🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

On 11 December 2025, just before the Christmas holidays, the Austrian National Council introduced amendments to the School Education Act (Schulunterrichtsgesetz [SchUG]), banning headscarves for students under 14 in the name of protecting children’s freedom of development and fulfillment. It is expected that the Federal Council will give its consent within next few days. This regulation constitutes the second attempt by the Austrian legislature to introduce a headscarf ban. The initial attempt was subsequently overturned by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of its unconstitutionality.

This article therefore examines the extent to which the legislature has taken the requirements of the Constitutional Court into account. Although the legislator has been largely successful in this, two crucial aspects have been overlooked: the resulting stigmatisation and the underlying patriarchal structures.

The (renewed) headscarf ban

The primary component of this “protection of children’s freedom” entails the compulsion that students up to the age of 14 are prohibited to wear a headscarf that covers the head in accordance with Islamic traditions. The ban applies to all public and private schools in Austria. Parents or guardians are obliged to ensure that the ban is observed. The objective is to facilitate optimal development and fulfilment of all pupils, with a particular emphasis on self-determination, equality, and the enhancement of visibility for girls. This approach is deemed to be in the best interests of the child.

In the event of a first violation of the ban, the school management must immediately convene a meeting with the pupil concerned and her legal guardians in order to clarify the background to the violation. It is evident that this aims at persuading parents to adhere to the headscarf prohibition. In the event of a subsequent violation of the headscarf ban, the school management must inform the responsible school authority, whereupon a further discussion is held with the parents or guardians. Should this discussion also prove unsuccessful, the legal guardians are threatened with an administrative fine ranging from 150 to 800 euros, and the youth welfare authority must also be informed.

The headscarf ban, which was passed with the votes of all parties represented, except of the Greens, is the second edition of an attempt that was first made in 2019. The law was introduced by the then center-right ÖVP/FPÖ coalition under massive criticism from the opposition parties (the social democratic SPÖ, the liberal NEOS and Greens) at the time. The legal provisions adopted in 2019 applied, in contrast to the recent attempt, only to public schools and exclusively to girls of primary school age. These provisions were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH]) in 2020.

Judgement of the Constitutional Court

The primary rationale was that a regulation counteracting undesirable gender segregation and thus serving the educational goal of social integration and gender equality generally pursues an important constitutional objective in general (Article 7 para. 2 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG]) and for schools in particular (Article 14 para. 5a B-VG). However, such a regulation must be proportionate and objective, particularly in alignment with the other fundamental values of the school.

The Constitutional Court has stated that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf is a practice that can be carried out for various reasons. For instance, it could simply be an expression of affiliation to Islam or the orientation of one’s own life towards its religious values. Furthermore, the wearing of the headscarf can also be interpreted as a sign of belonging to the Islamic culture or of adherence to the traditions of one’s country of origin. Consequently, the Islamic headscarf is not characterised by a clear and unambiguous meaning. The Constitutional Court’s position is therefore in opposition to the attribution of a fundamentalist significance to the headscarf. However, given that the headscarf is not necessarily an expression of Islamic fundamentalism, the Constitutional Court does not see itself in a position to measure the constitutionality of banning headscarves in state educational institutions against this possible interpretation.

The selective ban, which affected only Muslim girls, under Section 43a SchUG of 2019 prohibited girls from wearing a headscarf until the end of the school year in which they turn ten. The Constitutional Court found that these measures were from the outset unsuitable to achieve the objective formulated by the legislator itself. Rather, the 2019 ban could also have a detrimental effect on the inclusion of Muslim girls and lead to discrimination, as it potentially hinders their access to education or socially excludes them. The 2019 regulation of Section 43a SchUG was identified as a factor that marginalises Islamic origin and tradition. The deliberate prohibition of the Islamic headscarf, predicated on a single religious or ideological clothing regulation, would have – according to the Constitutional Court – a stigmatising effect on a specific group of people.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court contended that the prohibition on headscarves might result in pupils opting for private schools without the benefit of public rights or to attending lessons at home. This, in turn, could potentially lead to social exclusion and deny affected girls access to other ideological concepts within the meaning of the constitutional educational mandate under Article 14 para. 5a B-VG.

The Constitutional Court acknowledged the legislator’s legitimate concern regarding the protection of Muslim girls who do not wear a headscarf, and thus to ensure a free decision on the practice of religion. However, this circumstance could not justify the selective ban under Section 43a SchUG. For the Constitutional Court, it was not objectively justifiable that the solution to such conflict situations starts with girls wearing headscarves, instead of addressing those persons who exert pressure on them to do so, for example in the form of hostility, devaluation or social exclusion in its decision VfSlg 20.435.The 2019 headscarf ban had, from the point of view of the Constitutional Court, the effect of discriminating against Muslim pupils by creating a distinct separation between them and other pupils. The enforcement of the religious and ideological neutrality of the state could, in principle, also justify restrictions on the individual legal sphere. However, the emphasis on a specific religion or ideology and its particular manifestation in a singular type of attire, which is also comparable to other non-prohibited clothing habits in one way or another, is incompatible with the principle of neutrality.

