🍻 Selber Bier Brauen

Bangladesh’s political journey since gaining independence in 1971 has shifted back and forth between democratic aspirations and periods of authoritarian rule. The country now stands at a crossroads again after its authoritarian leader, Sheikh Hasina, was ousted after popular protests last year.

Tasked with the mandate of “rebooting democracy” by the interim administration under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, the Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) has proposed sweeping changes, including restructuring the legislature from a parliamentary to a semi-parliamentary system with moderation. In a previous blog post, I explained the Bangladeshi political context that has led to the current situation and critically examined the process of the ongoing constitution-making effort. This post examines the substantive content of these reforms, especially the proposals concerning the “engine-room” of the Constitution, placing them within the context of Bangladesh’s authoritarian history and ongoing global debates about democratic design. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of semi-parliamentarism, moderated parliamentarism, and democratic backsliding, it assesses whether the CRC’s proposals can truly dismantle centralized power or risk reproducing exclusionary practices. While the CRC’s reforms represent an ambitious effort to dismantle authoritarian legacies through bicameralism, term limits, and checks on executive power, critical gaps – such as the Upper House’s non-staggered terms, the National Constitutional Council’s vulnerability to ruling-party dominance, and populist risks in the referendum process – threaten to perpetuate systemic inequalities and undermine long-term democratic stability.

The CRC’s Proposed Parliamentary Reforms

The CRC’s report proposes a bicameral legislature, consisting of a Lower House (National Assembly) and an Upper House (Senate), both having four-year terms. Some key elements include:

1. Lower House: The Lower House would comprise 400 members, with 300 directly elected through the First Past the Post (FPTP) system and 100 women chosen from reserved seats via direct elections in designated constituencies. It also mandates youth quotas (10% of total seats), lowers the candidacy age to 21, and ensures parliamentary standing committees are led by opposition members.
2. Upper House: The Upper House would consist of 105 members, with 100 elected through Proportional Representation (PR) based on votes cast in the Lower House elections and five nominated by the President to represent socially and economically marginalized groups.
3. Executive Constraints: The Prime Minister (PM) must retain majority support in the Lower House and is limited to two non-consecutive terms (even if a term is cut short, it counts as one term). The President’s role is largely ceremonial, acting primarily on the PM’s advice.
4. Checks and Balances: A National Constitutional Council (NCC), comprising representatives from all state organs – including the President, Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Speakers, Chief Justice, and opposition-nominated Deputy Speakers – ensures balanced representation rather than domination by the ruling party. The NCC oversees critical appointments (e.g., to the Election Commission and judiciary) and emergency declarations.
5. Amendment Process: Constitutional changes require a two-thirds majority in both Houses and approval via a national referendum decided by a simple majority.

These reforms aim to distribute power more evenly, enhance accountability through institutional checks (e.g., opposition-led committees, balanced NCC), and prevent authoritarian regression by curbing unilateral executive and legislative overreach. The inclusion of proportional representation, term limits, and a bicameral structure with mixed methods of selection further promotes political moderation and institutional stability. 

Semi-Parliamentarism and Moderated Parliamentarism

The Constitutional Reform Commission’s (CRC) proposal to restructure Bangladesh’s legislature draws inspiration from two distinct but complementary frameworks: semi-parliamentarism and moderated parliamentarism. Steffen Ganghof’s model of semi-parliamentary government advocates for a dual-chamber system where two independently elected bodies – one representing majority rule (e.g., a lower house) and the other ensuring proportionality (e.g., an upper house) – share legislative power. This design aims to balance democratic responsiveness with stability, preventing the tyranny of simple majorities while ensuring representation for minorities. However, the CRC’s adaptation deviates significantly from Ganghof’s ideal. Although the proposed Upper House (Senate) uses proportional representation, it is not a direct election because its members are not chosen through a separate vote by the people; rather, they are indirectly allocated based on the proportion of votes cast in the Lower House (National Assembly) elections. In Ganghof’s framework, both chambers derive authority directly from voters, ensuring mutual accountability; the CRC’s Senate, by contrast, risks becoming a secondary institution, dependent on the Lower House’s electoral results and vulnerable to partisan influence.

