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The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) My Voice, My Choice (MVMC) for safe and accessible abortion, signed by over 1.2 million people, has proven remarkably successful. On 26 February 2026, the Commission announced that it will link abortion services to the European Social Fund Plus, thereby effectively enabling Member States to use EU funds to provide these services to women across the Union. While the Commission did not establish a new European right to abortion in a new law – which would be a likely legal dead end anyway – it has once again demonstrated a masterclass in EU legal manoeuvring. More importantly, it has effectively provided European budgetary support for abortion services for the first time, thereby significantly improving the harsh realities faced by millions of women in the EU. Finally, the MVMC initiative shows that when millions of Europeans get together, their demands simply cannot be ignored.

The road to 1.2 million: a chronology of mobilization

The MVMC initiative was born from a harsh reality: an estimated 20 million women in the EU lack access to safe abortion, facing mental as well as physical harm, economic stress, and even death in countries with restrictive laws. The movement sought to create an EU-wide financial mechanism to support Member States that voluntarily provide safe abortion care to those lacking it.

The journey began on April 10, 2024, when the ECI was officially registered by the Commission. Over the following year, a coalition of more than 300 organizations mobilized a massive cross-border campaign. This was not merely a street-level protest; it was a digital revolution. In Malta, where abortion is criminalized, activists collected over 4,000 signatures – twice the expected number – largely because the online format protected supporters from the stigma of public protest.

By September 1, 2025, the Commission validated 1,124,513 signatures. The political momentum shifted, and on December 2, a public hearing was held at the European Parliament where coordinator Nika Kovač stated that activists had brought something to the table – “[their] own chair to the places where [they] usually don’t have the chairs”. They brought their own chair directly to the table of power. Just two weeks later, on December 17, 2025, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution with 358 votes in favour, urging the Commission to submit a proposal for a dedicated financial mechanism.

The Commission’s decision: strategic use of ESF+

On February 26, 2026, the European Commission delivered its response, that can be described as a masterclass in EU legal manoeuvring. The Commission announced that it would not submit a new proposal for a standalone legal act or a new funding program. Instead, it formally affirmed that the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), which is an already existing multi-billion-euro EU budgetary system, can be used by Member States to provide safe abortion services.

The Commission’s reasoning rested on Article 168(7) of the TFEU, which protects the national competence of Member States to define their own health policies. By utilizing the ESF+, the Commission avoided a direct legislative conflict over abortion rights, which remains within the discretion of individual Member States.

Under this framework, one can identify three main characteristics: First, the ground rule is voluntary participation. Member States can choose to amend their regional or national ESF+ programs to include abortion care. Second, if they choose to participate, the funds can cover not only medical services but also travel costs, which is vital for women in life-threatening situations who must travel abroad for care. Lastly, in order to respect EU law, any funded service must be open to women regardless of their residence or nationality, ensuring it does not specifically target women from more restrictive states in a way that would undermine those states’ law.

In practice, this is relatively straightforward. A willing Member State must amend its national or regional ESF+ programme under Article 24 of the Common Provisions Regulation to include abortion care. The Commission then reviews this amendment to ensure compliance with EU law, in particular Art. 168(7) TFEU and internal market principles, including the requirement that services remain neutral to nationality. Once approved, the Member State can use ESF+ funds to support healthcare providers or NGOs delivering these essential services. For a woman in a restrictive jurisdiction, this creates a tangible pathway: she can access funded abortion care in another Member State that has opted into the scheme, ensuring that women’s health in the EU is not a matter of geographic luck.

In other words, while the EU does not mandate access to abortion, it enables Member States to finance it. The EU provides the financial framework. It is up to the Member States to make use of it.

Is a win always a win?

The reaction to the decision was split along ideological and strategic lines. For the organizers, the decision was a historic victory. Nika Kovač argued that the “priority was always getting results for women, not the legal form”. This perspective suggests that a win is defined by policy outcomes: for the first time, the EU has unequivocally confirmed that its budget can support abortion access and allows for broad financial coverage of what can be called abortion care.