Navigating the Constitutional Courts’ requirements

In light of the aforementioned context, the question arises as to whether the headscarf ban that will enter into force with the beginning of the upcoming school year on 1 September 2026 fulfils the requirements formulated by the Constitutional Court. The federal government seems to be convinced that it does, and also refers to the accompanying measures, in particular the discussions held with those affected. . However, there is little more detail on this; the measures are not explicitly delineated within the legislative amendment. Instead, they appear to be, at best, support measures intended to prevent the emergence of situations in which Muslim girls are exposed to pressure from young moral guardians at schools.

When the recent legislative regulation is evaluated in this context, it is evident that the legislator has made a concerted effort to mitigate the rigid headscarf ban: The consequence of the offence is a result of discussions with the legal guardians; the sanction ultimately affects them, not the girls concerned. It is acknowledged in the law that wearing a headscarf is a matter of personal preference, and that this choice should be respected. It is evident that the ban does not permit teachers to remove the headscarf. It is also evident that the federal government is keen to establish an environment that is conducive to the integration of Muslim girls into society and that reduces external pressure on them to wear a headscarf.

However, these efforts are now being thwarted by the fact that these girls, or rather their legal guardians, are being pressured to force them not to wear headscarves. The ban, targeting a single religion, criticised by the Constitutional Court in 2020, remains – albeit in a new form – in place, as does the stigmatisation of those affected. Whether this result can be justified by the fact that the sanctions are not disproportionate is questionable. In addition, the accompanying measures are only very vaguely known.

The assertion made by government officials that legislators were as certain of the constitutionality of the new law as they profess to be is questionable. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that, at least temporarily, there was a degree of discussion about the possibility of ascribing the headscarf ban constitutional status. In such a scenario, with the backing of the FPÖ, it would have been feasible to insulate the headscarf ban from constitutional scrutiny by elevating it to constitutional status. With few exceptions, the Austrian Constitutional Court lacks jurisdiction to review constitutional provisions with regard to contradictions between these provisions and fundamental rights. It is praiseworthy that the ruling parties resisted this temptation, which would have have elevated a fundamental rights restriction to constitutional status and, moreover, would have documented through this constitutional status that the headscarf represents a significant obstacle to integration in Austria.

Addressing the result, not the source of the problem

A constitutional analysis of the law commences with the fact that the obligation not to wear the headscarf – even for children and young people – constitutes a restriction of their freedom of religion in accordance with Article 9 ECHR and Article 10 EU Charter or an interference with the parents’ right to religious education on this basis. Furthermore, it is a restriction of private and family life in accordance with Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 EU Charter. Finally, there is also the question – particularly emphasised by the Austrian Constitutional Court – of unequal treatment in comparison to members of other religious communities, where there is no ban on visible signs of religious affiliation.

In contrast to the classic secular model in France, for example, the Austrian state is not entirely neutral in religious terms, especially not in the context of the education system. Despite the fact that the cross in the classroom is regarded as a symbol of Western culture rather than of Christianity, as established by the case law of the Constitutional Court, it nonetheless represents a significant instance of unequal treatment, particularly in the context of the headscarf ban.

Nevertheless, this distinction is not inherently unconstitutional, provided it can be objectively justified. The legislative documents make such an eloquent attempt at justification when they refer to the number of women wearing headscarves in Austrian schools and the importance of integration. The number of women who choose to wear headscarves is not, in itself, problematic; however, there is an issue when this garment is worn as a result of social coercion, which promotes and perpetuates patriarchal structures. The public interest in counteracting such conditions can also justify treating this religious symbol differently from other religions, where such fears are not justified either due to the small size of the groups concerned or for other reasons.

Conversely, with the extension of the headscarf ban to all schools, the legislator has considered a justified concern of the Constitutional Court regarding the legal situation in 2020 and, additionally has also extended the group of those affected from the age of 10 to the age of 14. This exacerbates the problem. The Constitutional Court’s objection that the headscarf ban could lead to a switch to private schools has at least been countered by the legislator by extending the ban to such educational institutions, but it cannot cover home schooling, which is permitted in Austria. Above all, the legislator does not know how to respond to the Constitutional Court’s indication that – in short – the patriarchal structures should be addressed rather than the result and how to deal with the fact that the headscarf ban stigmatises.

The political elephant in the room

In light of the aforementioned circumstances, the elephant in the room is the question of whether a headscarf ban that is (also) supported by the Austrian political and societal mainstream could induce the Constitutional Court to depart from its previous case law, where it annulled a similar ban adopted by a centre-right government. That the mere breadth of political or societal support for a piece of legislation cannot serve as a constitutional argument requires no further explanation. Yet one may wonder whether such support is truly irrelevant in practice. This question becomes more pressing due to the constitutional concerns in relation to the renewed ban.