Tarunabh Khaitan’s concept of moderated parliamentarism also informs the CRC’s reforms. Khaitan argues that parliamentary systems need strong institutional checks to balance executive accountability with effective governance. The CRC aligns with this by introducing bicameralism and a National Constitutional Council (NCC) tasked with overseeing key appointments and emergency declarations. The NCC, made up of high-ranking multi-partisan and non-partisan state officials (e.g., the Prime Minister, President, and Chief Justice), is designed to prevent authoritarian consolidation by dispersing power. However, this structure comes with its own set of risks. If the Upper House, which is dominated by proportional representation, blocks legislation passed by the majority-led Lower House, it could lead to legislative gridlock – a problem Khaitan argues should be clearly addressed in the constitutional framework that seeks a path between unilateralism by the ruling party and intransigence by the opposition. While the move to bicameralism is welcome, a clear mechanism for resolving disagreements between the two houses is essential to avoid US-style legislative paralysis in Bangladesh. Options include German-style joint coordination committees or Indian-style joint sittings of both houses.

Institutional Checks and Decentralization

To what extent can the CRC’s proposed mechanisms to distribute power and embed accountability dismantle Bangladesh’s legacy of centralized rule, or do they risk perpetuating systemic vulnerabilities? Focusing on the Lower House’s electoral design, the Upper House’s structural gaps, executive term limits, the National Constitutional Council’s balance of power, and the rigidity of constitutional amendments, I argue that while the reforms advance democratic moderation, critical flaws (such as non-staggered Senate terms, NCC susceptibility to partisan capture, and populist referendum risks) threaten their ability to sustain inclusive governance.

1. Lower House: FPTP, Reserved Seats, and Youth Inclusion

While the First Past the Post system ensures geographic representation, it risks reinforcing polarization, as seen in Bangladesh’s history of zero-sum politics. As Khaitan recommends for the confidence chamber, a ranked-choice voting (RCV) system rather than a First Past the Post system could incentivize moderation by requiring candidates to appeal beyond core bases and build broad church parties. The 100 reserved seats for women, elected through designated constituencies, represent a significant step toward gender parity rather than tokenism, yet this progress could be further strengthened by introducing enforceable quotas for ministerial and leadership roles. A 10% youth quota (for candidates aged 21–35) and a reduced candidacy age of 21 seek to counter generational exclusion. Opposition-led parliamentary committees could enhance oversight, but their effectiveness hinges on vesting agenda-setting and convening rights and powers in the opposition parties to protect them from ruling-party interference.

2. Upper House: Proportional Representation with Structural Gaps

The Upper House’s 105 members include 100 elected via proportional representation based on Lower House votes and five nominated by the President to represent marginalized groups. While proportional representation ensures diversity in legislative representation (e.g., religious and ethnic minorities such as the Hindu, Christian, Chakma, and Garo communities), the Upper House’s four-year term – aligned with the Lower House – fails to provide institutional continuity. While Bangladesh currently has a unicameral legislature, the example of dominant party control in the 2014 and 2018 elections underscores the importance of institutional safeguards – such as staggered terms in a potential upper house – to prevent simultaneous dominance across legislative chambers in systems with bicameral parliaments.

As Khaitan argues, a staggered term for the upper checking chamber serves two functions: (a) it decouples its composition from any single electoral wave and therefore reduces the likelihood of single party domination; and (b) it ensures that the lower confidence chamber always has a more recent mandate as a house, and therefore the sole legitimacy to hire and fire a government. Two viable models for Upper House’s staggered terms emerge, within the context of the CRC’s proposals that seek to align its elections with those of the Lower House: 12-year terms with one-third of senators elected every four years or 8-year terms with half the Senate renewed every four years. Either of these options must be combined with a two-term limit and a lifetime ban on senators contesting Lower House elections to encourage parties to nominate civil society figures, academics, or policy experts rather than career politicians. The 12-year model offers distinct advantages: it could transform the Upper House into a deliberative body of “wise elders” focused on systemic challenges like climate resilience or intergenerational equity. Such extended terms would be akin to the UK’s 2017 proposal for 15-year House of Lords tenures—encourage parties to nominate civil society figures, academics, or policy experts rather than career politicians. However, both models require safeguards against elite capture. For the five President-nominated seats representing marginalized groups, empowering the National Constitutional Council (NCC) to vet nominees – rather than creating separate bodies – could enhance transparency and shield the process from partisan interference. Ultimately, the 12-year model’s emphasis on independence and long-term vision aligns more closely with Bangladesh’s need to break cycles of majoritarian dominance, provided robust checks against entrenchment are embedded.

