🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

Die Vereinbarkeit einer Parteimitgliedschaft in der AfD mit der beamtenrechtlichen Verfassungstreuepflicht prägt den juristischen Diskurs. Immer wieder geben neue verwaltungsgerichtliche Entscheidungen Anlass, die immergleichen Maßstäbe neu anzuwenden. So auch im jüngsten Fall vor dem VG Berlin, das die Nichteinstellung eines Kommunalpolitikers der AfD in den Polizeidienst billigte. Die Entscheidung ist konsequent, dennoch plädiere ich dafür, das redundante Nachbeten und Anwenden der verwaltungsgerichtlichen Abwägungsdogmatik und Einzelfallbezogenheit zu überwinden und die Beweislast umzukehren: Nicht die innerparteilichen und politischen Aktivitäten müssen im Einzelfall eine verfassungsfeindliche Haltung untermauern, vielmehr begründet die Parteimitgliedschaft als solche bereits eine Regelvermutung, die der Betroffene durch aktives innerparteiliches Eintreten für die Werte der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung widerlegen kann.

Der Ausgangsfall

Doch zunächst zum Ausgangsfall, der schnell erzählt ist: Ein Polizeivollzugsbeamter bewarb sich bei der Berliner Polizei, um die Laufbahnbefähigung für den gehobenen Dienst der Kriminalpolizei zu erlangen. Nach seiner Einstellungszusage beantragte der Polizeikommissar die Entlassung aus dem Beamtenverhältnis auf Lebenszeit, um zum 01.04.2026 zum Kriminalkommissaranwärter auf Widerruf (§ 4 Abs. 4 BeamtStG) ernannt zu werden. Hierzu kam es jedoch nicht. Die zuständige Dienstbehörde nahm die Zusage nur wenige Tage vor der geplanten Einstellung zurück, da sie erfahren hatte, dass der Beamte Fraktionsvorsitzender der AfD-Fraktion in einer Gemeindevertretung war, und sie daher an seiner charakterlichen Eignung zweifelte. Der Beamte reagierte prompt und legte sein kommunales Amt schon am nächsten Tag nieder und wandte sich gegen die Entscheidung. Doch zu spät: Die Behörde blieb bei ihrer Position und so beantragte der Beamte vorläufigen Rechtsschutz nach § 123 VwGO beim zuständigen Berliner Verwaltungsgericht.

Wiederholung der verwaltungsgerichtlichen Maßstabsbildung

Das VG Berlin folgte mit Beschluss vom 11. Juni der behördlichen Argumentation richtigerweise und lehnte den Antrag ab. Die Begründung rezipiert die allseits bekannten beamtenrechtlichen Maßstäbe: Die politische Treuepflicht, die als hergebrachter Grundsatz in Art. 33 Abs. 5 GG verankert und in § 7 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 BeamtStG einfachgesetzlich kodifiziert ist, gebietet eine aktive Haltung für die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung. Es genügt nicht, kein Verfassungsfeind zu sein. Erforderlich ist es vielmehr, sich verfassungsfreundlich zu verhalten, also aktiv für die Werte der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung einzutreten.

Auch beim Verhältnis des Beamten zu verfassungsfeindlichen Organisationen, insbesondere Parteien, kann das VG Berlin auf ein umfangreiches Rechtsprechungsrepertoire zurückgreifen, nicht nur auf die allseits bekannte Judikatur des BVerfG und BVerwG, sondern auch auf die jüngste Entscheidung des VGH Mannheim zur Vorstandseigenschaft in der Jungen Alternative Hessen. Aus den verwaltungsgerichtlichen Ausführungen ist nicht erkennbar, dass sich die Dogmatik im Vergleich zu meinem letzten Beitrag weiterentwickelt hat. Man könnte meinen, sie sei ausgeschrieben.

Mal wieder: Verfassungsschutzbehördliche Einstufung

In der Subsumtion verweist die Kammer wieder einmal zunächst auf die verfassungsschutzbehördliche Einstufung. Der brandenburgische Verfassungsschutz hat die AfD im April vom Verdachtsfall zum gesichert extremistischen Beobachtungsobjekt heraufgestuft. Das Innenministerium begründet diesen Schritt mit einem „Prozess der sukzessiven, systematisch betriebenen Radikalisierung“ der AfD. Laut dem Verfassungsschutz vertritt sie einen ethnisch-homogenen Volksbegriff, lehnt zentrale Staatsstrukturprinzipien strukturell ab und vernetzt sich zunehmend mit rechtsextremen Akteuren. Indem das VG Berlin dieses Gutachten zur Grundlage seiner Verfassungstreueprüfung macht, untermauert es einmal mehr dessen zentrale Rolle für die Maßnahmen des administrativen Verfassungsschutzes. Die Einstufungsentscheidung ist Ausgangspunkt und zentrales Kriterium für verwaltungsgerichtliche Entscheidungen, etwa im Waffen-, Beamten- oder Sicherheitsüberprüfungsrecht.

