The arrest of the opposition’s presidential frontrunner Ekrem İmamoğlu marks a historic turning point for Turkey. In a recent post on Verfassungsblog, Cem Tecimer compellingly demonstrated how judicial harassment has become a central tool of political control in Turkey, focusing on the domestic dimensions of Ekrem İmamoğlu’s criminalization. This piece complements and builds on that analysis by turning the lens toward Strasbourg. It argues that the İmamoğlu case, emblematic of Turkey’s shift from “competitive authoritarianism” towards “full authoritarianism” or a weak form of fascism, demands immediate and preventive intervention by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Most importantly, retrospective assessments of the recent events in Turkey are insufficient at this point. It is crucial to invoke Article 18 and the “chilling effect” doctrine before irreparable political damage occurs. Judicial harassment systematically aims to neutralize opposition and suppress democracy. If the ECtHR fails to act now, it risks relegating itself to the role of a historical observer rather than upholding its mandate as a guardian of democratic constitutionalism in Europe.

The First Instance of Judicial Harassment: The “Foolish Case”

Ekrem İmamoğlu first attracted Erdoğan’s attention during the 2019 local elections when, as the CHP candidate, he narrowly defeated AKP’s Binali Yıldırım. Following AKP’s objections, the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) annulled the election, leading to a repeat vote in June 2019, where İmamoğlu won decisively with 54.22% of the vote. As the first non-Islamist to win Istanbul since Erdoğan’s 1994 mayoral victory, İmamoğlu became a key target. Since then, he has faced what the Council of Europe calls ‘judicial harassment’ — repeated legal actions aimed at intimidating or silencing individuals through prolonged legal entanglements.

The first major case of judicial harassment against İmamoğlu arose from the “Foolish Case.” In a speech at the European Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Strasbourg on October 30, 2019, İmamoğlu criticized the annulment of the Istanbul election, the refugee crisis, and the appointment of trustees over elected mayors. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu retaliated, calling İmamoğlu “the fool who went to the European Parliament to complain about Turkey.” İmamoğlu responded by calling those who annulled the election “the real fools.” It led to a criminal case accusing him of “collectively insulting public officials” (Art. 125/3-5), supposedly targeting the SEC members. His lawyers argued that his remarks were directed at Soylu and referenced the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Council of Europe resolution advocating for the decriminalization of defamation.

Despite these arguments, İmamoğlu was sentenced to 2 years, 7 months, and 15 days in prison, resulting in a potential political ban preventing him from running in the 2023 presidential elections, where Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a much weaker contender, ran as the opposition’s joint candidate.

The ‘Foolish Case’ fulfilled its intended purpose: It acted not only as a deterrent (see the “chilling effect doctrine”) but also as a politically motivated measure involving a severe sentence based on an overbroad and vague legal provision. The legal process violated ECHR standards.

The harassing nature of the present proceedings—despite the absence of a conviction—triggers the rationale in Akçam v. Turkey, where the Court held that even a discontinued criminal investigation under a vague and overly broad provision may exert a chilling effect and justify victim status. Dilipak v. Turkey further confirms that a prolonged criminal trial based on such a norm can itself amount to an interference with freedom of expression, regardless of its outcome. These cases demonstrate that the lack of a final conviction does not bar admissibility where the process itself has a deterrent effect. In the present case, the exceptional nature of the sentence, its suspicious timing, the restrictions imposed on political activity, and the accusatory discourse in pro-government media all point not only to a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections), but also to a breach of Article 18 (misuse of power), taken in conjunction with them. Therefore, in the forthcoming case concerning his detention, the application should be examined not only under Article 5 (right to liberty and security) but also in light of these aspects.

Other Instances of Judicial Harassment

The ‘Foolish Case’ is far from being the only instance of judicial harassment targeting İmamoğlu. In recent years, a multitude of criminal and administrative investigations have been initiated against him. Over 90 investigations—most of them politically motivated—were launched against İmamoğlu between 2019 and 2023. During that period, a total of 50 separate criminal investigations were launched against İmamoğlu, with allegations ranging from threats and abuse of office to bid rigging. Out of these, 31 cases were eventually dismissed. Most of the allegations appear to be frivolous or politically motivated. Examples include minor accusations such as overcrowding buses during COVID-19 or database use in public services, complaints about the suitability of newly purchased minibuses for the streets of Princes’ Islands, and claims that he disrespected the tomb of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror by entering it wearing shoes.

While it is impractical to detail all of these investigations here, five particular cases have drawn significant public attention.

The Bid Rigging Case

The ‘bid rigging’ case against Ekrem İmamoğlu illustrates judicial harassment targeting opposition politicians in Turkey. It stems from a Ministry of Interior investigation into İmamoğlu’s decisions as Mayor of Beylikdüzü (2014–2019), focusing on a 2015 public tender. Although the tender occurred five years earlier, scrutiny only began in 2020, a year after İmamoğlu’s election as Istanbul’s Mayor.