I would like to thank Ina Kapusta for her editorial support.

The post Compulsion to Freedom appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Heiko Sauer hat dem BVerfG an dieser Stelle unlängst einen „Kurswechsel im Europaverfassungsrecht“ bescheinigt. Anlässlich des Egenberger-Beschlusses des Zweiten Senats zeichnet er das Bild eines Bundesverfassungsgerichts, das nach den Erschütterungen des PSPP-Urteils (BVerfGE 154, 17) in ruhigeres Fahrwasser zurückkehrt. Sauer spricht von einer „wohltuenden Deflationierung der Ultra-vires-Kontrolle“, ja von einem „Abgesang“ auf die großen europaverfassungsrechtlichen Auseinandersetzungen. Die Karlsruher Kontrollvorbehalte würden auf das zurückgeführt, was sie einst sein sollten: exzeptionelle Letztvorbehalte, theoretische Notbremsen, deren Betätigung in weite Ferne rückt. Der Tenor ist Erleichterung: Die Harmonie scheint wiederhergestellt, weil die Dissonanz leiser geworden ist.

So verlockend diese Deutung angesichts des Wunsches nach einem harmonischen Gerichtsverbund sein mag: Sie läuft Gefahr, die bloße Abwesenheit offenen Streits mit einer strukturellen Befriedung gleichzusetzen. Ich möchte Sauers These daher ergänzen und zugleich wenden: Nicht die Deflationierung, die der Kontrolle die Wirkungskraft entzieht, ist die Lösung, sondern ihre Institutionalisierung.

Echte Kooperation erfordert Regeln für den Umgang mit Kompetenzgrenzen – ein institutionalisiertes Zusammenspiel, das den Konfliktfall nicht als unionsverfassungswidrigen Betriebsunfall, sondern als klärungsbedürftigen Dialog begreift. Die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle ist kein Störfall, sondern – richtig verstanden – ein notwendiges Institut des Unionsverfassungsrechts selbst.

Kein deutscher Sonderweg: Der europäische Befund

Ein zentrales Missverständnis in der Debatte um die „Deflationierung“ ist die Annahme, die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle sei ein deutsches Phänomen, ein Karlsruher Sonderweg, den man nun langsam wieder in den europäischen Mainstream eingliedert. Eine systematische Gesamtschau der europäischen Verfassungsrechtsprechung zeigt jedoch ein ganz anderes Bild: Europäische Normalität ist die Ablehnung eines absoluten, kompetenzblinden Anwendungsvorrangs.

Solange die Mitgliedstaaten über das ‚Ob‘ und ‚Wie‘ der Integration entscheiden, ist die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle keine nationale Marotte, sondern die logische Kehrseite der europäischen Kompetenzordnung. Zwar beansprucht der EuGH für sich eine absolute Autonomie des Unionsrechts und ein damit verbundenes umfassendes Rechtsprechungsmonopol. Doch diese absolute Autonomie ist eine Fiktion, die weder historisch noch dogmatisch in den Verträgen verankert ist. Die EU fußt auf dem Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung (Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 1 und Abs. 2 EUV). Dieses Prinzip ist keine bloße politische Absichtserklärung, sondern die rechtliche Lebensader der Union. Damit bleibt die Union eine abgeleitete Rechtsordnung; ihre Geltung beruht nicht auf sich selbst, sondern auf dem Willen der Mitgliedstaaten und deren verfassungsrechtlich verorteten und demokratisch gesteuerten Rechtsanwendungsbefehlen.

Dies ist auch kein deutsches Spezifikum, sondern europäischer Verfassungsstandard: Sei es Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 des Grundgesetzes, Art. 88-1 der französischen Verfassung, Art. 90 der polnischen Verfassung oder Art. 11 der italienischen Verfassung – sie alle öffnen die nationale Rechtsordnung für das Unionsrecht, markieren aber als Geltungsgrund zugleich dessen Grenzen.

In der Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten haben Verfassungsgerichte Kontrollvorbehalte etabliert, die funktional der Ultra-vires-Kontrolle entsprechen. Das dänische Højesteret hat im Ajos-Urteil (Case 15/2014) eine klare rote Linie gezogen und dem EuGH die Gefolgschaft verweigert, gestützt auf das Bestimmtheitserfordernis der dänischen Verfassung bei der Hoheitsrechtsübertragung. In Frankreich nutzen der Conseil constitutionnel und der Conseil d’État eine flexible Prinzipienabwägung („Identitätskontrolle“ bzw. „Äquivalenztest“), um sicherzustellen, dass Kompetenzüberschreitungen nicht die Verfassungsidentität aushöhlen – wie etwa im French Data Network-Urteil (Conseil d’État, Nr. 393099) deutlich wurde. Auch in Tschechien (Holubec, Pl. ÚS 5/12), Polen (K 18/04, vor der Rechtsstaatskrise) oder Italien („Controlimiti“, vgl. schon Fragd, 232/1989) behalten sich die Gerichte vor, den Vorrang des Unionsrechts dort zu begrenzen, wo fundamentale Verfassungswerte und die Volkssouveränität berührt sind.