Zur Identifikation eines Gemeindevertreters mit parteipolitischen Zielen

Die Entscheidung schließt sodann mit der individuellen Verhaltensprüfung des Betroffenen. Als Fraktionsvorsitzender einer Gemeindevertretung, der noch kurz davor aktiv im Wahlkampfgeschehen für die AfD tätig war, hatte er vornherein keine allzu günstigen Chancen. Er trug mehrere haltlose Argumentationsansätze vor, die das Gericht teils aus prozessualen Begründungspflichten, teils wohl aus strategischem Akzeptanzmanagement in dieser grundrechtssensiblen Sphäre vergleichsweise ausführlich wegschrieb.

Das Verwaltungsgericht betont die besondere Indizwirkung einer Kandidatur für politische Ämter hinsichtlich der Identifikation mit den verfassungsfeindlichen Parteizielen. Daran änderte auch nichts, dass der Betroffene eine organisatorische Trennung zwischen kommunalen AfD-Strukturen und dem AfD-Landesverband behauptete. Denn mangels Ortsverband musste der Antragsteller durch den Kreisverband zum Wahlbewerber gewählt werden, der nach § 2 Abs. 1 Satz 1 der Landessatzung der AfD organisatorisch in den Landesverband eingebunden ist.

Schließlich widmet sich das Gericht vergleichsweise ausführlich der offensichtlichen Schutzbehauptung, der Antragsteller habe „die überörtlichen Entwicklungen der AfD Brandenburg […] nicht in ihrer Tragweite erkannt“, und verwirft diese. Zuletzt hilft ihm auch die Niederlegung des kommunalpolitischen Mandats nicht. Denn er legte es nicht bereits nach der Einstufungsentscheidung des Verfassungsschutzes nieder, sondern erst dann, als der Widerruf der Einstellungszusage unmittelbar negative persönliche Folgen für ihn zeitigte.

Reflexion der Dogmatik

Zunächst: Die Entscheidung ist richtig. Akzeptiert man die verfassungsschutzbehördliche Einstufungsentscheidung des AfD-Landesverbandes Brandenburg und die konsolidierte verwaltungsgerichtliche Dogmatik zum Verhältnis von Mitgliedschaft in extremistischen Parteien zur politischen Treuepflicht, so ist die hier getroffene Feststellung alternativlos: Ein aktiver Mandatsträger, wenn auch nur in einer politisch weniger bedeutsamen Gemeinde, unterstützt die Ziele der rechtsextremen Partei. Insbesondere die aktive Rolle im Wahlkampf, und sei es auch nur auf kommunalpolitischer Ebene, ist als proaktive und nachhaltige Unterstützung der verfassungsfeindlichen Bestrebung zu werten. Wer die parteiprogrammatische Ausrichtung nicht nur innerlich gutheißt, sondern aktiv im Wahlkampf, d.h. mit erhöhter Intensität verteidigt (BVerfGE 148, 11 Rn. 46), dem wird man eine stärkere Identifikation mit ihr attestieren können, die sich von einer bloß passiven Mitgliedschaft abhebt.

