Over the weekend, Italians resoundingly rejected the Meloni government’s constitutional reform on the overhaul of the judiciary via referendum. With the “No” side receiving 53.2% of the popular support, with an unexpectedly high turnout at 55.7%, this is Meloni’s first political defeat since becoming Prime Minister in 2022. The consequences of the referendum show that Italian checks and balances are stronger than one might have feared, despite the fact that, on the eve of the referendum, V-Dem listed Italy as an autocratizer for the first time amid a series of illiberal policies implemented by the sitting government. However, this is not the last challenge for Italian democracy. As Meloni is likely to adjust her strategy, and with new electoral reforms on the horizon, Italian democratic resilience will soon face another real test.

Background on the reform

In broad strokes, the reform proposed by the government (and passed through the two houses of Parliament without a single amendment), can be broken down into three parts. Firstly, the separation of career paths within the judiciary, going from the more general umbrella career path for “magistrates”, to one distinguishing between “judges” and “prosecutors”. Secondly, and connected with the former, the separation of the unitary self-governance body, the High Judicial Council (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura or CSM), into three distinct bodies: a CSM for judges; a CSM for prosecutors; and a new High Disciplinary Court, with rules to be defined via ordinary legislation. The third and final change pertained to the appointment to the three bodies, switching from election by peers, to sortition (for more commentary on its merits, see here).

Supporters of the “Yes” vote welcomed these changes as heralds of greater judicial independence, especially in light of scandals related to political “currents” or “factions” within the magistracy that had suggested lack of impartiality within the CSM. Moreover, they saw this as an opportunity to reduce phenomenon of judges leaning in favour of prosecutors, a problem that criminal defence lawyers have long decried, and the reason why a majority of them campaigned in favour of the reform.

The “No” side, on the other hand, highlighted the broader rule of law consequences of the reform, including a greater politicisation of the judiciary by fundamentally weakening the CSM through the new election process, but also potentially drawing the prosecution service closer to the executive. Furthermore, the lack of clarity on the legislation needed to actualise the reform – e.g. defining the parameters for compiling the lists from which to draw lots, new rules on disciplinary proceedings, etc – raised fears about potential abuse by the political class.

Lessons from the vote

As many commentators pointed out, the judicial overhaul proposed by the government bore an undeniable resemblance to illiberal moves witnessed in countries like Poland or Romania, introducing a new disciplinary regime for judges and new rules that would undermine judicial self-governance potentially running afoul of European standards (see the new Venice Commission rule of law checklist) and EU values (as per established CJEU case law). Therefore, as an immediate outcome of the vote, it would appear that the spectre of autocratic decay has been vanquished, at least momentarily. Nonetheless, I would argue that this referendum offers more opportunities for reflection beyond the obvious.

The data emerging from the referendum itself paints an interesting picture. Only three mainstream (opposition) parties campaigned for “No”, representing a minority of voters at the previous parliamentary as well as at the last European Parliament elections, and this despite the political turn that the “Yes” campaign took in the final days. The result nevertheless suggests a sharp inversion in the trend of support Giorgia Meloni has enjoyed since the beginning of her mandate. The fact that voters did not follow party lines speaks to a continued trust and belief in the robustness of Italy’s post-fascist Constitution, and the solidity of the checks and balances it created. According to YouTrend data, 61% of “No” voters were motivated by a desire to not amend, and thus preserve, the Constitution, presumably out of concern that the reform would overall weaken the text.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this result is broadly in line with other referendums of this kind. Out of five constitutional referendums in the history of the Republic, only two have succeeded – in 2001 and in 2020. Moreover, an abrogative referendum to overhaul the judiciary was attempted as recently as 2022, but it failed to pass the turnout threshold with only 20.5% of eligible citizens casting a vote. Arguably, the lack of a turnout threshold for the 2026 referendum should have benefited the proponents of the reform, as mobilisation was not an imperative. However, the final turnout registered was the second highest this century, only below the even more controversial and politically charged referendum on the overhaul of the political system proposed by the Renzi government in 2016. As a whole, this can be seen as a good sign for Italian democracy, and a strong response against the populist rhetoric promoted by the government – including high-ranking officials within the Ministry for Justice stating that their objective was to “get rid of the judiciary”, equating it to “firing squads”.