3. Executive Constraints: Term Limits and Ceremonial Presidency

 The proposed two-term, non-consecutive on the Prime Minister aims to address Bangladesh’s pattern of personality-centric rule (exemplified by Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year tenure). However, a term cut short by a no-confidence vote still counts as one term, which may be unduly restrictive. It might be better to only count a term lasting at least (say) two years, or alternatively, to define the term limit as two terms or eight years in office (whether consecutively or otherwise), whichever is longer. The President’s ceremonial role, acting on the Prime Minister’s advice, reduces authoritarian risks but leaves gaps in crisis oversight. On the question of inviting an MP to form a government or on dissolving the Assembly before its term is over, the President should be required to consult the leaders of the five largest parties in the Assembly as well as the Chief Justice, rather than acting solely on the Prime Minister’s recommendation

4. Checks and Balances: The NCC’s Composition and Risks

The National Constitutional Council (NCC) includes representatives from all state organs: the President, Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Speakers, Chief Justice, and opposition-nominated Deputy Speakers. While designed for balanced representation, the NCC risks de facto ruling-party dominance if key figures – particularly the Prime Minister and Speakers – align politically. A much clearer partisan balance is essential to avoid domination by the ruling party.

The appointment process must be designed to be deadlock-proof to avoid non-appointment: any member of the Council (other than the President) should be able to nominate their candidate at any point in a period that is between three months and two weeks before an incumbent is due to retire, or within two weeks of an incumbent’s resignation or death in office. All nominations received within this timeframe should then be subject to a ranked-choice vote, to be held either two weeks prior to the scheduled vacancy or within two weeks following an unexpected one.

To further ensure moderation, supermajority voting rules (such as a 7-out-of-9 vote requirement.) for critical decisions (e.g., emergency declarations) could prevent abuse of such provisions. The NCC’s role in regulating emergencies – requiring its approval to suspend rights – is laudable, but Bangladesh’s history of politicized emergencies (e.g., 2007–2008) demands clearer criteria for activation.

5. Amendment Process: Rigidity vs. Populist Override

Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both Houses and a national referendum. This rigidity aims to protect against authoritarian overreach (for example, the 2011 removal of caretaker government provisions). However, referendums—decided by a simple majority—risk populist manipulation, as seen in Turkey’s 2017 executive presidency referendum. A voter turnout threshold – such as 40% – could help legitimize outcomes, particularly when combined with a two-thirds majority in both chambers. This approach aligns with the principle of national consensus for constitutional amendments, as recognized in the African Charter for Democracy, and appears consistent with the existing Bangladeshi provisions. By contrast, India’s amendment process (no referendum required, but judicial review) is probably too flexible.

Conclusion

The CRC’s moderated parliamentary proposal is an ambitious effort to break away from Bangladesh’s history of authoritarian rule. Its reforms aim to decentralize power through bicameralism, term limits, and checks like opposition-led committees. However, gaps – such as the Upper House’s non-staggered terms, the NCC’s susceptibility to ruling-party influence, and the referendum’s populist risks – leave room for refinement. Integrating staggered elections, supermajority safeguards, and turnout thresholds could strengthen these mechanisms against Bangladesh’s legacy of majoritarian rule.

The post Reforming the Legislature in Bangladesh appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Im März 2025 haben der Deutsche Bundestag und der Bundesrat einer Änderung des Grundgesetzes zugestimmt. Das am 24. März 2025 im Bundesgesetzblatt verkündete Gesetz sieht unter anderem vor, dass für Bund und Länder in den nächsten Jahren erhebliche neue Gestaltungs- und Verschuldungsspielräume entstehen sollen. Die Änderungen betreffen dabei erstens eine Bereichsausnahme für Ausgaben für die Gesamtverteidigung und für die Erfüllung sicherheitspolitischer Aufgaben. Zweitens wird für die Länder – ähnlich wie bereits für den Bund – eine strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit geschaffen. Drittens kann auf Bundesebene ein Sondervermögen errichtet werden, durch das zusätzliche Investitionen in die Infrastruktur sowie Investitionen zur Erreichung der Klimaneutralität finanziert werden dürfen.

Bundestag und Bundesrat folgten den nach der Bundestagswahl zunehmenden Stimmen für eine Reform der Schuldenbremse noch vor der konstituierenden Sitzung des 21. Deutschen Bundestags am 25. März 2025. Neben inhaltlicher Kritik stieß auch das Verfahren der Grundgesetzänderung nicht nur auf Zustimmung. So hatte das Bundesverfassungsgericht über mehrere Eilverfahren zu entscheiden, die es jedoch mit Beschlüssen vom 13. März 2025 / 13. März 2025 sowie vom 17. März 2025 verwarf.