Darüber hinaus bleiben jedoch auch nach diesem Beschluss die Einzelheiten der Tragweite unklar: Welcher Grad an aktivem Verhalten unterhalb aktiver Übernahme von Mandats- oder Funktionsämtern ist für die nachhaltige Verfolgung der Ziele notwendig? Das Verwaltungsgericht betont nachdrücklich, dass der Antragsteller von den verfassungsfeindlichen Aktivitäten aufgrund seiner Mandatsträgereigenschaft gewusst haben müsse. Das stimmt natürlich – aber es ließe sich auch entgegnen: Wem nicht? Insbesondere welchem Parteimitglied? Es ist schwerlich vorstellbar, dass es ein passives Mitglied gibt, das 2013 aus wirtschaftspolitischen Motiven in die damals EU-kritische Lucke-AfD eingetreten ist und seitdem die allgegenwärtige Berichterstattung zur Radikalisierung der AfD ignoriert hat. Auch eine Person, die „sich mit Aussicht auf Erfolg dafür einsetzt, dass diese [verfassungsfeindlichen Bestrebungen] ernsthaft und nachhaltig unterbunden werden“, wie es das Bundesverwaltungsgericht fordert (BVerwGE 114, 258, 284), ist theoretisch nur schwer vorstellbar. Eine Recherche des SWR zeigte jüngst den Umgang mit abweichenden Ansichten in der AfD: „Wer widerspricht, wer intern unbequeme Fragen stellt oder öffentlich Kritik übt, könne unter Druck geraten – in Parteigremien, als Journalist oder als normaler Bürger im Alltag.“ Unter diesen Bedingungen erscheint ein aktives Eintreten gegen verfassungsfeindliche Tendenzen beinahe unmöglich – zumal das OVG Münster festgestellt hat, dass sich diese Tendenzen nicht in singulären Äußerungen einzelner Mitglieder erschöpfen, sondern sich systematisch bei einer Vielzahl von Funktionsträgern finden. Vielmehr trifft man medial bedeutend häufiger das Phänomen der „AfD-Aussteiger berichten“ an, bei welchem ehemalige Mitglieder nach ihrem Parteiaustritt Kritik üben.

Paradoxie der Dogmatik

Das aber zeigt die theoretische Unterentwicklung und Paradoxie dieser Dogmatik: Die verwaltungsgerichtliche Judikatur fordert einerseits ein völliges Unterlassen der parteipolitischen Unterstützung, keine Übernahme von Funktionsämtern und Mandaten, also das Dasein als passive Karteileiche (BVerwG), und gleichzeitig die aktive Distanzierung von sämtlichen verfassungsfeindlichen Zielen. Die Person muss von den verfassungsfeindlichen Bestrebungen in ihrer Partei wissen, darf es aber eigentlich nicht, um weiterhin gutgläubig zu sein. Diese Kombination gibt es empirisch nicht. Dennoch weigern sich Rechtsprechung und Literatur, die reine Parteimitgliedschaft für eine Verletzung der Verfassungstreuepflicht genügen zu lassen. Thorsten Masuch betont demgegenüber: „Wer seine Mitgliedschaft in einer Partei oder Vereinigung trotz erkennbarer verfassungsfeindlicher Bestrebungen beantragt oder aufrechterhält, bekennt sich gerade nicht zur geltenden Verfassungsordnung“ (Masuch, ZRP 2025, 172 (175)).

Ich plädiere in Anlehnung an meinen letzten Beitrag für eine geänderte Dogmatik, jedenfalls aber für eine ehrlichere Maßstabsbildung der Verfassungstreue, die eben nicht lediglich aktives Agieren in Funktionsämtern der Partei sanktioniert, wie es die verwaltungsgerichtliche Judikatur suggeriert, sondern: Die Mitgliedschaft in einer verfassungsfeindlichen Partei begründet eine Regelvermutung für die Verletzung der politischen Treuepflicht, die man in atypischen Fallkonstellationen, im Ausnahmefall, widerlegen kann. Weg vom bloßen „Indiz“ (Jarass/Pieroth/Jarass, 19. Aufl. 2026, GG Art. 33 Rn. 76) zur Regelvermutung. Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz, aus dem die „funktionsbezogene Differenzierung“ folgen soll (von Münch/Kunig/Bickenbach, 8. Aufl. 2025, GG Art. 33 Rn. 136), wird ohnehin unterlaufen, wenn eine Addition kaum erfüllbarer Kriterien dazu führt, dass doch nahezu jeder Person eine Bestrebungsunterstützung attestiert wird. Oder anders formuliert: Eine umfassende Abwägung aller maßgeblichen Aspekte im Einzelfall verliert ihre Wirkung, wenn sie doch immer zum selben Ergebnis kommt.

Freilich muss sich der hier vorgeschlagene Paradigmenwechsel an Art. 21 GG messen lassen. Insofern erhebe ich mit diesem Beitrag nicht den Anspruch, die Problematik restlos geklärt zu haben. Geht man aber – anders als Matthias Honer (NVwZ 2024, 705 (707)) – nicht davon aus, dass das Parteienprivileg die Berücksichtigung einer Parteimitgliedschaft für die Annahme fehlender Verfassungstreue absolut sperrt, weil Art. 33 Abs. 2 und 5 GG im „Hinblick auf die (Verfassungs-)Treuepflicht sämtlicher Beschäftigten des öffentlichen Dienstes sensibler reagiert als Art. 21 II GG“ (Dreier/Brosius-Gersdorf, 3. Aufl. 2015, GG Art. 33 Rn. 108), sprechen wenige Sachargumente dafür, eine nachhaltig aufrechterhaltene Parteimitgliedschaft in einer verfassungsfeindlichen Partei bei der beamtenrechtlichen Verfassungstreueprüfung zu tolerieren. Ist der mit der Verfassungstreueprüfung nach Art. 33 Abs. 5 GG verbundene Eingriff in die politischen Kommunikationsgrundrechte bei aktiven Parteimitgliedern – wie hier – gerechtfertigt, so ist nicht ersichtlich, warum ein passives Parteimitglied wesentlich schutzwürdiger sein sollte.