Wenn wir also über eine „Deflationierung“ sprechen, dürfen wir nicht so tun, als sei das PSPP-Urteil ein Betriebsunfall gewesen, den man nun korrigiert. Es war vielmehr der deutlichste Ausdruck einer europaweit geteilten Rechtsüberzeugung: Die Geltung des Unionsrechts endet dort, wo das demokratische Mandat der nationalen Verfassung seine Grenze findet.

Vom Störfaktor zum Institut des Unionsrechts

Das Desiderat der aktuellen Debatte ist ein Perspektivwechsel: Die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle steht nicht außerhalb des unionalen Rechtsrahmens, sondern stützt sich auf die Verträge selbst. Die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle ist damit nicht als Störfaktor, sondern als Institut des Unionsrechts zu begreifen. Sie ist der Schlüssel zur Lösung des Konflikts.

Zunächst verpflichtet die Identitätsklausel des Art. 4 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Var. 2 EUV die Union, die jeweilige nationale Identität der Mitgliedstaaten zu achten, die in ihren grundlegenden politischen und verfassungsmäßigen Strukturen zum Ausdruck kommt. Entgegen einer scheinbar verbreiteten Lesart handelt es sich hierbei nicht um unverbindliche politische Lyrik oder eine bloße Höflichkeitsfloskel gegenüber den Hauptstädten, sondern um eine harte, justiziable Rechtsnorm mit klarem Geltungsanspruch. Art. 4 Abs. 2 EUV fungiert als eine Art „Rechtsgrundverweisung“: Das Unionsrecht öffnet sich an dieser Stelle bewusst für die unantastbaren Kernelemente der mitgliedstaatlichen Verfassungen und macht deren Schutz zu einer eigenen unionsrechtlichen Verpflichtung. Damit ist im Primärrecht selbst eine immanente Schranke angelegt, die den Geltungsanspruch des Unionsrechts dort begrenzt, wo es die verfassungsrechtliche Identität und Volkssouveränität eines Mitgliedstaats berührt.

Diese Identitätswahrung ist untrennbar mit den demokratischen Prinzipien der Union verknüpft, wie sie in Art. 2 und Art. 10 EUV niedergelegt sind. Die Europäische Union bezieht ihre demokratische Legitimation nicht aus einem eigenen Staatsvolk, sondern abgeleitet aus den Wahlvölkern der Mitgliedstaaten, vermittelt über die nationalen Parlamente und das Europäische Parlament. Das Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung ist der Garant dieser demokratischen Rückbindung: Nur soweit eine Kompetenzübertragung durch die nationalen Parlamente demokratisch legitimiert wurde, darf die Union handeln. Eine qualifizierte Kompetenzüberschreitung – also ein Handeln ultra vires – ist daher niemals nur ein technischer Fehler im Zuständigkeitsgefüge, sondern ein Angriff auf das Demokratieprinzip selbst. Wenn Unionsorgane Mandate an sich ziehen, die ihnen nie übertragen wurden, durchbrechen sie den demokratischen Legitimationszusammenhang und verletzen die Volkssouveränität, die als Kernbestandteil der nationalen Verfassungsidentität unter dem besonderen Schutz des Art. 4 Abs. 2 EUV steht.

Diese Feststellung muss auch prozedural abgesichert werden: Wenn das materielle Unionsrecht über Art. 4 Abs. 2 EUV den Schutz der verfassungsrechtlichen Identität und der demokratischen Selbstbestimmung garantiert, muss es auch ein Verfahren geben, um diesen Schutz im Ernstfall durchzusetzen. Würde man den nationalen Verfassungsgerichten dieses Instrument verweigern, liefe der Schutz der Verfassungsidentität ins Leere, sobald der EuGH eine Kompetenzüberschreitung nicht als solche erkennt oder sanktioniert. Die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle ist daher kein Akt des Ungehorsams gegen das Unionsrecht: Sie stellt sicher, dass die in den Verträgen selbst angelegten Grenzen der Integration nicht durch eine schleichende Kompetenzausweitung contra legem überschritten werden.

Die Kontrolle sichert daher die demokratische Legitimation der Union. Denn die EU ist eine kompetenziell legitimierte Demokratie. Wenn Kompetenzen ohne Mandat wandern („Creeping Competences“), kann die Zustimmung der Bürger erodieren. Die Überwachung der Kompetenzgrenzen verfolgt eine demokratiespezifische Ventilfunktion.