The investigation escalated into a criminal case in 2022, resulting in a lawsuit in 2023 — eight years after the tender. The case remains pending before the Court of First Instance, with the next hearing scheduled for the 811th day, far exceeding the 409-day limit under Turkey’s “Judicial Target Time” framework.

Expert reports have consistently cleared İmamoğlu of wrongdoing, confirming he held no direct responsibility for the tender. However, a dubious document was introduced after the final expert report, raising serious procedural doubts.

The prosecution’s conduct further highlights procedural irregularities. During a critical hearing – despite having previously declared readiness to deliver a final opinion – the prosecutor unexpectedly requested more preparation time. This deliberate delay tactic reflects a strategy of judicial harassment, perpetuating prolonged pressure on İmamoğlu’s political career akin to a ‘Sword of Damocles’ and creating a chilling effect on opposition politicians

Erdoğan’s Compensation Lawsuit

New lawsuits and investigations are constantly being added to the list. One recent example is President Erdoğan’s lawsuit demanding one million Turkish Liras in moral damages over İmamoğlu’s remarks about the unlawful detention of Ahmet Özer, the CHP’s Istanbul Esenyurt Mayor, arrested on October 30, 2024, on allegations of membership in the separatist/illegal PKK. İmamoğlu had referred to the government as a ‘dark movement pursuing its own agenda’ and as ‘holding batons.’

The lawsuit blatantly violated established ECtHR case law, which stipulates that politicians must tolerate a higher degree of criticism than ordinary citizens. The Pakdemirli v. Turkey decision clearly states that high-compensation lawsuits aimed at chilling political speech violate Article 10 of the ECHR. Such moral damages claims reflect a broader pattern of judicial harassment designed to silence opposition voices through financial intimidation.

Controversies with the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor

Judicial harassment against İmamoğlu also involves Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, known for handling politically charged cases. The CHP has labelled Gürlek a “mobile guillotine” due to his controversial role in prosecuting figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, Canan Kaftancıoğlu, the Academics for Peace, and seizing Can Dündar’s properties. Gürlek’s refusal to implement Constitutional Court rulings and his role as Deputy Minister of Justice have raised further concerns about his impartiality.

The controversy intensified when CHP Youth Branch President Cem Aydın shared a critical video about Gürlek on X, resulting in Aydın’s early-morning detention. In response, İmamoğlu condemned Gürlek’s actions, stating: “To free your children from these treatments, we will remove the mindset governing you from the nation’s mind.” Despite the absence of any incitement to violence or support for terrorism, an investigation was announced within hours, accusing İmamoğlu of “threatening and targeting individuals involved in counter-terrorism efforts.”

The investigation, led by Gürlek himself as both prosecutor and”‘victim”, violates the Budapest Guidelines and ECHR standards, as established in cases like Kolesnikova v. Russia. Five days later, an indictment was issued, explicitly naming Gürlek as the “victim”, highlighting a severe conflict of interest and lack of procedural fairness.

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s office violated the presumption of innocence by releasing a press statement implying İmamoğlu’s guilt. It contradicts ECtHR case law, including Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria and Y.B. and Others v. Turkey, which prohibit premature declarations of guilt. The investigation also disregards Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) rulings affirming that public officials, especially those with political roles like Gürlek, must tolerate criticism under freedom of expression. The incident exemplified the misuse of legal mechanisms to suppress political dissent under the guise of counter-terrorism.

Finally, the investigation disregards the TCC’s judgments in the Özgür Arıkan, Bayram Akın, and Arif Altın cases, which affirm that prosecutors, as public officials, must endure criticism within the framework of freedom of expression. The fact that Gürlek held political roles, including his tenure as Deputy Minister of Justice, makes him even less deserving of special protection against criticism.

Ultimately, the incident is yet another alarming example of how legal mechanisms are being systematically exploited to silence opposition figures under the pretext of counter-terrorism. It highlights a broader pattern of judicial harassment aimed at intimidating and suppressing political dissent.

Expert Witness Controversies

President Erdoğan hinted at politically motivated investigations against CHP municipalities by stating, “big radish in the saddlebag”  during an AK Party speech on January 17, 2025, implying impending legal action against İmamoğlu. In response, İmamoğlu held a press conference on January 27, 2025, highlighting the systematic harassment targeting CHP municipalities over alleged economic misconduct. He noted a striking anomaly: the same expert witness was assigned to nearly all cases involving CHP municipalities, suggesting deliberate manipulation.