Dieser Text gibt einen Überblick über die beschlossenen Änderungen des Grundgesetzes. Die Änderungen, die nach dem Entwurf des Koalitionsvertrages (ab Zeile 1612) wohl noch nicht das Ende der Reformbemühungen darstellen, weisen einige offene Fragen und sprachliche Ungenauigkeiten auf, die Bund und Länder einfachgesetzlich weiter bearbeiten müssen.

Verteidigungsausgaben

Art. 109 Abs. 3 Satz 5 GG n.F. und Art. 115 Abs. 2 Satz 4 GG n.F. sehen vor, dass von den zu berücksichtigenden Einnahmen aus Krediten der Betrag abzuziehen ist, um den die Verteidigungsausgaben, die Ausgaben des Bundes für den Zivil- und Bevölkerungsschutz sowie für die Nachrichtendienste, für den Schutz der informationstechnischen Systeme und für die Hilfe für völkerrechtswidrig angegriffene Staaten 1 vom Hundert im Verhältnis zum nominalen Bruttoinlandsprodukt übersteigen. Die Beschlussempfehlung (BT-Drs. 20/15117, S. 23) enthält insofern eine Aufzählung derjenigen Ressorteinzelpläne, aus denen Maßnahmen durch Kredit finanziert werden können.

Vor dem Hintergrund der im Entwurf (BT-Drs. 20/15096) und in der Beschlussempfehlung des Haushaltsausschusses (BT-Drs. 20/15117) beschriebenen Herausforderungen im Zusammenhang mit der sicherheitspolitischen Situation sind insbesondere die Kreditfinanzierbarkeit der Verteidigungsausgaben – auch und insbesondere zur Erreichung des 2-Prozent-Ziels der NATO – nachvollziehbar. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Zivil- und Bevölkerungsschutz wird man sich die Aufgabenteilung von Bund und Ländern ansehen müssen. Die nach oben hin nicht begrenzte Möglichkeit, die genannten Aufgaben durch Kredit zu finanzieren, wird im Hinblick auf die Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Haushalte in der Praxis zu beobachten sein.

Strukturkomponente für die Länder

Die Länder erhalten, wie der Bund bisher schon, eine strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit. Art. 109 Abs. 3 Satz 6 GG n.F. sieht vor, dass die Gesamtheit der Länder dem in Satz 1 geregelten Nettoneuverschuldungsverbot entspricht, wenn die durch sie erzielten Einnahmen aus Krediten 0,35 vom Hundert im Verhältnis zum nominalen Bruttoinlandsprodukt nicht überschreiten. Die Aufteilung der für die Gesamtheit der Länder zulässigen Kreditaufnahme nach Satz 6 auf die einzelnen Länder regelt gem. Satz 7 ein Bundesgesetz mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates. Vorstellbar ist insofern eine Aufteilung auf die einzelnen Länder im Bundesgesetz, zum Beispiel nach Einwohner:innenzahl, nach dem Bruttoinlandsprodukt oder nach dem Königsteiner Schlüssel. Die Auswahl der Verfahren dürfte dabei im Detail Unterschiede der Höhe der Kreditaufnahme des jeweiligen Landes mit sich bringen.

Nach dem Wortlaut des Art. 109 Abs. 3 Satz 7 GG ist in dem Bundesgesetz zu regeln, wie die für die Gesamtheit der Länder zulässige Kreditaufnahme nach Satz 6 auf die einzelnen Länder aufgeteilt wird. Ob und wie die Länder dies für ihre Haushalte im Rahmen ihrer verfassungsrechtlichen Kompetenzen weiter ausgestalten, ist nach Satz 8 durch sie zu regeln. Von Bedeutung und nicht unumstritten ist insofern der neue Satz 9. Danach gilt, dass bestehende landesrechtliche Regelungen, die hinter der gemäß Satz 7 festgelegten Kreditobergrenze zurückbleiben, außer Kraft treten.