Ausblick nach Magdeburg

Diese Überlegungen sind keine rein akademische Reflexion verfassungsrechtlicher Theorieansätze, sondern können bald praktische Wirksamkeit entfalten: Der AfD-Spitzenkandidat für Sachsen-Anhalt, Ulrich Siegmund, kündigte der MZ gegenüber an, im Falle einer Regierungsbeteiligung umfassende Entlassungen von unliebsamen Beschäftigten vornehmen zu wollen. Es lässt sich mit wenig Fantasie und einem Blick in autokratische Staaten erahnen, mit welchen Personen er diese Stellen nachbesetzen will (vgl. auch den Beitrag von Vogel). Freilich ist dann auch eine beamtenrechtliche Dogmatik, wie ich sie hier vorschlage, wenig wirkungsvoll: Denn die personalführende Stelle, die die Einstellungen von AfD-Sympathisant*innen durchführt, wäre auch die Stelle, der die Prüfung der Einstellungsvoraussetzungen nach § 7 Abs. 1 BeamtStG und damit auch der FDGO-Treue (§ 7 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 BeamtStG) obliegt. Aber umso mehr erscheint es sinnvoll, solange demokratische Kräfte die Exekutive kontrollieren, über Maßnahmen der Resilienz nachzudenken. Denn seine Rolle als Funktionsbedingung von Demokratie (BVerfGE 150, 169 Rn. 30) und Rechtsstaat (Zähle, DÖV 2021, 380 (381)) kann das Beamtentum nur erfüllen, wenn es selbst keinen Zweifel daran lässt, diesen Werten verpflichtet zu sein.

The post Fiktion der Einzelfallprüfung appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Much has already been written about the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR or the Court”) first substantive climate judgment Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland (“KlimaSeniorinnen”) (see for example here and here). This blog post takes that landmark ruling as a starting point to examine the role of procedural rights in climate litigation before the ECtHR. Procedural rights, as we argue, can be understood in a twofold manner: on the one hand, as admissibility criteria structuring access to the Court, and on the other, as substantive guarantees flowing from the Convention itself. Read in this light, KlimaSeniorinnen – alongside Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway (“Greenpeace Nordic”) – reveals key developments in the Court’s emerging climate jurisprudence across both dimensions.

Against this backdrop, we argue that the Court’s restrictive criteria for individual victim status under Article 6 ECHR only allegedly serve to prevent actio popularis, while potentially limiting effective protection of Convention rights – especially in times of democratic backsliding. We further show that in Greenpeace Nordic, the Court developed important procedural safeguards under Article 8 ECHR to protect individuals from climate-related harm, yet applied these guarantees with notable restraint.

KlimaSeniorinnen: Victim Status and Standing Requirements Under Article 6 ECHR

In KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court introduced new, particularly strict victim status criteria for individual climate litigants (see also Judge Pavli’s contribution). Under the new victim status test, the threshold for individuals to prove they are personally and directly affected is especially high (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 488). The Court established that (1) individual applicants must show that they are subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, that is, the level and severity of (the risk of) adverse consequences of governmental action or inaction affecting the applicants must be significant, and (2) the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm owes to a pressing need to ensure the applicants’ individual protection (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 487).

On Article 6 ECHR, the Court addressed victim status in conjunction with the question of the provision’s applicability. In doing so, it appears to have adopted the restrictive victim status criteria developed in the context of Article 8 of the Convention (KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 478-488) as a ratione materiae threshold, into the assessment under Article 6. Notably, the Swiss Government did not contest the victim status of the individual applicants under Article 6. As Judge Eike underlined in his dissenting opinion, “there was, in fact, no dispute and no uncertainty” on this point (KlimaSeniorinnen, Dissenting Opinion, § 22). Against this background, the Court’s restrictive reading does not seem compelled by the circumstances of the case.