Now what? Wider consequences of the vote

While checks and balances have proven solid in this instance, expecting the referendum to fold future attempts to skew the separation of powers in favour of the executive would be naïve. The Meloni government has already eroded the rule of law significantly outside the realm of judicial independence, including by undermining the public sphere, restricting the rights of marginalised groups, and weakening the anti-corruption framework (see here for a comprehensive overview). Despite enjoying widespread popular support and having achieved nearly unprecedented stability, what the government lacks is a strong enough majority in Parliament to amend the Constitution freely (2/3 majority required). This reform, beyond its content, was the government’s first opportunity to test its consensus, before proposing more far-reaching reforms that would have a much costlier political impact.

Unlike Renzi in 2016, or David Cameron with Brexit, Meloni was careful not to link the referendum to her political survival, never suggesting she would resign in the event of a loss. Only in the last days of the campaign she appeared more visible in the media, to no avail. This experience will provide a good indication of whether there is scope to attempt a referendum again in the last year of her mandate, before the new elections expected in 2027 may redraw the Parliament’s composition.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that “the mother of all reforms”, a constitutional amendment introducing the direct election of the Prime Minister and revolutionising the system of government accordingly, has been effectively put on hold. Instead, last month, the government presented a bill to amend ordinary electoral legislation. The main objective would be that of granting an automatic parliamentary majority (potentially up to 60%) to any coalition winning more than 40% of the vote, in order to increase stability and a government’s ability to legislate. This measure, if approved by the legislature and if indeed in line with previous jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court, would open new political scenarios. A more powerful executive could perhaps amend the Constitution more easily and more frequently, with potential consequences for democracy and the rule of law. This is especially evident now, as the latest referendum showed that the electorate is not always aligned with their representatives on systemic reforms changing the constitutional text.

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that although the electorate has demonstrated its support for and trust in the magistracy as an institution, the Italian judicial system is far from flawless or above reform. As the 2025 Rule of Law Report highlights, persistent staffing shortages and the length of judicial proceedings remain serious problems. Moreover, complaints put forward by criminal defence lawyers, including regarding the high number of unfounded criminal prosecutions and requests for precautionary measures, low level of scrutiny in preliminary and pre-trial hearings, and subsequently the high number of appeals, should not be ignored. Nevertheless, this reform has not effectively addressed these particular issues, despite the claims in the referendum campaign suggesting otherwise. Indeed, even the government itself admitted that the reform would not allocate much needed resources or otherwise address these concerns. It rather obfuscated these problems with populist claims that the reform would stop judges from fostering immigration and that, with a “No” win at the referendum, magistrates would “free rapists and paedophiles”. Therefore, as badly as a reform of the justice system is needed, this proposal was far from the answer.

Conclusion

The popular rejection of Giorgia Meloni’s judicial overhaul is ultimately a good sign for Italian checks and balances, as it, perhaps surprisingly, constitutes her first set back since 2022. This is good news for Italian checks and balances in the short term. However, the government may become better in the future at executing its autocratic playbook that seeks to undermine the judiciary. Meloni continues to enjoy a large majority to pass ordinary legislation, which she has consistently used to undermine the rule of law, and the momentum is unlikely to stop in the final year before the general elections. If anything, I would argue, this referendum was more of a test for the Italian people (and civil society), than for the government. The electorate responded, but this just means that Meloni will change her strategy and act accordingly from now on (see: the various referendums called and lost by Orban, before he simply stopped using them as a tool to test consensus). With new electoral legislation on the horizon, the true resilience of Italian democracy will soon be tested yet again.

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