Indem wir die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle als Institut des Unionsrechts begreifen, wandelt sie sich von einer einseitigen „Notbremse“ zu einem Instrument des Dialogs im Verfassungsgerichtsverbund. Das Ziel ist eben nicht der Bruch, sondern die Sicherung der gemeinsamen Rechtsgrundlage. Institutionalisiertes Zusammenspiel bedeutet, dass nationale Verfassungsgerichte und der EuGH nicht gegeneinander, sondern in einem arbeitsteiligen Prozess miteinander fungieren: Der EuGH sichert die Einheitlichkeit (Art. 19 EUV), die nationalen Gerichte sichern die Grenzen der Ermächtigung.

Prozeduralisierung statt Konfrontation: Ein Vier-Stufen-Modell

Wie sieht dieses Zusammenspiel konkret aus? Es darf kein „wildes“ Ausbrechen geben, keine willkürliche Verweigerung der Rechtsbefolgung. Ein europarechtskonformes Ultra-vires-Verfahren muss zwingend prozeduralisiert sein. Nur durch Verfahren lässt sich der Konflikt von der politischen auf die rechtliche Ebene heben und dort befrieden.

Ein solches institutionalisiertes Verfahren könnte man – grob angerissen – de lege lata in vier Stufen konzipieren, die sich aus einer Zusammenschau der verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen in Art. 2, Art. 4 Abs. 2 und 3 sowie Art. 5 EUV und den Rechtsschutzgarantien der Art. 19 EUV und Art. 267 AEUV ergeben:

Erstens verlangt das Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung (Art. 5 Abs. 1 und 2 EUV) eine präzise Trennung zwischen einfachem Rechtsverstoß und Kompetenzanmaßung. Nicht jede fehlerhafte Rechtsanwendung ist ein Ultra-vires-Akt; vielmehr muss ein struktureller Ausbruch aus dem „Integrationsprogramm“ des Zustimmungsgesetzes vorliegen. Ein solcher ist gegeben, wenn die Union entweder in einem Bereich tätig wird, für den ihr die Verbandskompetenz fehlt, oder wenn sie eine bestehende Kompetenz unter Missachtung ihrer konstitutiven Schranken – etwa durch Verletzung von Verbotsnormen oder des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes – so exzessiv ausübt, dass dies faktisch einer vertragslosen Kompetenzerweiterung gleichkommt.

Auf der zweiten Stufe greift die prozedurale Sicherung durch die gerichtliche Kooperationspflicht aus Art. 4 Abs. 3 EUV und Art. 267 AEUV. Bevor ein mitgliedstaatliches Verfassungsgericht eine Unionsmaßnahme im eigenen Rechtsraum unangewendet lässt, trifft es eine Vorlage- und Dialogpflicht. Bestehen Zweifel an der Kompetenzgrundlage, muss der Weg nach Luxemburg beschritten werden; der Dialog ist keine Option, sondern eine unionsrechtliche Notwendigkeit zur Klärung der Rechtslage. Das BVerfG hat dies im OMT-Verfahren (BVerfGE 134, 366) vorgemacht: Es legte detailliert dar, warum es eine Kompetenzüberschreitung sah, gab dem EuGH aber die Möglichkeit zur (konformen) Auslegung.

Drittens ist die Zuständigkeitsverteilung nach Art. 19 EUV zu respektieren: Danach hat der EuGH das Mandat zur „Wahrung des Rechts bei der Auslegung der Verträge“. Dabei muss sich der EuGH aber nachvollziehbarer Methoden bedienen. Hier liegt die Chance, die Sauer in seiner Analyse der „Deflationierung“ vielleicht unterschätzt. Wenn das BVerfG in Egenberger die Entscheidung des EuGH akzeptiert, dann nicht aus Resignation, sondern weil es die Antwort des EuGH auf ihre „Methodengerechtheit“ geprüft hat. Wenn der EuGH aber die methodischen Standards völlig missachtet – etwa indem er offensichtliche Tatsachen ignoriert, den Wortlaut verkehrt oder willkürliche Rechtsfortbildung betreibt –, verlässt er den Boden der Auslegung der Verträge und betreibt unzulässige Rechtssetzung. Um hierbei die Rechtssicherheit zu wahren, bedarf es geschärfter Kategorien für solche schwerwiegenden Methodenfehler.

Das Weiss-Urteil des EuGH (C-493/17) war ein warnendes Beispiel für ein methodisches Defizit, in dem der Gerichtshof die wirtschaftspolitischen Auswirkungen der EZB-Politik faktisch ausblendete und so eine Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung unmöglich machte. Im Fall Egenberger hingegen sah das BVerfG die Auslegung der Antidiskriminierungsrichtlinie als methodisch vertretbar an. Das ist der Unterschied: Dem EuGH-Urteil wird nicht blind gefolgt („Deflationierung“), vielmehr ist es das Ergebnis einer eingehenden Prüfung („Institutionalisierung“). Das BVerfG behält sich die Kontrolle vor, übt sie aber zurückhaltend aus, solange der EuGH methodisch nachvollziehbar arbeitet.