As is well established, the applicability of Article 6 requires (1) the existence of a “civil right”, (2) a “genuine and serious dispute”, and (3) that the outcome of the proceedings be “directly decisive” for the applicants’ rights (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 595). While the Court had little difficulty accepting the first two criteria, it drew a distinction regarding the third: it denied that the outcome was directly decisive for the individual applicants, yet affirmed this requirement for the applicant association. This distinction is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s own reasoning. The judgment acknowledged that the dispute had a “direct and sufficient link” to the rights of the association’s members (§ 618). At the same time, however, it did not consider the outcome to be directly decisive for those very members in their individual capacity. The resulting tension suggests that the Court sought to align its new approach of favouring associations over individuals regarding victim status under Article 8 with the uncontested victim status criteria under Article 6. The doctrinal basis for such an alignment remains open to discussion (see also KlimaSeniorinnen, Dissenting Opinion, § 28).

Preventing Actio Popularis?

The Court justified the particularly high threshold for individual victim status by invoking the need to avoid actio popularis, which is not permitted under the Convention. Yet it is not immediately clear that allowing individuals to bring claims of violations of their rights to climate protection would amount to such a prohibited form of litigation – simply because the outcome of the case may benefit the public at large.

This raises a more fundamental question: what qualifies an actio popularis in the Convention system? In general, an application is of an actio popularis nature where an applicant does not claim to be personally affected by a violation of a Convention right, but rather seeks to bring a complaint in the abstract or in the general interest. However, the Court’s case-law on victim status does not require individuals to be affected differently from others. The criteria for excluding actio popularis and for victim status are generally non-comparative. What is decisive, rather, is that an individual is affected in a legally relevant manner – regardless of how many others are affected as well. Likewise, the Court has not, in principle, treated the potential systemic effects of a judgment as an admissibility criterion. The fact that the case may “open the ‘floodgates’ of litigation” and encourage future climate cases is not decisive for the assessment of victim status (for a full argumentation by George Letsas, see here and here; see furthermore here).

Against this background, the Court’s reasoning in KlimaSeniorinnen appears to conflate distinct considerations: The concern underlying the judgment may be less about actio popularis in a strict doctrinal sense and more about the practical implications of climate litigation for the Court’s already considerable caseload. The Court has processed hundreds of thousands of applications since its establishment; in 2025 alone, 31,800 applications were allocated to judicial formation. While such considerations are undoubtedly relevant from an institutional perspective, incorporating them into the definition of victim status risks blurring doctrinal boundaries.

Standing of Associations: Does Membership Matter?

Turning to associative standing – “the other side of the ‘victim status’ coin”, as Judge Pavli described it –, the Court argued that the association “represents a vehicle of collective recourse aimed at defending the rights and interests of individuals against the threats of climate change” (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 523) and accepted its standing (for why this, too, does not amount to an actio popularis, see Corina Heri’s compelling argumentation here and here). What remains uncertain is how the Court intends to apply the criteria on associative standing it developed in KlimaSeniorinnen in future climate cases. To bring climate-related claims on behalf of their members associations must fulfil three criteria: they must demonstrate that (1) they are lawfully established or legally recognised in the jurisdiction concerned, (2) they pursue a dedicated purpose in accordance with its statutory objectives in the defence of the human rights against threats arising from the climate crisis, and (3) they are qualified and representative to act on behalf of its members or other affected individuals (KlimaSeniorinnen, § 502).

Already in a talk we gave at the 2024 Lisbon Climate Conference, we suggested that particularly the latter two criteria should not be applied too rigidly. A strict reading would risk excluding organisations such as Greenpeace, which are not structured as membership associations. The judgment in Greenpeace Nordic seemed to confirm a more flexible approach: both organisations were granted standing despite Greenpeace Nordic’s structure.

However, the recent inadmissibility decision in Fliegenschnee and Others v. Austria (“Fliegenschnee”) complicates this picture (for a more detailed discussion of the case, see here and here). As in KlimaSeniorinnen, the case involved individual applicants alongside an environmental association – Global 2000, Austria’s largest environmental NGO. While the Court swiftly rejected the individuals’ victim status, it left the association’s standing open, raising doubts as to whether it fulfilled the criteria set out in KlimaSeniorinnen, its purpose of defending human rights against climate threats and its representative function (Fliegenschnee, §§ 31–32). However, unlike Greenpeace Nordic, Global 2000 is formally a membership organisation and thus appears to meet the requirement of representativeness more readily. Against this background, the decision suggests a more restrictive reading of associative standing than Greenpeace Nordic would indicate, leaving the Court’s approach uncertain.