Legal experts who supported the ECI argued that this affirms the EU’s supportive competence. By integrating MVMC into the Gender Equality Strategy 2026 – 2030 on March 5, 2026, the Commission also signalled that this is no longer just a citizens’ request, but an official pillar of EU policy. This matters because EU strategies function as administrative roadmaps. Inclusion in the strategy means that the initiative is now embedded across policy areas and subject to concrete implementation requirements. One of the key actions is the rollout of the MVMC-mechanism, with clear timelines for 2026 and 2027. The immediate consequence is a shift from political rhetoric to administrative accountability. The Commission is now required to operationalise the initiative, including through technical guidance and the monitoring of gender equality expenditure. In this sense, the EU is translating political support into budgetary reality. More broadly, this illustrates how the EU can act within its limited competences: not by imposing legal obligations, but by steering policy through funding, coordination, and strategy.

However, this win feels fragile. Because the mechanism is voluntary, its success depends entirely on the political will of individual Member States. For example, a woman in Poland or Malta still relies on another willing country to amend their ESF+ programs to help her.

Is a loss always a loss?

Conversely, critics and some MEPs viewed the refusal to create a dedicated fund as a failure to act. The far-right Spanish party Vox even claimed the Commission had rejected the initiative entirely by merely pointing to existing instruments.

From a strictly legislative perspective, the ECI did lose its demand for a new law. But in the world of EU governance, being absorbed into existing structures can often be a more effective way to ensure long-term funding than fighting for a new program that could be blocked by the Council. If the loss of a dedicated legal act leads to the win of immediate funding through the ESF+, the outcome cannot be adequately captured in traditional binary terms of success and failure.

The aftermath: what happens now

The decision on 26 February 2026 was not the end, but the beginning of a new administrative phase. Member States wishing to act must now submit amended ESF+ programs to the Commission for approval. Also, the implementation of the MVMC-mechanism is explicitly listed as a key action for 2026 and 2027 in the official Gender Equality Strategy. In the same document, the Commission discloses plans to launch a study on the societal and economic benefits of closing the “women’s health gap”, which will include menopause and reproductive health. Another development currently in motion is that activists are advocating for the Commission to create a central platform so patients know exactly where and how they can access these EU-funded services.

A new blueprint for solidarity

The MVMC initiative has defined the boundaries of EU health policy. While it did not result in establishing a new European right to abortion under a new law – which was not the sole goal of the initiative and would have likely been struck down for exceeding EU competences – it has created a financial bridge across legal borders de facto providing a supportive system for accessing abortion in another Member State.

Hence, the initiative of My Voice, My Choice is a pragmatic victory. It proves that when 1.2 million citizens raise their voices, the Commission cannot simply ignore it. It must find a way to say yes, even if that is wrapped in a masterclass in EU legal manoeuvring. The MVMC-movement has shown that in the EU, a step forward for the women on the ground may not always be a loud legislative bang. Sometimes, it is the quiet and pragmatic solution that proves to be historic, nevertheless. The fight for bodily autonomy has moved from the streets of Valletta and Warsaw to the budget implementation offices of Brussels. That is, in itself, a revolutionary shift.

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The Australian social media ban for children under 16, introduced in December 2025, appears to have influenced lawmakers across Europe: one country after another announces its intention to implement similar restrictions on children’s access to social media. France, Turkey, Spain, and the UK are the forerunners for the time being. Germany, too, is actively debating similar regulation, with legislation likely to follow soon.

This piece contributes to the debate by examining a Turkish draft law imposing a social media ban on children under 15 and restrictions on children aged 15 and older, introduced in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (hereinafter, the Parliament) on 4 March. Although the Turkish approach offers a more advanced model by introducing a two-tiered system, it appears that some of the central flaws of the current trend are not overcome.

The regulatory shift and the legal challenges

Regulating children’s use of online services is not a new legal phenomenon. However, previously, the focus was on privacy, as seen in Article 8 of the EU’s GDPR, while the recent legislative initiatives mark a departure in aim and purpose. The emerging approach aims for an absolute ban on social media for children, regardless of parental consent, time or content limitations. Therefore, the ban is not solely aimed at preventing children from accessing harmful content; it treats such platforms as inherently harmful for children.

For instance, the Australian ban was introduced for access to social media platforms with the aim of minimising “exposure to the harms experienced by young people on social media”, “such as cyber bullying, body image issues, eating disorders and addiction to scrolling”. To implement this, children are prevented from opening social media accounts. However, the Australian ban has been challenged by both children, as supported by an NGO, and by one of the affected platforms, Reddit. Both legal proceedings are based on the constitutional freedom of communication on political and government matters and are ongoing.