Viertens muss das Verfahren gegen Rechtsmissbrauch abgesichert sein. Eine Ultra-vires-Kontrolle darf keinesfalls dazu dienen, rechtsstaatliche Standards abzubauen oder sich den Grundwerten der Union zu entziehen. Warnende Beispiele für einen solchen instrumentellen Missbrauch liefern die Rechtsprechungspraxis des politisch gekaperten polnischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs (etwa im Urteil K 3/21) und des ungarischen Verfassungsgerichts (insbesondere Entscheidung 22/2016). Rechtssicherheit schafft hier nur eine präzise Fallgruppenbildung auf Basis von Art. 2 EUV. Denn nationale Identität darf nicht zum Deckmantel autoritärer Strukturen werden: Wer den Rechtsstaat im Inneren schleift, kann sich gegenüber der Union nicht auf ihn berufen.

Fazit: Keine Angst vor institutionalisierter Dissonanz

Sauers „Abgesang“ auf die großen Auseinandersetzungen ist insofern verfrüht, als die institutionellen Fragen noch nicht abschließend geklärt sind. Die Kompetenzfragen werden nicht verschwinden, solange die Union sich dynamisch entwickelt und Krisenbewältigung mit Kompetenzdehnung einhergeht. Sie aber nur „kleinzukochen“, reicht nicht. Wir sollten die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle aus der Schmuddelecke des vermeintlichen Nationalismus holen und sie als prozedurales Element fest in die Unionsarchitektur einbauen.

Das PSPP-Urteil mag als Schock empfunden worden sein, doch historisch betrachtet könnte es die Geburtsstunde einer effektiven Kompetenzkontrolle als Gemeinschaftsaufgabe sein. Ähnlich wie die Solange I-Rechtsprechung (BVerfGE 37, 271) einst den EuGH zwang, den Grundrechtsschutz ernst zu nehmen, zwingt der Ultra-vires-Vorbehalt den Gerichtshof heute, seine Rolle als Hüter der Kompetenzordnung ernster zu nehmen und nicht einseitig als „Motor der Integration“ zu agieren.

Ein institutionalisiertes Verfahren zwingt zur Begründung und zur Auseinandersetzung mit den Argumenten der anderen Seite. Es transformiert den Machtkampf in einen Diskurs. Eine Union, die ihre eigenen Grenzen ernst nimmt und deren Einhaltung durch ein kooperatives Verfahren garantiert, ist am Ende harmonischer, legitimer und auch effektiver als eine Union, die Kompetenzkritik als Majestätsbeleidigung behandelt.

Echte Stabilität wird nicht dadurch erzeugt, dass die Verfassungsgerichte verstummen, sondern indem sie in ein geordnetes europäisches Verfahrensrecht eingebunden werden. Die jüngere Rechtsprechung der europäischen Verfassungsgerichte zeigt immer deutlicher: Die Ultra-vires-Kontrolle ist gekommen, um zu bleiben. Wer ihren Abgesang anstimmt, verkennt, dass gerade die rechtlich eingehegte Möglichkeit des „Nein“ das „Ja“ zur europäischen Integration erst unionsverfassungsrechtlich tragfähig macht. Das ist das „institutionelle Zusammenspiel“, das wir auch nach Egenberger weiterentwickeln müssen.

The post Gekommen, um zu bleiben appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

As the infrastructures for creating, replicating, and disseminating information have increased significantly since the advent of the World Wide Web, the tools used by nationalist governments to control those infrastructures have expanded and evolved to keep pace with technological change. Nationalist governments seek control of knowledge infrastructures both to promote their supporters and beliefs and to erase positions and people who they fear. While the increased embrace of nationalist practices – particularly in relation to information – is currently occurring in a distressing number of governments across Europe and the Americas, the United States (US) provides an especially stark example of how rapidly a nationalist government can gain political control of knowledge infrastructures to advance its preferred beliefs and silence opposing views.

Knowledge is dangerous, especially to governments

Governments have viewed knowledge as potentially dangerous to their authority as long as we have records of governments. Well before the Common Era (BCE) in Egypt, China, Greece, Jerusalem, Rome, and many other locations, governments were implementing censorship policies when written records were confined to papyrus scrolls and clay tablets. The first censorship campaign for which detailed records have survived was in China in 213 BCE, and it was thorough. The emperor Qin Shi Huang called for the burning of all texts contradicting his preferred version of history, along with the more than 400 authors of those texts just to make sure the stories would not be told again.