Greenpeace Nordic: Building Procedural Climate Safeguards Under Article 8 ECHR

In Greenpeace Nordic, the Court was confronted with a different type of climate complaint than in KlimaSeniorinnen: the case was not about what States must achieve, but rather about how they must decide. Two environmental NGOs – Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth – together with six individual applicants challenged Norway’s 2016 decision to grant petroleum exploration licences in the Barents Sea. Crucially, the applicants did not seek to prohibit oil production as such. Instead, they targeted the decision-making process, arguing that Norway had failed to carry out an adequate environmental impact assessment (EIA) and had thereby not ensured sufficient protection against climate harm (Greenpeace Nordic, §§ 1-2). This procedural framing shaped the Court’s approach: Greenpeace Nordic was treated as a procedural case under Article 8, closely aligned with the Court’s established environmental jurisprudence on information duties, rather than a case centring on substantive mitigation obligations of the kind at issue in KlimaSeniorinnen.

The Court reiterated that Article 8 entails a duty for States “to do [their] part” in ensuring effective protection from serious climate-related harm (Greenpeace Nordic, § 314). Importantly, it translated this duty to procedural safeguards. Central among these is the obligation to conduct an adequate, timely, and comprehensive EIA, in good faith and based on the best available science, before authorising potentially harmful activities (Greenpeace Nordic, § 318). For petroleum projects, this entails at least three requirements: (1) a comprehensive accounting of GHG emissions, including combustion emissions, both domestically and abroad, (2) a legal assessment of whether the project aligns with climate obligations, and (3) public participation at a stage where all options remain open and environmental harm can still be prevented at source (Greenpeace Nordic, § 319).

Closely linked to this is a right to information when climate risks are at issue. Drawing on its own case-law as well as the Aarhus Convention, the Court underlined that affected individuals must be informed about environmental risks to assess and avert them. Significantly, this right operates ex ante: it applies independently of whether the risk later materialises and is meant to shape decision-making before harm occurs (Greenpeace Nordic, § 295). Taken together, Article 8 includes robust procedural climate safeguards, particularly regarding early-stage information and participation.

A Gap Between Theoretical Findings and Practical Application?

Yet, having set out these requirements, the Court applied them with notable restraint. It concluded that Norway had complied with Article 8– even though key climate-related issues, such as exported combustion emissions, were not assessed at the licensing stage but deferred to later phases of the project (Greenpeace Nordic, § 330). This sits uneasily with the Court’s own emphasis on timing. The judgment stresses that EIAs must precede authorisation and that consultation must occur when meaningful alternatives are still available. Nevertheless, it tolerated a system in which decisive aspects of climate impact assessment were postponed and potentially addressed only after the core political and economic commitments had already been made (Greenpeace Nordic, §§ 331-336). The tension becomes even more apparent when viewed against the Court’s reliance on international materials emphasising early and preventive assessment (e.g. Aarhus Convention, Advisory Opinions of ITLOS, IACtHR, ICJ) (Greenpeace Nordic, § 320-324), as well as its precautionary logic in KlimaSeniorinnen, where it rejected postponing review to a stage at which mitigation opportunities are effectively lost (KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 413, 548-549, 631-640).

A similar inconsistency arises regarding the right to information. In its earlier environmental case-law, the Court emphasised that serious long-term risks must be evaluated up-front (see, e.g. Taşkın and Others v Turkey, §§ 118-119; Guerra and Others v Italy, § 60). Information about climate risks, EIAs and public participation must therefore occur at a point in time when they can still meaningfully influence decisions and avert harm. Yet, in Greenpeace Nordic, the Court accepted a procedural design that arguably limits precisely this ability.

Conclusion: Procedural Rights as Gatekeepers and Guarantees

Taken together, KlimaSeniorinnen and Greenpeace Nordic illustrate how procedural rights operate along the two dimensions identified at the outset: as gatekeepers to the Court and as substantive guarantees under the Convention. On the substantive side, Greenpeace Nordic marks an important step in consolidating procedural safeguards under Article 8. Even though the application ultimately failed, the judgment clarifies that effective climate protection under the Convention is not only a matter of outcome, but also of process – in particular, timely information, early-stage assessment, and meaningful participation. On the admissibility side, the Court reshapes access to the Convention system in climate matters by setting a particularly high threshold for individual victim status while favouring associative claims – without yet offering a fully coherent doctrinal foundation.

However, what emerges with clarity is the structural importance of procedural rights in climate litigation: they do not merely shape how claims are assessed, but whether they can be brought at all. The Court’s reliance on associations is therefore not without risk. It assumes a functioning civil society – an assumption that becomes fragile in times of democratic backsliding and increasing autocratic tendencies. Where associations committed to climate protection are restricted, dissolved, or do not exist, restricting individual victim status may ultimately leave Convention rights without an effective procedural pathway.

