On Monday, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held in Danileț v. Romania that judges cannot be disciplined for publicly defending the constitutional order or commenting on the functioning of justice, provided they do not cross the lines of impartiality, propriety, or incitement. Coinciding with the early December 2025 testimonies by judges and journalistic investigations exposing corruption and sustained pressure on the Romanian judiciary, the Grand Chamber’s judgment could not have arrived at a more timely moment. Danileț extends beyond the vindication of one judge’s freedom of speech rights: it is an important moment for Romania’s judiciary and a reminder that courts must be able to speak – and be heard – when democracy and the rule of law are under threat.

Case background and procedural trajectory

The case centers on two Facebook posts published in January 2019 by Judge Vasilică-Cristi Danileț, then a member of the Cluj County Court and nationally known for his views on democracy, rule of law, and justice reform. One post concerned a public controversy over the President’s extension of the Army Chief of Staff’s mandate; the other related to a press interview with a prosecutor, accompanied by a brief colloquial remark in which the applicant praised the prosecutor’s spirit. For these posts, the National Judicial and Legal Service Commission imposed a disciplinary sanction on Danileț: a two-month 5% salary cut, on the grounds that he had impaired the dignity of judicial office and breached a duty of discretion. The High Court of Cassation and Justice upheld the sanction in May 2020.

On 20 February 2024, the ECtHR, sitting as a Chamber, found that Romania had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It concluded that the disciplinary interference with Danileț’s speech on matters of public interest lacked sufficient justification. At the Government’s request, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber in July 2024, signalling that the State considered the issues to be of exceptional importance and disagreed with the Chamber’s reasoning. The Grand Chamber heard the case on 18 December 2024 and, exactly a year later, by ten votes to seven, confirmed that Romania had violated the applicant’s Article 10 rights.

The Grand Chamber’s analysis

The judgment follows a well-established structure for addressing Article 10 claims: interference, legality, legitimate aim, and necessity in a democratic society. The Strasbourg Court accepted that the disciplinary sanction interfered with freedom of expression, noting that Romanian law is accessible and sufficiently precise to regulate judges’ conduct, and recognised the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary (paras. 138-141). The crux of the matter, however, lies in necessity: was the sanction imposed addressing a pressing social need, grounded in relevant and sufficient reasons, and proportionate?

The Court emphasised the balancing exercise intrinsic to Article 10(2) when applied to judges and prosecutors: between their ordinary right of judges to freedom of expression on the one hand, and their specific duties and responsibilities of judicial office, notably the duty of discretion meant to protect public confidence in the judicial system (para. 171). In calibrating that balance, the Court drew a sharp distinction between speech implicating ongoing proceedings or compromising impartiality and speech defending constitutional order, the separation of powers, and the functioning of justice. The latter, the Court stressed, are matters of public interest that attract the highest level of protection (para. 191).

The Grand Chamber underscored that, where democracy and the rule of law are under serious threat, judges are entitled to speak out; remarks made in such contexts generally warrant a high level of Article 10 protection (para. 186). That principle directly anchors the Court’s treatment of the first post, which defended constitutional order amid an institutional dispute over the Army Chief of Staff’s extension. The Court found no evidence that the remarks undermined the proper functioning of justice, impaired the dignity of the judiciary, or endangered impartiality (paras. 176, 197).

The second post, linking to an interview about prosecutorial caseloads and reforms, likewise concerned matters of public interest – namely the functioning of the justice system – and thus deserved robust protection. The sanction hinged largely on the judge’s use of the colloquial phrase “blood in his [the prosecutor’s] veins” (Romanian: sânge în instalație), which domestic authorities deemed to exceed propriety. This idiom is best translated as “being courageous enough to do something”; which in this context implies that Danileț praised the prosecutor for speaking up openly against interferences with judicial independence. The Grand Chamber acknowledged that ambiguous language by judges on social media might be problematic and suggested that clearer phrasing would have been preferable. Yet it concluded that the domestic authorities failed to articulate how the phrase “significantly overstepped” the inherent limits of propriety or why it justified disciplinary punishment (para. 183). Crucially, the Court found no defamatory, hateful, or violent content, no call to uprising, and no concrete impact on impartiality or public confidence in the applicant’s publications.

Two additional aspects seem to have affected the Grand Chamber’s reasoning. First, procedural safeguards: neither the Disciplinary Board nor the High Court examined whether the value judgments in the first post had a sufficient factual basis, nor did they explain the gravity of the colloquial phrase or situate the speech in its public interest context (paras. 201-204). This omission raised concerns for the Court about the quality and scope of judicial review at the national level. Second, the chilling effect played an important role. Even a mild sanction, the Court emphasised, can deter judges from engaging in public discourse on constitutional and systemic questions (para. 200). The Court treated this chilling potential as an integral element of its proportionality analysis, especially in an environment where institutional pressure on the judiciary is a pressing concern.

