht die aktuelle Fassung des § 2 Abs. 1 BuchenwaldGedStStiftErG TH vor, dass die Stiftung die „kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den im Nationalsozialismus begangenen Verbrechen und deren Folgen fördern und die Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora als Orte der Trauer und der Erinnerung an die zahllosen Opfer bewahren“ soll. Sofern man dem Stiftungszweck eine zentrale Stellung für die Bestimmung der Opferwürde zuspricht, muss sich diese einfachrechtliche Änderung auch auf die Maßstabsbildung auswirken.

Opferwürde als Grenze zivilgesellschaftlichen Gedenkens

Ob ein aus § 15 Abs. 2 VersG abgeleitetes „Instrumentalisierungsverbot“ im Sinne der VG-Entscheidung die grundrechtlichen Grenzen der Art. 8 Abs. 1 GG, Art. 5 Abs. 1, 2 GG beachtet, hängt zentral davon ab, ob es den Schutz der Opferwürde und die durch Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit geschützten Formen zivilgesellschaftlichen Gedenkens in einen angemessenen Ausgleich zu bringen vermag.

Das VG Weimar geht davon aus, dass eine Versammlung, deren inhaltlicher Mittelpunkt nicht die Opfer, sondern die Gedenkenden sind, stets die Würde der Opfer verletze (s.o.). Ein solches Verständnis des von § 15 Abs. 2 VersG vermittelten Würdeschutzes gibt hierdurch für alle an Gedenkstätten stattfindenden Versammlungen einen engen inhaltlichen „Gedenkkorridor“ vor. Versammlungsinhalte, die über die Erzählung der Opferschicksale hinausgehen, sind folglich nur in äußerst beschränktem Maße zulässig; der hierdurch entstehende Eingriff in die freie Meinungsäußerung potentieller Versammlungsteilnehmer ist erheblich. Dem kann auch nicht entgegengehalten werden, dass die hohe Eingriffsintensität örtlich nur sehr begrenzt gilt: Weil mit bestimmten Orten eine die kollektive Meinungskundgabe verstärkende Wirkung einhergeht, umfasst das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Art. 8 Abs. 1 GG grundsätzlich auch das Recht auf die freie Wahl des Versammlungsortes.

Der Schutz der Meinungsfreiheit erfordert, dass der Tatbestand des § 15 Abs. 2 VersG so ausgelegt und angewendet wird, dass der besondere Wertgehalt der Kommunikationsfreiheiten gewahrt bleibt (siehe nur BVerfGE 120, 180 (199)). Der Maßstab des VG – die Frage, ob das Gedenken oder der Gedenkende im Mittelpunkt stehen – stellt höchstens auf den ersten Blick eine diesem Anspruch genügende Lösung dar.

Bei näherer Untersuchung stellt man fest, dass dieser Maßstab Trennschärfe lediglich vorspiegelt. Das liegt daran, dass der Schutzbereich des Art. 8 Abs. 1 GG gerade die kollektive Kundgabe subjektiver Meinungen umfasst. Weil die sich Versammelnden und ihr Inhalt qua Konzeption des Grundrechts „verschmelzen“, stehen die sich Versammelnden zu einem gewissen, nicht sinnvoll ermittelbaren Grad letztlich immer auch im Vordergrund der Versammlung. Folglich erscheint die vom Gericht vorgenommene Hierarchisierung der Außenwirkung zwischen Versammlungsteilnehmer und Versammlungsinhalt willkürlich. Weil der vom VG angeführte Maßstab also unergiebig ist, nimmt das Gericht letztlich eine Inhaltsüberprüfung der Meinung vor. Zur inhaltlichen Bestimmung der Opferwürde wird dabei auf den Stiftungszweck rekurriert, was im Ergebnis auf eine Engführung zulässiger Versammlungsinhalte mit dem institutionalisierten, gesetzgeberisch geprägten Verständnis der Opferwürde hinausläuft (s.o.).

Den Bemühungen, eine „Instrumentalisierung des vergangenen Leids“ zu verhindern, liegen nachvollziehbare Motive zugrunde. Allerdings geht das VG unter Berücksichtigung einer grundrechtsschonenden Auslegung zu weit: Im Ergebnis etabliert der skizzierte Maßstab eine Tendenz zu „konformistischem“, entpolitisiertem Gedenken. Das zeigt sich beispielhaft daran, dass der vom VG Weimar angeführte Maßstab der Opferwürde, denkt man ihn konsequent fort, auch das folgende Ergebnis zutage fördert: Bei einer etwaigen vom Zentralrat der Juden organisierten Versammlung, die „aktuelle antisemitische Entwicklungen in Deutschland“ zum Gegenstand hat, stünde nicht das Gedenken an die Opfer der Shoah und ihr Leid im Mittelpunkt. Ein Verbot könnte unter dem Maßstab des VG entsprechend nicht beanstandet werden.

Mit Blick auf das Gesagte drängt sich die Frage nach einer verfassungskonformen Handhabung des Konflikts, der diesem Beitrag zugrunde liegt, auf. Eine Lösung könnte – im Fahrwasser einer im Gesetzgebungsverfahren diskutierten Fassung von § 15 Abs. 2 VersG (BT-Drs. 15/4832, S. 2) – darin bestehen, dass im Kontext von Gedenkstätten solche Versammlungen zulässig sind, die das individuelle Leid aller Opfer(gruppen) anerkennen und dieses nicht „verdrängen“. Das bedeutet insbesondere, dass die von den Opfern erlittene menschenunwürdige Behandlung weder gebilligt noch verharmlost, geleugnet oder rechtfertigt wird (woran es mit Blick auf die streitgegenständliche Versammlung tatsächlich Anlass zu Zweifeln gibt).

Fazit

Der Versuch, die besondere gesellschaftliche Verantwortung in der Bundesrepublik für das Gedenken an die Opfer des nationalsozialistischen, deutschen Unrechtsregimes auszufüllen, ist eine kaum zu überschätzende Aufgabe. Gerade deshalb müssen diverse zivilgesellschaftliche Perspektiven auch an den Gedenkstätten eine Rolle spielen. § 15 Abs. 2 VersG sollte daher weder einer bloßen Konservierung noch einer Entpolitisierung der Erinnerung an die Opfer Vorschub leisten. Ein falsch verstandenes „Instrumentalisierungsverbot“ wird der inhärent politischen – und damit zwangsläufig auch diskursiven – Gedenkstättenarbeit nicht gerecht.

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