Die Strukturkomponente für die Länder ist einer derjenigen Reformvorschläge, der seit längerem in der Diskussion war. Die neue Regelungssystematik in Art. 109 Abs. 3 GG, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der konkreten Ausgestaltung durch Bund und Länder, wird im Detail einige rechtliche Fragen mit sich bringen, die in den nächsten Jahren sicherlich wissenschaftlich – insbesondere im Hinblick auf die unterschiedlichen Verfassungsräume – bearbeitet werden dürften. Hierzu zählt das Verhältnis der Normen zueinander, aber auch die in Satz 9 vorgesehene Regelung zum Außerkrafttreten restriktiverer Regelungen im Zusammenhang mit der strukturellen Verschuldungsmöglichkeit für die Länder.

Die Strukturkomponente hat ursprünglich den Sinn, die bestehenden Investitionsbedarfe zu berücksichtigen, ohne jedoch für diese gebunden zu sein (vgl. Siekmann, in Sachs (Hrsg.), GG, 10. Aufl. 2024, Art. 109 Rn. 71). Dass die Länder eine solche strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit nicht hatten, ist eher auf die damaligen Beratungen zurückzuführen, als dass es sachlich begründet ist. Insofern kann eine Strukturkomponente für die Länder eine sinnvolle Ergänzung des bisherigen Systems der Schuldenbremse sein – über die Höhe ließe sich streiten. In den Ländern führt die Regelung dazu, dass diese ihre bisherigen landesrechtlichen Ausgestaltungen der Schuldenbremse überprüfen und erforderlichenfalls anpassen müssen.

Auf die strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit der Länder sind die Kredite im Zusammenhang mit finanziellen Transaktionen (also z.B. der kreditfinanzierbare Erwerb von Beteiligungen) nicht anzurechnen. Auch wenn Art. 109 Abs. 3 GG die Bereinigung um finanzielle Transaktionen nicht ausdrücklich vorsieht, handelt es sich hierbei um eine zulässige Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeit der Schuldenbremse für die Länder (vgl. BT-Drs. 16/12410, S. 12).  Während der Bund eine solche Bereinigung in Art. 115 Abs. 2 Satz 6 GG regelt, müssen die Länder dies gem. Art. 109 Abs. 3 Satz 8 GG n.F. weiterhin im jeweiligen Landesrecht ausgestalten.

Auch im Zusammenhang mit dem in Art. 109 Abs. 3 Satz 9 GG vorgesehenen Außerkrafttreten strengeren Verfassungsrechts ist zu beachten, dass nicht jedwede strengere Regelung außer Kraft tritt, sondern sich diese – durchaus streitbare Regelung – auf das Nettoneuverschuldungsverbot bezieht. Soweit in einzelnen Länder beispielsweise keine konjunkturbedingte Kreditaufnahme vorgesehen ist, kann hierdurch keine – nicht vorhandene – Regelung außer Kraft treten. Das Außerkrafttreten bezieht sich insofern nur auf das Nettoneuverschuldungsverbot, bei dem die Länder bisher keine strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit hatten. Auch Art. 87 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Verfassung von Berlin, der vorsieht, dass Kredite nur aufgenommen werden dürfen, wenn andere Mittel zur Deckung nicht vorhanden sind, ist von der Regelung grundsätzlich nicht betroffen. Das Grundgesetz kennt in Art. 31 und 142 GG Vorschriften (vgl. Meickmann: hier), die einen Durchgriff auf das Landesrecht bedeuten können. Letztlich ließe sich diskutieren, ob nicht durch Satz 9 der Spielraum der Länder erweitert wird. Auch dies hätte Aufgabe der Länder sein können, den Spielraum selbst zu umgrenzen (siehe Tappe).

Spannend ist die neue strukturelle Verschuldungsmöglichkeit auch vor dem Hintergrund aktueller oder geplanter Feststellungen außergewöhnlicher Notsituationen. Unabhängig von der Frage, wie sich die strukturelle Kreditaufnahme und die notsituationsbedingten Kredite zueinander verhalten, sollen die strukturellen Kredite nach der Gesetzesbegründung gerade den Herausforderungen in den Ländern dienen (zum Beispiel die Anpassung an den Klimawandel und der Integration geflüchteter Menschen) und werden diesen danach sogar „gerecht“ (vgl. BT-Drs. 20/15117, S. 2f., 5). Diese Wertung ist in den Ländern zu beachten. Die strukturelle Kreditaufnahme ist im Übrigen eine allgemeine Ausnahme (vgl. Schmidt, Öffentliches Finanzrecht, Tübingen 2023, Rn. 589 f.; Disselbeck, Staatsverschuldung, Berlin 2017, S. 149 ff. und 174; Hintzen, Fiskalresilienz im Budgetparlamentarismus, Tübingen 2025, S. 102 ff.) vom ansonsten geltenden Nettoneuverschuldungsverbot. Denkbar wäre daher, dass sie den notsituationsbedingten Krediten vorgehen.