The argument of the first challenge is that the ban burdens political communication more than reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose since there are better alternatives to an absolute ban, such as “parental consent pathways for 14-15 year olds, … targeted moderation/takedown”. Reddit’s challenge, among others, is based on the argument that the ban does not provide sufficient protection because social media content remains accessible to children in logged-out mode. Therefore, it argues that

“a person under the age of 16 can be more easily protected from online harm if they have an account, being the very thing that is prohibited […] because the account can be subject to settings that limit their access to particular kinds of content that may be harmful to them”.

These challenges are relevant not only to the Australian ban but also to any country that adopts the new regulatory approach, including Turkey.

The two-tiered Turkish draft law

The Turkish draft law adds and amends Law 5651 on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publication (hereinafter, the Turkish Internet Law). Although its details may change at a later parliamentary stage, the government’s draft law is expected to retain its main pillars.

The draft law introduces an absolute ban on social media for children under 15, while foreseeing tailored services to children aged 15 and older (i.e., until the age of 18). The explanatory memorandum explains the aim of the ban and restrictions as

“to introduce firm and protective measures to safeguard children’s physical, psychological and social development from harmful content, cyberbullying and abuse in the digital environment”.

The proposed absolute ban is identical to the Australian Act, except for the age threshold. The parliamentary commission report cites scientific research for the 15-year-old threshold. It is also possible that the 15-year-old threshold is preferred to align the legislation with the criminal liability rule for minors under the Turkish Criminal Code. The tailored services for children aged 15 and older are original to the Turkish draft law.

Tailored social media services for children are not entirely new in the Turkish legal system. For instance, the Turkish Internet Law, similar to Article 28 of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA), already requires social network providers to take the necessary measures to provide tailored services for children by taking the child’s age and best interests into account. However, the existing legal framework is drafted in general terms, without requiring specific measures. The draft law clearly takes a different route, not only by requiring social media platforms to publish the measures they have taken, but also by requiring them to introduce parental control features that allow parents to control account settings, oversee paid transactions, and monitor and limit screen time. In this sense, the draft law moves towards concrete obligations for the platforms. This approach seems akin to the European Commission’s 2025 Guidelines, which describe tools for guardians as complementary to safety-by-design measures, and therefore envisage parental control features as one possible element of platforms’ compliance strategies.

The effects of the restrictions on children’s social media usage

An issue intrinsic to any absolute ban or restricted access of this kind is the effect of the lack of access to social media on children. The issue is closely related to various aspects of the freedom of expression of children, such as the right to receive and impart information and ideas, under Article 26 of the Turkish Constitution and Article 10 of the ECHR. As stated by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter, the UN Committee), “[t]he digital environment provides a unique opportunity for children to realize the right to access to information.”

One should consider the role of social media in contemporary society. Such platforms are not mere websites where one can like cute AI-generated cat videos. The nature of social media as a modern public square must not be overlooked, since such platforms “for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge”. Preventing and restricting access to these “modern public squares” will have significant effects on children, potentially partially positive, but also adverse, as they play a critical role in children’s participation in public debates.

The proposed two-tiered system might, at first, seem more advanced than the single-tiered Australian system, since it allows the second tier to use social media in a “tailored” environment. In theory, we agree with the tiered approach, which aligns with the UN Committee’s position: states “should respect the evolving capacities of the child as an enabling principle that addresses the process of their gradual acquisition of competencies, understanding and agency.”

However, the proposed two-tiered system restricts access to social media until the age of 18. Considering that any Turkish citizen aged 18 or over can vote and stand for election in a parliamentary election, whether restricting children’s access to social media until the day they can become an MP is proportionate remains to be determined. Similarly, another key question, which is also raised against the Australian ban, is whether an absolute ban until the age of 15 is necessary, while tailored services can be provided. In this vein, the EU Commission’s 2025 Guidelines state that “parts of social media services with content, sections or functions that may pose a risk to minors […] should only be made available to adult users whose age has been verified accordingly.”

The obligations of the social network providers

Under the draft law, the obligation bearer is set as the “social network providers”, which is defined as “[n]atural or legal persons that enable users to create, view, or share content such as text, images, audio, and location on the internet for the purpose of social interaction” under Article 2(s) of the Turkish Internet Law. This definition is not confined to social networks in the narrow sense but also encompasses user-generated content (UGC) platforms. Although the wording of the definition is rather vague and may include other platforms, such as messaging services, in practice, it has been interpreted and applied to cover only large social networks and UGC platforms.