Why this case matters now

The importance of Danileț is two-fold. Doctrinally, it contributes to the Court’s ever-growing Article 10 jurisprudence by clarifying the boundaries of judicial speech in digital public spheres and setting a high bar for disciplining judges who speak on public interest matters. Practically, it intervenes timely in the Romanian context where judicial independence faces systemic pressure. Over the past week, judges’ testimonies and investigative reporting have exposed patterns of intimidation, politicised disciplinary actions, and informal pressure networks that seek to constrain magistrates who resist political encroachment or criticise structural issues. These accounts have captured an unprecedentedly big audience: the Recorder’s documentary, which started the whole debate, accumulated over 4 million views within 5 days on YouTube alone. Thousands of people demonstrated their disagreement with the situation by protesting in the streets, demanding changes to the judicial system and the resignation of those whose names featured in the investigations. The reports suggest not sporadic excesses of superior judges’ competences but a pattern embedded in institutional practice, which many have aptly described as a systemic issue.

Against this backdrop, the Danileț judgment is particularly important. Itself a highly debated verdict (ten votes to seven, three separate opinions), it affirms that judges (and, by implication, prosecutors) can, and sometimes must, speak to defend constitutional architecture and institutional independence. It rejects the decade-long practice of disciplining them for participating in public debate, especially where their speech concerns governance of the justice system, structural reforms, and the separation of powers. By condemning sanctions grounded in unfounded claims of impaired dignity or propriety, the ECtHR shifts the burden of proof to authorities to show concrete harm to impartiality or public trust. Moreover, by highlighting the chilling effect that even modest penalties can produce, the verdict confronts the reality that disciplinary tools can be – and are being – weaponised to silence judges.

The judgment’s timing underscores its significance. Romania’s political landscape remains divided, and debates on judicial reform, prosecutorial powers, and institutional checks and balances have fuelled discussions about reshaping the powers of judges. It is against this background that the Constitutional Court of Romania issued one of its most controversial rulings ever, declaring the results of the first round of the 2024 presidential election null and void. In this light, the Court’s engagement with the amicus submissions by Romanian and international civil society organisations further indicates that this matter is not merely domestic; international support and scrutiny are essential to aligning this part of Romania’s judiciary framework with European standards. As Romania navigates these challenges, Danileț provides a normative guideline: judicial speech on public interest matters is presumptively protected, sanctions require precise and evidence-based justification, and judicial independence is incompatible with disciplinary practices that cause chilling effects.

Systemic pressures, rule of law, and democratic resilience

The public scandal of the last couple of weeks suggests that disciplinary mechanisms and informal levers have been used to constrain judicial voices. This dynamic corrodes the rule of law at several levels. First, it undermines internal judicial deliberation and external transparency, incentivising silence over principled critique. Second, it distorts accountability by punishing speech rather than examining the institutional issues judges legitimately raise: caseload burdens, resource deficiencies, legislative overreach, and executive pressure. Third, it lowers public trust in the system, as citizens start considering the judiciary to be hesitant to defend constitutional norms or inhibited from honest reporting on systemic dysfunction. All of these issues were extensively highlighted in public and academic debates about Romania’s justice system.

The ECtHR’s strengthening of protection for judges’ speech on matters of public interest addresses this corrosion. In democratic terms, the judgment reinforces that courts are more than mute technicians merely applying the law; instead, they are an essential mechanism of accountability for the protection of the rule of law. A judiciary that fears speaking cannot uphold the law when it matters most, and a democracy that silences its judges weakens its capacity to correct its failures. The Romanians should not search for such examples abroad, as the legacy of the Ceaușescu dictatorship with its puppet courts is among the main reasons for the population’s reduced trust in the judiciary; an issue which a member of the European Union with a steadily increasing human rights compliance record should be capable of addressing. Romania’s Prime Minister, Ilie Bolojan, intervened in the public debate amid the scandal, stating that “winning back the trust in [public institutions], including in the judiciary, is a priority” for the Government. President Nicușor Dan called this “a serious problem that has to be resolved”.

In Romania’s case, the systemic nature of pressure, attested by magistrates and documented by journalists, means the solution cannot be piecemeal. What is required are institutional safeguards that align disciplinary practice with Article 10 ECHR standards, transparent procedures preventing political influence, and a cultural change recognising judges’ contributions to public debate as essential rather than unwarranted. Moreover, when addressing the issue of judicial independence, the Government should bear in mind that it is essentially a complex problem that requires coherent solutions. For instance, as the Court’s judgment in Roșca v. the Republic of Moldova confirmed just a week before Danileț, sanctions against the judiciary can also interfere with other rights, such as the right to privacy. Importantly, addressing these issues effectively will require external oversight and dialogue: engagement with the Council of Europe’s execution process for ECtHR judgments, EU rule of law mechanisms, and civil society organisations can enhance Romania’s progress and hold institutions to account.

Now, the ball is in the Government’s court. It is only through a comprehensive reform, informed by the consultations with local and international civil society organisations, that Bolojan and his cabinet can start restoring trust in the national justice system.

Author’s note: Funded by the European Union (ERC, BeyondCompliance, 101166174). Views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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