Sondervermögen Infrastruktur

Die dritte Neuerung betrifft die geschaffene Möglichkeit, ein Sondervermögen mit eigener Kreditermächtigung für zusätzliche Investitionen in die Infrastruktur und für zusätzliche Investitionen zur Erreichung der Klimaneutralität bis zum Jahr 2045 mit einem Volumen von bis zu 500 Mrd. € zu errichten, vgl. Art. 143h Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG. Davon sollen 100 Mrd. € an den Klima- und Transformationsfonds (Satz 5) zugeführt werden und 100 Mrd. € stehen den Ländern für Investitionen in deren Infrastruktur (Abs. 2 Satz 1) zur Verfügung. Sprachlich ist Abs. 2 Satz 1 etwas missglückt. Danach stehen den Ländern 100 Mrd. € auch für Investitionen der Länder in deren Infrastruktur zur Verfügung. Gemeint ist aber nichts anderes, als dass aus dem Sondervermögen – neben dem Bund – auch den Ländern Mittel für Investitionen in deren Infrastruktur zustehen. Wichtig für die Flächenländer dürfte sein, dass die Kommunen hierbei mitgedacht werden, insbesondere da durch das Sondervermögen die Klimaneutralität bis zum Jahr 2045 erreicht werden soll (vgl. auch Kühl/Scheller).

Bemerkenswert ist die in Satz 2 vorgesehene Legaldefinition der Zusätzlichkeit. Diese liegt nämlich dann vor, wenn im jeweiligen Haushaltsjahr eine angemessene Investitionsquote im Bundeshaushalt erreicht wird. In der Begründung der Beschlussempfehlung des Haushaltsausschusses heißt es hierzu, dass dies dann der Fall ist, „wenn der im jeweiligen Haushaltsjahr insgesamt veranschlagte Anteil an Investitionen 10 vom Hundert der Ausgaben im Bundeshaushalt ohne Sondervermögen und finanzielle Transaktionen übersteigt“ (BT-Drs. 20/15117, S. 23). Der Bund ist insofern gehalten, seine Investitionsquote jedenfalls in der Planung hoch zu halten. Für eine spürbare Verbesserung der Infrastruktur wäre indes eine Durchführung der Maßnahmen und damit ein Mittelabfluss entscheidend.

Das Ausgliedern von Aufgaben und Ausgaben in Sondervermögen (vgl. Meickmann, Schattenhaushalte und parlamentarisches Budgetrecht, NVwZ 2022, 106 ff.), noch zumal solchen, die in den Kernbereich von Bund und Ländern fallen, kann keine Dauerlösung sein. Sie erschweren die Übersichtlichkeit der staatlichen Ausgaben. Die Haushaltsgrundsätze der Einheit und Vollständigkeit (§ 8 HGrG) sollen dies grundsätzlich ermöglichen. Auch das Gesamtdeckungsprinzip (§ 7 HGrG) sollte bei der Errichtung von Sondervermögen nicht aus dem Blick geraten (siehe Tappe; Matuschka, Das Nonaffektationsprinzip, S. 64 ff.).

Ausblick

Insgesamt stellt die Grundgesetzänderung die Verschuldungsmöglichkeit in Bund und Ländern in den nächsten Jahren auf veränderte Grundlagen und schafft sowohl für Bund und Länder erhebliche finanzielle Spielräume. Es ist Aufgabe der künftigen Haushaltsgesetzgebung, die rechtlichen Möglichkeiten mit den Handlungsbedarfen einerseits und den Fragen der Tragfähigkeit des Haushalts sowie der finanziellen Generationengerechtigkeit andererseits in Ausgleich zu bringen.

Der erhebliche Zeitdruck bei der Beratung der Änderungen dürfte noch einige rechtliche Fragen nach sich ziehen. Die nur eingeschränkte Justiziabilität einer nur einfachgesetzlichen Schuldenbremse in den Ländern könnte bei einer späteren Reform einbezogen werden. Eines ist aber festzuhalten: Das Grundgesetz schafft neue Gestaltungs- und Verschuldungsspielräume. Diese werden im weiteren Verlauf sowohl im Bund als auch in den Ländern näher ausgestaltet werden müssen.