The social network providers will be obliged to ensure compliance and not to “provide services” to children under 15 by “taking necessary measures”, including age verification. Similarly, they will be responsible for “taking necessary measures” to provide tailored services to children aged 15 or older. In comparison, the Australian act requires social media platforms to take “reasonable steps to prevent age‑restricted users having accounts”. The difference between the obligation not to provide services and to prevent having accounts might be mere semantics. However, if one considers Reddit’s legal challenge in Australia, the difference might become vital. As stated by Reddit, most social media content is available to the public, including children, in logged-out mode, which renders the Australian ban ineffective. The Turkish draft law imposes an obligation not to provide services, which can be interpreted as affecting access to social media content in logged-out mode.

Such an interpretation would resolve the critique against the Australian Act, yet would also significantly limit the services that social networks can provide, not just to children but also to adults. Furthermore, adults would need an account to access any kind of social media content. These extensive consequences might be questioned on proportionality grounds. Neither the draft law nor the explanatory memorandum has any clear indication of the intended scope of the obligation not to provide services. It may be further clarified by an addition or an amendment at a later parliamentary stage or a secondary regulation. However, the lack of clarity of the current draft law may also be a potential critique under the principle of legality.

In line with their obligations, social network providers will also be responsible for age verification; however, the draft law provides no further details on the age-verification process. In comparison, the Australian Act provides the bare minimum threshold for the privacy measures by prohibiting the collection of government‑issued identification material or the use of services that collect such material without providing reasonable alternative means. Given that age verification mechanisms often raise valid concerns about user privacy by processing sensitive data, such as biometrics or identity documents, ensuring an age verification framework that is both effective and privacy-respecting remains a challenge affecting both children and adults. These concerns could be particularly acute if age verification is left to social network providers or to a governmental digital identity system, without using regulated independent intermediaries.

Regardless of the details of the Turkish draft law, the question of whether age verification can be sufficiently effective remains a persistent one. Minors can easily bypass the age verification requirement with a few clicks by using VPNs. All this signals that people of a certain age with not-so-extensive knowledge of technology can, in one way or another, get around any online ban. In light of this, whether strict regulations are necessary or a less restrictive approach might be preferable to ensure that the targeted group does not seek (perhaps more harmful) alternatives.

Conclusion

The emerging regulatory trend aims to protect children from “harmful” social media platforms. We agree that the underlying concerns driving the regulatory trend are widely valid. However, the ongoing debate largely ignores the potential adverse effects of (nearly) complete exclusion of children from the “modern public squares”. One must not forget that the new generation lives in a world shaped by today’s technology. Any legal solution must be capable of living in that world, too.

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On 5 March 2026, in its C-613/24 judgment, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) fined Portugal for €10 million for its failure to comply with a 2019 judgment (C-290/18) on the Habitats Directive. In addition, the Court imposed a daily penalty payment of €41,250 until the judgment is fully complied with. This figure corresponds to the 55 sites in question and will be reduced as Portugal makes progress on the implementation of the ruling. This ruling is in many ways arguably a straightforward enforcement case. However, it demonstrates, once again, that enforcement action – even for basic or preliminary implementation – simply takes too long. In addition, it highlights the need for follow-up action under Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to ensure that judgments are actually implemented. Both points highlight fundamental rule-of-law issues.

Overview of the ruling

The C-613/24 case concerned the designation and management of protected sites under the Habitats Directive (HD). The Directive itself is from 1992 and sets out a four-stage process for the designation of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs), as summarised in para 37 of the judgment. The key stage is the adoption of a formal (agreed) list of sites by the Commission, which Member States must then designate as soon as possible, and within six years at the latest. For Portugal, the relevant decisions were from 2004 and 2006, meaning that the last deadline for designation was 2010 and 2012 respectively. Following various enforcement steps launched by the Commission in 2013, in 2019 the CJEU found Portugal in breach of Article 4(4) of the HD for failing to designate 61 sites. In addition, Portugal was found in breach of Article 6(1) of the HD for its failure to take adequate conservation measures as the measures it had adopted were generic and not specific to the ecological requirements of each habitat type and species that the sites should have been designated for.

Portugal failed to implement the judgment, and the Commission brought follow-up proceedings under Article 260(2) of the TFEU, referring the case to the CJEU in February 2024. In its March 2026 judgment, the CJEU found that the breach of Article 4(4) and Article 6(1) of the HD still persists at the February 2022 reference date (2 months after the formal notice, para 46 and 62), and consequently, that Portugal has breached its obligation under Article 260(1) of the TFEU to implement the Court’s earlier ruling (para 63).