Most governments and religions kept an index of banned materials as a matter of basic policy. But, in a practical sense, censorship policies had only a small range of written materials to cover before the printing press made the written world much more available. Prior to the printing press, the cost of a typical book was about $20,000 in production costs in today’s money. Such books were filled with transcription errors that had accumulated over time, and in many cases the creation of new copies took more time than the decay of the existing books due to the materials used. New discoveries were often forgotten faster than they could be recorded.

The first comprehensive government programs to control knowledge infrastructures were created in response to the printing press, as this invention suddenly made it much easier to spread information that a government did not want to spread. The printing press greatly advanced access to information, which in turn spurred increases in literacy. The rapid expansion of the written word encouraged mass confusion and increased isolation along national and religious lines, producing many bloody conflicts driven by differences in religious beliefs that were now in print for all to read.

Learning to control knowledge infrastructures

Control of what information was printed and disseminated became a driving goal for most governments, leading to banned books lists and state control of who had license to print materials. As the period of European powers creating colonial empires coincided with the expansion of publications and literacy via the printing press, the colonizers could wield their power both through printing and through censorship. Later new technologies, such as the telegraph and the steam-powered printing press, would further government control over empires and knowledge infrastructures by giving the government the ability to learn new information faster and thus control narratives about events.

The Habsburg Empire implemented policies to control knowledge infrastructures that spanned centuries. In Spain, the Habsburg policies led to the Inquisition and an approved books list of about 100 titles. In the central European branch of the Empire, every creative act had to be approved by the authorities, and all improvisations were forbidden. Public performances had a police officer in the audience following the script word for word with any actor guilty of deviating however slightly arrested on the spot.

Asserting control over knowledge infrastructures is a defining characteristic of nationalist governments, which work to inextricably link their political party to the nation and state itself. The marginalization and dehumanization of minority populations and political opponents is one of the core uses of these infrastructures. Nationalism defines current governments such as Argentina’s Javier Milei, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, India’s Narendra Modi, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Russia’s Vladmir Putin, and Donald Trump in the US, among many others.

The twentieth century featured many nationalist states – such as Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Communist China, and the Soviet Union – seeking comprehensive control of knowledge infrastructures that incorporated a widening array of communication technologies including newspapers, radio, films, academic journals and scientific publications, recordings, and television. Such control included sometimes arresting – or much worse – scientists, journalists, and librarians. These governments undermined and attacked education, expertise, and public discourse so that the tools for dissent were badly weakened or no longer existed. Control of educational curricula was employed as a powerful means to dictate the information that was available. Dissenting writers were silenced and their works burned publicly. Such twentieth century efforts simultaneously promoted the government-approved narratives and beliefs, while limiting or erasing other perspectives. Russia’s Vladmir Putin, the person who has invented much of the playbook for government control of knowledge infrastructures in the information age, has stated that “Wars are won by teachers”.

In the twenty-first century, the capacities of the World Wide Web magnify the power and reach of government efforts to control knowledge infrastructures. Government messages can be spread instantly to create the preferred narrative and drown out a dissenting narrative. Social discord and disorganization among opponents can be created through disinformation that distracts from real threats. Online harassment of opponents can intimidate and punish those who dissent. Swarms of bots can be deployed to further disinformation and cyberbullying efforts on a massive scale. The Internet can even be slowed or turned off to control information flows within a country.

For Internet-enhanced nationalist governments, control of information, censoring information, and spreading disinformation are now entirely interrelated. The growth of knowledge infrastructures inevitably leads nationalist governments to discover new methods of control, like removing all of the information about a population from government websites. All these Internet-enabled methods are enhancements to the established methods.

Asserting control of knowledge infrastructures

One key lesson that nationalist governments have learned is that a flurry of activity and disinformation is very useful in accomplishing their goals. Opponents are left working to keep track of all the changes, to determine which are conjectures and which are genuine proposals, to ascertain which have been implemented, and to figure out the implications of the changes. The more that is happening, the harder it is to understand how these changes interact with one another. That confusion is intended, enhancing the unending stream of falsehoods to make you question your own perceptions of reality.

In the US, this tactic can actively be witnessed in the relentless efforts by the second Donald Trump administration to take control over knowledge infrastructures in the US, primarily through executive orders rather than legislation, during its first year in office. Since taking office in January 2025, the Trump administration has:

• Fired many government employees with specific areas of expertise and in positions related to information collection, oversight, analysis, and accuracy, including the Librarian of Congress and the Archivist of the United States.
• Removed thousands of government webpages, many focused on science.
• Mandated government use of nationalist terms such as “restoring patriotism” and “restoring American exceptionalism”, which are contrary to the independent missions of institutions, while also prohibiting the use of other terms and perspectives.
• Shuttered federal grant programs and agencies supporting libraries, archives, and museums, such as the Institute for Museum and Library Services (IMLS).
• Fired all the librarians at federal government agencies, such as the Center for Disease Control (CDC) Library that supports public health professionals across the US.
• Required the federal museums of the Smithsonian Institution to submit their exhibition content, plans for future shows, and guidelines for review by the White House.
• Ended all federal government funding for independent public media, such as National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting System (PBS).
• Closed or greatly diminished federal agencies devoted to collecting and disseminating news and other information resources, such as the Voice of America (VOA).
• Cancelled many already awarded grants devoted to topics the administration objects to, such as projects focused on issues of gender, diversity, equity, and inclusion, from agencies such as the National Science Foundation (NSF).
• Ended federal funding related to COVID-19 vaccine mandates.
• Asserted direct control over the curriculum in all schools run by the federal government, such as military academy schools.
• Created lists of banned books for federal government libraries.
• Eliminated federal funding for programs that the administration objects to, particularly those related to diversity, equity, and inclusion.
• Threatened to cancel broadcasting licenses or take other retaliatory regulatory actions from commercial networks airing content the administration disagrees with, such as trying to get television comedians Jimmy Kimmel and Stephen Colbert removed from their respective late night programs.
• Encouraged censorship organizations looking to ban materials about marginalized populations in local schools and libraries while simultaneously claiming that no such censorship organizations exist.

The second Trump administration entered office with an extensive plan – known as Project 2025 – prepared to accomplish massive changes to the federal government and the entire country. Many of these ideas had been proposed repeatedly but not acted upon in the first Trump administration. And, in addition to all these tactics to control scientific knowledge infrastructures, Trump spreads a great deal of strange disinformation related to science, such as clearly not understanding the causes of wildfires.

One alarmingly notable thread across these efforts to control knowledge infrastructures is trying to establish which perspectives and experiences are to be considered truly American. These policies variously target Black, Indigenous and other people of color (BIPOC), lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual, and beyond (LGBTQIA+), disabled, and immigrant populations to establish that these traditionally marginalized populations are not worthy of inclusion in the administration’s vision for America. Many of the policies of Project 2025 intentionally increase the disadvantages faced by already marginalized populations. The same populations are often spoken of in highly negative terms by Trump.

The extent of the Trump administration’s success thus far in asserting control over information is evident in the rising amounts of self-censorship. In an example of unsuccessfully trying to avoid criticism, Harvard Education Publishing Group cancelled an issue of one its own journals in 2025 shortly before publication. The issue focused on the damage done to the educational infrastructure of Gaza during the war with Israel. Given the strong anti-Gaza stance of the Trump administration, even writing about the need to educate the children of Gaza displaced by the war was determined to be potentially displeasing to the Trump administration.

Controlling science infrastructures

All the means of controlling the knowledge infrastructure noted above have been readily applied to scientific knowledge infrastructures, through ending funding programs, closing agencies, cancelling grants, threatening retribution, and firing experts. Additionally, the Trump administration has taken further steps to control the scientific knowledge infrastructure by elevating the roles and opinions of those who lack scientific expertise.

The clearest example of all these methods of undermining scientific knowledge infrastructures through political action can be found in the appointment of Robert F. Kenndey, Jr. to the position of Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). With a budget in the billions and control over most of the health, medicine, and safety research done by the US government, HHS is the perfect avenue through which to undermine and repurpose the scientific knowledge infrastructure in the US.

Kennedy has seemingly devoted his life to contradicting established science, including spreading disinformation about many diseases and vaccines, while advocating for treatments that have no scientific basis. Placing an anti-science activist in charge of HHS guarantees that the scientific knowledge infrastructure in the US will be greatly altered to disregard research, evidence, and scientific data in favor of the personal, not-science-based beliefs of Kennedy and the political objectives of the Trump administration. Kennedy has cancelled health and safety research programs, already stopped public education programs, and appointed people who share his beliefs rather than relevant expertise to advisory committees.

The political intentions to undermine scientific knowledge infrastructures through HSS were perfectly encapsulated in a report issued by the agency entitled Make America Healthy Again, which had to be retracted and corrected multiple times. Not only was much of the content contrary to established scientific evidence, a large portion of the work cited in the first version of the report did not exist. Publications and scientists were made up, while actually existing publications and scientists were wildly mischaracterized; the report was also filled with obvious indicators that generative AI had been used to write the report rather than experts.

A depressing centerpiece

The US is less than one year into the second Trump administration. The mounting damage to knowledge infrastructures overall, and particularly to scientific ones, is painfully evident. The capture and misuse of knowledge infrastructures by nationalist governments is central to their political strategies of controlling what information is available, what information is censored, and what disinformation is foisted upon the public. Whether the goal is to erase the presence of marginalized cultures or inconvenient scientific truths, political control of knowledge infrastructures is a depressing centerpiece of the playbook of the increasing numbers of nationalist governments in the twenty-first century.

This essay is adapted from the forthcoming book entitled Book Bans, Disinformation, and Cultural Erasure: The Censorship Movement in Libraries, Schools, and Society by Paul T. Jaeger, which will be published in 2026 by Bloomsbury.

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