The post Grundlegende Reform oder Schnellschuss? appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

Upcycling has become one of the trendiest buzzwords for people with a sustainability-oriented mindset. While the term might refer to various forms of recollection, improvement and reuse of data or (raw) materials, this post adopts a narrower focus. It is limited solely to reviewing how upcycling might be approached from a copyright perspective (for approaches to upcycling from a trademark law perspective, see the previous blog posts in this symposium by Martin Senftleben and Irene Calboli).

For the purposes of this analysis, we might define upcycling as the transformative – recontextualized or repurposed – recycling and redistribution of tangible copies of works or goods (or components thereof) that represent, embody, visualise, or otherwise express content protected by intellectual property (IP) law.

Essential features of upcycling

From a copyright perspective, there are (at least) four essential features of upcycling.

First, the source work or good shall remain objectively recognizable or identifiable by the average observer or consumes. However, the transformed object need  not constitute  an original work of expression eligble for  copyright protection  (as the Court of Justice of the European Union has said in the context of parody in its Deckmyn judgement).

Second, although upcycling is most commonly associated with the fashion sector, it may also extend to other parts of the creative economy, including visual art, design, and architecture.

Third, the use may be commercial (see the sale of customized luxury watches), non-industrialised/artisan (e.g., unique upcycled garments), or purely artistic (e.g., the ‘Watts Towers’). Upcycling can therefore lead to the production of more or less unique handcrafted goods in a typically do-it-yourself manner. In particular, artisan and artistic forms of upcycling represent a bottom-up approach to reusing otherwise discarded materials in an environmentally conscious manner.

Finally, the added value of upcycling is not necessarily commercial.  The added value of upcycled products often lies in their artistic or purely “sentimental” qualities. Upcycling, in many cases,  represents a distinctive form of transformative expression—an exercise of freedom of expression.

Not all of these conceptual elements can be paralleled with specific copyright concepts, but each can nonetheless be evaluated in light of current legal doctrine.

Proposition 1

My first proposition is that the actual manner of use –  rather than the purpose of the upcycler, whether commercial, artisanal, or artistic –  affects which exclusive right applies in a given case and how the operation of that right might be limited or excluded.

The range of possible applicable rights is notably broad: upcycling somewhat overlaps with the scope of reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and even public display. The quantitative and qualitative features of upcycling are of crucial importance. It makes a significant difference whether the reuse leads to a new, original work of expression – thus triggering the adaptation right (which is more plausible for artistic reuses) –  or whether it constitutes mere copying of the whole or parts of the source material. Frequently, upcycled works are also disseminated publicly, either through sale (distribution) or through exhibition ( display).

The right that is ultimately engaged will, in turn, influence which limitation or exception is potentially applicable. For instance, exceptions grounded in freedom of expression – such as quotation, parody, or pastiche – do typically limit reproductions (as harmonised by the European Union); and they apply to the rights of adaptation, distribution or display only as long as Member States choose to provide for such coverage. In the case of distribution rights, any such domestic exception may be justified under Article 5(4) of the InfoSoc Directive. However, the rights of adaptation and display, along with their corresponding limitations, have not been harmonized at the EU level, thereby leaving it to the Member States to delineate their boundaries (albeit subject to the three-step test, though). As of this writing, the author is unaware of any Member State laws that introduced any upcycling- or sustainability-oriented exceptions to their copyright regime.

Another illustrative example is the doctrine of exhaustion, which is expressly limited to cover redistributions of copies of works whose ownership has been lawfully transferred by the right holder or an authorized party. Consequently, resales of upcycled goods – such as garments –  might be excluded if their creation is declared ab initio as reproduction or adaptation.

Proposition 2

The second proposition is that any determination regarding the interplay between exclusive rights and their limitations has direct implications for the balancing of fundamental rights.

More precisely, Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights protects IP rights in line with property rights. At the same time, Article 37 of the Charter declares that “[a] high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development” (for a more in-depth analysis of the scope and meaning of this provision, see Jasper Krommendijk’s previous blog post in this symposium). Furthermore, Article 52(1) necessitates the balancing of fundamental rights so that the operation of one right does not harm the operation of any other right in a disproportionate manner. Finally, Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union requires that the internal market contribute to the sustainable development of Europe.

Taken together, we need to identify a combination of economic rights and corresponding exceptions or limitations that meets the proportionality requirement under the Charter. Which combination best reconciles a high level of protection for intellectual property with a high level of environmental protection?