The post Procedural Rights in Climate Cases Before the ECtHR appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Keir Starmer’s resignation only two years after Labour’s landslide victory is more than a story about the failures of Labour or Starmer himself. It says something larger about the increasingly difficult conditions under which governments in what were once called “advanced liberal democracies” operate today. Across Europe and beyond, political fragmentation, electoral volatility and the rise of populist challenger parties have made governing considerably harder. Even majoritarian political institutions such as those of the UK, which favour single-party majorities and executive stability, can no longer protect incumbents from shifts in public mood as effectively as they once did.

When Starmer entered Downing Street in July 2024, many hoped Britain would return to a more stable political era. After a decade marked by Brexit, constitutional turmoil, revolving-door prime ministers and deep political polarization, Labour’s victory appeared to promise a restoration of moderation and normality. Indeed, this is how Starmer himself described it after the election. Barely two years later, he resigned.

The immediate explanations are familiar. His government suffered from a series of political blunders, damaging controversies and unpopular policy reversals. Labour performed badly in the local and devolved elections of May 2026, and many pointed to Starmer’s leadership shortcomings, particularly his weak communication skills and inability to establish an emotional connection with voters. All these factors certainly played a role. But they are only part of the story.

The Starmer Government

Starmer’s caution and incrementalism led to a few damaging policy U-turns, notably on digital identity cards, inheritance taxation for farmers, and winter fuel payments, which reinforced the image of a government reacting to events rather than shaping them. Additional political blunders further eroded his political capital. The controversy surrounding gifts and donations reinforced perceptions of a political class detached from ordinary voters. The appointment of Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States led to political embarrassment once Mandelson’s ties with disgraced billionaire Jeffrey Epstein were made public.

At the same time, by most measures, especially when compared with some of his recent predecessors, Starmer’s premiership was not an obvious failure, which makes the rapidity of his downfall quite striking. Labour entered office with a large parliamentary majority and moved relatively quickly to implement key parts of its programme. This was notable given the uneven support for Starmer within the parliamentary party (Jeffery et al. 2024) and the precarious electoral position of many Labour MPs. The government strengthened workers’ rights through reforms of sick pay, parental leave and zero-hours contracts. It introduced stronger protections for tenants, advanced its green energy agenda and made progress in reducing NHS waiting lists. After years of political turbulence, it also restored a degree of credibility to Britain’s international position at a moment of considerable geopolitical uncertainty.

The Local Elections of May 2026

The immediate trigger of Starmer’s fall was Labour’s negative performance in the local elections of May 2026. Across 136 English councils, the party lost nearly 1,500 councillors. At the same time, the radical-right populist party Reform UK, Nigel Farage’s latest political vehicle after UKIP and the Brexit Party, gained 1,452 councillors, almost exactly matching Labour’s losses. The Greens also performed strongly, while the Conservatives continued their decline. The picture was hardly better for Labour in the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. In Scotland, Labour recorded its worst result (17 seats, down five from its previous lowest point in 2021) since the creation of the devolved parliament. In Wales, the party lost control of the Senedd for the first time since devolution, collapsing from 30 to only nine seats despite the expansion of the regional Assembly from 60 to 96 seats.

The political fallout of the defeat was immediate. Starmer’s leadership came increasingly under attack. A week after the vote, four junior ministers resigned, followed two days later by Wes Streeting, Health Minister and Labour leadership hopeful. On the same day, Labour MP Josh Simons resigned his seat in Makerfield to allow Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham to contest the by-election with a view of challenging Starmer’s leadership. Under Labour’s rules, candidates for the party’s leadership must be sitting MPs. Burnham’s candidacy acquired additional significance because only a few months earlier Starmer had blocked his return to Parliament through another by-election, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to prevent a future leadership challenge.

Burnham entered Parliament with a landslide victory, winning 54.8% of the vote, almost 10% more than Labour had obtained in 2024. Having campaigned explicitly as a future leadership challenger, he emerged from the by-election with considerable political momentum. Four days later, Starmer resigned. Barring highly unlikely developments, Burnham is likely to become Prime Minister within weeks.