Before the press conference even ended, a new investigation was launched against İmamoğlu for “attempting to influence the judiciary.” To challenge the plausibility of the expert witness assignment, İmamoğlu’s legal team employed ChatGPT to calculate the probability of all 24 cases being randomly assigned to the same expert witness from a pool of 1,803 experts. The result was an astronomical improbability of approximately 7.18 x 10^(-79) – a figure comparable to cosmological phenomena, such as a human passing through a wall via quantum tunnelling or all atoms in the universe converging at a single point.

The staggering improbability highlights a deliberate manipulation of the judicial process. Instead of investigating the credibility concerns İmamoğlu raised, his speech itself became the target of judicial harassment, violating his freedom of expression.

Diploma Annulment

One of the most striking examples of judicial harassment against İmamoğlu is the annulment of his university diploma, a constitutional requirement to run for the presidency.¹⁾ Following his presidential candidacy announcement, the Turkish Higher Education Council (THEC) initiated an investigation claiming İmamoğlu’s 1990 transfer from Girne American University in Northern Cyprus to Istanbul University was illegal due to the alleged lack of THEC’s recognition of the former at that time.

İmamoğlu’s lawyers argued that no regulation explicitly required such recognition in 1990, and applying today’s standards retroactively is legally unacceptable. They provided documents proving YÖK’s recognition of a diploma from the same university in 1991, showing Turkish authorities accepted such transfers.

Even if the transfer was deemed unlawful, revoking a vested right after 31 years violates the principle of legal certainty, as established by the European Court of Human Rights in Bigaeva v. Greece, Convertito and Others v. Romania, and Şahin Kuş v. Turkey. The TCC’s Abidin Pişgin judgment also upheld these principles.

Despite a compelling legal basis, his diploma was annulled—seemingly to block his candidacy.

The Last Act in the Judicial Harassment: İmamoğlu’s Arrest and Aftermath

Following the shock of İmamoğlu’s diploma revocation, the harassment escalated on March 18 with his arrest from his home. Pro-government media had already predicted the development, orchestrating a disinformation campaign resembling an ‘adverse press campaign’ aimed at shaping public perception, as described by the Strasbourg organs.

Despite being willing to appear before authorities if summoned, İmamoğlu was arrested with excessive force, violating the ECtHR’s standards established in Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, which prohibits such measures against well-known politicians with no history of violence.

The arrest triggered mass protests, but the government responded with undemocratic measures: throttling social media, banning demonstrations for four days, and using excessive force, including acts amounting to torture. Even platforms like X (formerly Twitter) resisted the restrictions.

İmamoğlu faces two cases: one alleging corruption and the other accusing him of collaborating with the PKK through a supposed electoral alliance with the HDP. Both cases heavily rely on statements from secret witnesses. While İmamoğlu was detained for the first case, the second remains unresolved, with many fearing a prolonged process similar to those of Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş.

What Can Be Done?

The answer to the question of what should be done can be both political and legal. Since this is a legal blog post, I will focus only on the legal aspects.

The latest developments should not be considered in isolation from the broader pattern of judicial harassment previously outlined. While some of these interventions are already legally underway, others exist primarily to create a chilling effect and to establish potential victimhood. All of these processes must be considered as a single package and examined without separating them from one another, as politically motivated interference can only be accurately identified through a comprehensive approach.

A decision rejecting the pre-trial detention order is currently awaited, followed by a decision from the TCC. However, there is reasonable doubt about whether the TCC’s decision will be rendered with full independence. It is precisely where the ECtHR’s role becomes critical.

The following question is legitimate: If the ECtHR – established to prevent the emergence of ‘weak fascism’ within the member states of the Council of Europe –  fails to intervene now, when will it? The ECtHR must abandon its policy of ‘waiting until the dust settles’ and distance itself from the practice of issuing judgments decades after a political figure has been purged (see Uzan and others v. Turkey).²⁾ After all, the ECtHR should not be a mere chronicler of historical injustices. We do not have the luxury of waiting for yet another Navalnyy scenario.³⁾

Furthermore, the ECtHR’s Article 18 case- aw, in conjunction with the doctrine of a chilling effect, should be instrumental in determining victim status. If judicial harassment within the broader political climate is evidently aimed at comprehensive deterrence, then all applications should be considered admissible together. The approach is particularly necessary when the TCC’s decisions have repeatedly failed to be implemented, especially in contexts resembling weak fascism.

The ECtHR must recognize that delayed intervention weakens rights protection and encourages authoritarianism. The ECtHR must move beyond formalism and act proactively to identify and counter judicial harassment.

The case law on ‘potential victim’, ‘chilling effect’ and Art. 18 (détournement de pouvoir) seems to be the key to overcoming these limits.  Only by adopting this perspective can the focus shift from extinguishing isolated injustices to addressing the broader systemic erosion of democratic governance.

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