The Finnish Tableware Jewellery Case

From a copyright perspective, the Finnish Tableware jewellery and copyright (2021) case deserves the closest look in Europe. In this case, fragments of broken porcelain tableware were repurposed into necklaces and earrings. The original plates and cups had been decorated, among other things, with floral patterns and berries of different colours. In its statement, the Finnish Copyright Council (FCC) concluded that the decoration met the threshold of originality and was thus protected under copyright law.

The FCC had to consider whether the rights of reproduction, adaptation or distribution in relation to the copyright-protected tableware had been infringed by the defendant’s upcycling practices or, alternatively, whether those rights had been limited or exhausted. However, the Council’s statement did not offer a definitive resolution. On the one hand, it distinguished the case from the CJEU’s famous Art & Allposters judgement, as the porcelain pieces were not ‘moved onto’ (though they were ‘incorporated in’) other tangible products. Furthermore, the FCC did not consider the classification of the use as ‘permitted borrowing’ due to the lack of creating new and independent works, and since the requirements of the quotation defence were not met due to the lack of any (artistic) dialogue between the source and secondary objects (as requested by the CJEU’s other notable judgment in Pelham and Others). Finally, the FCC also excluded the defendant’s activities from the scope of the doctrine of exhaustion since the defendant created ‘new material objects’. Overall, upcycling seems to be excluded from the scope of almost all possible economic rights – except reproduction – and from the reach of relevant exceptions and limitations.

The FCC’s statement was not unanimous. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the jewellery consisted of the exact same material objects initially sold in the Community by the right holder and, therefore, the distribution right concerning such objects that covers their reuse had been exhausted.

The statement of the FCC was widely criticised and became a catalyst for the first systematic review of the copyright aspects of upcycling in Europe by Péter Mezei and Heidi Härkönen.

Distribution + exhaustion = balanced interpretation

A close look at the FCC statement shows clearly how important it might be to approach transformative reuses in a flexible manner. While the invocation of reproduction (and adaptation) rights aligns with the current doctrinal status quo in copyright law, it also risks imposing undue burdens on secondary creators.  These burdens may conflict with broader, socially vital objectives – chief among them, environmental sustainability. By contrast, the applications of the doctrine of exhaustion in upcycling cases presents an opportunity for a more nuanced and equitable balancing of rights, interests, and resources.

A sustainability-oriented  (re)interpretation of exhaustion would align with key EU legislative initiatives that are vital for the circular economy, including, but not limited to the Waste Directive, the Textile Strategy, the Green Claims Directive proposal, or the Right to Repair Directive. As previously argued with Heidi Härkönen, interpreting the exhaustion doctrine in a manner which prohibits actions that improve the lifespan of a product simply does not serve the demands, aims and goals of the aforementioned EU legislative pieces. In a circular economy, a right-holder-centric view of exhaustion is simply outdated and must be replaced.

Furthermore, granting right-holders an exclusive right to decide on the distribution of the work, including discarded pieces of it, for the whole lifespan of such works does not comply with the concept and policy considerations of exhaustion at all. Ownership interests, product availability and affordability, and the reward theory (I discussed these policy arguments in my early paper on digital exhaustion and in my monograph) support the logic of lawful downstream commerce. A sustainability-oriented interpretation of the doctrine adds only further depth to this socially relevant concept. It might also foster new types of businesses and circular innovations, which is one of the ultimate goals of the EU to build a thriving and innovative single market.

Elsewhere, I have argued that since exhaustion represents a special limitation to the right of distribution, it “shall benefit from the doctrinal flexibilities developed by the CJEU related to other limitations and exceptions, especially the ‘user rights’ approach. This approach relies on the fundamental rights of end-users, e.g. freedom of expression, and it offers the effective application of such limitations against rights holders’ exclusive rights.”

Finally, exhaustion is defined in the EU with a regional scope and effect. As such, it could naturally support reusing trash on a scale far broader than what domestic limitations and exceptions can realistically achieve.

Conclusion: No to monopolizing trash!

In sum, upcycling represents a new philosophy for environmentally conscious producers and consumers, promising new bottom-up approaches to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of human activity. It fits perfectly within the scope of (re)distribution and is reinforced by the policy rationales underlying the doctrine of exhaustion. There is little doubt that this synergy between an economic right and its inherent flexibilities could play a significant role in the ongoing effort to ‘greenify’ EU copyright law.

The post Greenifying Copyright appeared first on Verfassungsblog.