A Volatile and Fragmented Political Landscape

And yet – even though the extent of Labour’s defeat in the local elections was significant, it would not necessarily have led to the PM’s resignation had British politics not changed profoundly over the last decade. Historically, especially in “majoritarian” democracies such as the UK, poor local-election results might prompt at most a limited cabinet reshuffle or some policy adjustments. They would not normally force a prime minister to resign. The fact that it does now is more due to the radically changed environment of British politics over the past decade than to the failures of Starmer or his government.

The long period during which Labour and the Conservatives dominated electoral competition has gradually given way to a more fragmented and volatile political landscape. Smaller parties command increasingly significant shares of the vote. Electoral loyalties are weaker than they once were. The 2024 election accelerated these trends.

These developments are not unique to Britain. Similar patterns can be observed across many liberal democracies around the world. Traditional centre-left and centre-right parties have experienced long-term decline. A higher number of voters switch parties across elections. Populist political entrepreneurs have successfully mobilized voters dissatisfied with established political actors. Politics has become simultaneously more fragmented and more polarized.

Such environments make governing considerably more difficult. Electoral victories become less durable because the coalitions that produce them are less stable. Local victories of once-excluded parties become an alarm bell that can no longer be ignored or accommodated with marginal adjustments. Governments face growing pressure to respond immediately to changing public moods. Political setbacks that might once have been absorbed become potential existential threats.

The Rise of Reform UK

The marked rise in the polls of Reform UK – a party that, if elected to power, would likely emulate the policies and the governing style of US President Donald Trump – strengthens the sense of urgency in responding to electoral mood swings. Since the 2024 general election, Reform has evolved from a challenger party into one of the central actors in British politics. By mid-2026, it was leading several national polls and had established itself as the primary vehicle for anti-establishment discontent.

Like many centre-left parties across liberal democracies, Labour has haemorrhaged voters over the past two decades. It has lost support both to its right and to its left. The aftermath of the Brexit vote enabled the Conservatives to make significant inroads into the former Labour strongholds of northern England, in particular in the 2019 elections. Labour regained many of these seats in 2024, but typically only thanks to the split of the right-wing vote between Reform and the Conservatives (Jennings et al. 2024). Starmer sought to appeal to these voters by tightening immigration and asylum policies under Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood, and by limiting rapprochement with the EU, even though many argued that Britain’s sluggish growth called for a bolder European strategy. This was, however, insufficient to prevent Reform’s victories in 2026.

As many analysts have emphasized, the more immediate electoral threat to Labour now comes from the opposite direction, namely from the Liberal Democrats and most of all the rapidly ascending Green party. In the 2026 local elections, Labour’s losses to the Greens have been estimated at about 22%, while those to Reform to be about a quarter of that figure. Recent research suggests that economic insecurity is the main driver of Labour defections across the political spectrum, while concerns about immigration play a particularly important role among voters moving (now in smaller amounts) towards Reform. Labour thus faces pressure, even though of different intensity, from both directions simultaneously. If Reform, as the polls suggest, replaces the Conservatives as the most viable contender on the right side of the political spectrum, many northern English Labour seats will be at serious risk.

Of course, this is not only a British problem. In different forms, it is present in nearly all liberal democracies today and significantly restricts the room for manoeuvre of centrist and centre-left governments alike. Attempts to respond to concerns about immigration and cultural change risk alienating progressive voters. Moves designed to satisfy progressive constituencies risk strengthening radical-right challengers.

A Tale of Our Times

These are structural characteristics of British politics today and there is no guarantee that Burnham, whatever his political skills, will be able to carve a way to victory for Labour in the next general elections. How to promote the growth policies that would be necessary to reduce economic insecurity and solidify Labour’s vote, without the prospect of stability and with the imperative of delivering in the short term? How to improve the country’s economic prospects if seriously mending the relationship with the EU remains a taboo for a large minority of the UK electorate? Whether any political leader could easily resolve these problems remains unclear.

Starmer represents a type of politician that post-war European liberal democracies have traditionally produced and often rewarded: serious, pragmatic, institutionally minded and committed to incremental reform. He is not a charismatic populist. His appeal rested largely on competence and moderation. What makes his fall politically significant is not that these qualities failed to generate enthusiasm. That has often been true. It is that they increasingly appear insufficient to sustain political authority.

Political polarization, electoral fragmentation, permanent campaigning, social media dynamics and declining trust in institutions have all made political support more volatile and less durable—in Britain like elsewhere.

Starmer’s resignation does not necessarily mean that moderation is impossible or that liberal democracy is doomed. But it does illustrate how difficult governing has become for moderate political leaders. His fall is a reminder of the increasingly demanding environment in which contemporary democracies must operate – and of the challenges that await not only Starmer’s successors, but governments across the democratic world.

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