The Court then considered the appropriate lump sum and penalty payment. The Commission argued (at the time of the referral, in February 2024) that safeguarding biodiversity was one of the main priorities for the EU (para 67), that Article 4(4) and 6(1) of the HD establish the framework of the conservation and protection of Natura 2000 sites (para 68), and that the infringement was therefore significant, according it a seriousness of 10 on a scale of 1-20 (para 66). Considering also the length of the non-implementation, the Commission proposed a lump sum payment of 8.2 million EUR and a daily penalty payment of 45.5k EUR (para 75-76). Portugal sought to argue that the HD was simply difficult to implement and that the effects of non-implementation had not been demonstrated (para 78, 80).

The Court found that the preservation and restoration of biodiversity constitute an essential objective of general interest (para 98), and that Article 4(4) and 6(1) of the HD are fundamental provisions of the HD, the breach of which undermines these objectives (para 99). The infringement must therefore be regarded as particularly serious (para 99), and the rich biodiversity of Portugal means that the stakes for the EU’s common heritage are particularly high (para 100). The Court further considered that the breach period constituted a considerable period of time (persisting since 2010/2012, with judgment form September 2019) (para 105) and it took Portugal’s ability to pay into account (para 106-109) to conclude on a 10 million lump sum (para 110) and a penalty payment of €750 per site, totalling €41,250 for the 55 sites in question on the day of the ruling (para 121).

Enforcement delays

As the guardian of the Treaties, it is the Commission’s role to ensure that EU law is complied with – a key element of the rule of law. The Commission is therefore equipped with various enforcement tools, including the ability to take Member States to the CJEU. This step sits at the end of several informal and formal exchanges between the Commission and the Member State in question – criticised for their opaqueness. In the field of environmental law, the Commission has long been criticised for being slow and often unambitious with its enforcement action, allowing political considerations to seep into the process. A lack of political will, reflected in insufficient resources, appears to continue to hinder the adequate enforcement of key EU environmental laws.

This case illustrates that even a relatively straightforward instance of non-designation can take more than a decade without achieving full compliance on the ground (yet). Following the expiry of the 2012 deadline, a first request for information was made in April 2013 (C-290/18, para 18), followed by a letter of formal notice two years later in 2015 and a reasoned opinion in May 2016. The initial referral to the CJEU under Article 258 TFEU occurred in January 2018, with a ruling issued in September 2019. The follow-up initially appeared quicker, with a request for information in October 2019 (para 16). However, a formal notice was only issued in December 2021, followed by a referral to the CJEU under Article 260 TFEU in February 2024. With a ruling in March 2026, this totals 14 years of non-designation of protected sites.

Follow-up to CJEU rulings

Even where enforcement action is taken and a Member State is brought before the CJEU and found to be in breach of environmental law, this does not necessarily result in actual change on the ground. A 2020 review of 11 CJEU rulings on the Birds and Habitats Directives found that implementation was only partially successful, with Article 260 of the TFEU proceedings often necessary but not always forthcoming to achieve change on the ground. Overall, Commission follow-up was found to be inconsistent and frequently very slow.

While there are indications that Portugal has finally started to designate the protected sites in question, this nonetheless appears extremely slow. This also suggests that earlier Article 260 proceedings could have sped up the implementation. However, there remains no systematic follow-up of CJEU rulings that includes clear timelines for initiating Article 260 TFEU proceedings.

Outlook

The judgment recognises the fundamental role of designation of protected sites and corresponding conservation measures for the Natura 2000 network and biodiversity in the EU. Yet, this obvious point should not have taken 14 years and a 10 EUR million fine.

A silver lining of the long enforcement journey may be that this ruling provides a timely reminder of the importance of proper designation and adequate measures as Member States prepare their National Restoration Plans under the EU Nature Restoration Law (NRL). While not containing a site designation process like under the Habitats Directive, Member States must set out restoration measures and identify restoration sites by September 2026. These obligations similarly constitute the foundation for the NRL’s architecture. With clear timebound restoration targets, corresponding to the urgent need to coherently address the climate and biodiversity crisis, there is no time for such decade-long enforcement procedures. Instead, implementation action should be stepped up, with swift enforcement by the Commission where needed, particularly given the overlap with existing obligations under the Habitats Directive. However, the current political context of slashing fundamental environmental legislation through various deregulation rounds does not spark optimism for the stricter enforcement action by the Commission. Instead, it suggests civil society actors may need to take even more of a role in fighting back and protecting what is left.

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