Bangladesh’s political journey since gaining independence in 1971 has shifted back and forth between democratic aspirations and periods of authoritarian rule. The country now stands at a crossroads again after its authoritarian leader, Sheikh Hasina, was ousted after popular protests last year.

Tasked with the mandate of “rebooting democracy” by the interim administration under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, the Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) has proposed sweeping changes, including restructuring the legislature from a parliamentary to a semi-parliamentary system with moderation. In a previous blog post, I explained the Bangladeshi political context that has led to the current situation and critically examined the process of the ongoing constitution-making effort. This post examines the substantive content of these reforms, especially the proposals concerning the “engine-room” of the Constitution, placing them within the context of Bangladesh’s authoritarian history and ongoing global debates about democratic design. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of semi-parliamentarism, moderated parliamentarism, and democratic backsliding, it assesses whether the CRC’s proposals can truly dismantle centralized power or risk reproducing exclusionary practices. While the CRC’s reforms represent an ambitious effort to dismantle authoritarian legacies through bicameralism, term limits, and checks on executive power, critical gaps – such as the Upper House’s non-staggered terms, the National Constitutional Council’s vulnerability to ruling-party dominance, and populist risks in the referendum process – threaten to perpetuate systemic inequalities and undermine long-term democratic stability.

The CRC’s Proposed Parliamentary Reforms

The CRC’s report proposes a bicameral legislature, consisting of a Lower House (National Assembly) and an Upper House (Senate), both having four-year terms. Some key elements include:

1. Lower House: The Lower House would comprise 400 members, with 300 directly elected through the First Past the Post (FPTP) system and 100 women chosen from reserved seats via direct elections in designated constituencies. It also mandates youth quotas (10% of total seats), lowers the candidacy age to 21, and ensures parliamentary standing committees are led by opposition members.
2. Upper House: The Upper House would consist of 105 members, with 100 elected through Proportional Representation (PR) based on votes cast in the Lower House elections and five nominated by the President to represent socially and economically marginalized groups.
3. Executive Constraints: The Prime Minister (PM) must retain majority support in the Lower House and is limited to two non-consecutive terms (even if a term is cut short, it counts as one term). The President’s role is largely ceremonial, acting primarily on the PM’s advice.
4. Checks and Balances: A National Constitutional Council (NCC), comprising representatives from all state organs – including the President, Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, Speakers, Chief Justice, and opposition-nominated Deputy Speakers – ensures balanced representation rather than domination by the ruling party. The NCC oversees critical appointments (e.g., to the Election Commission and judiciary) and emergency declarations.
5. Amendment Process: Constitutional changes require a two-thirds majority in both Houses and approval via a national referendum decided by a simple majority.

These reforms aim to distribute power more evenly, enhance accountability through institutional checks (e.g., opposition-led committees, balanced NCC), and prevent authoritarian regression by curbing unilateral executive and legislative overreach. The inclusion of proportional representation, term limits, and a bicameral structure with mixed methods of selection further promotes political moderation and institutional stability. 

Semi-Parliamentarism and Moderated Parliamentarism

The Constitutional Reform Commission’s (CRC) proposal to restructure Bangladesh’s legislature draws inspiration from two distinct but complementary frameworks: semi-parliamentarism and moderated parliamentarism. Steffen Ganghof’s model of semi-parliamentary government advocates for a dual-chamber system where two independently elected bodies – one representing majority rule (e.g., a lower house) and the other ensuring proportionality (e.g., an upper house) – share legislative power. This design aims to balance democratic responsiveness with stability, preventing the tyranny of simple majorities while ensuring representation for minorities. However, the CRC’s adaptation deviates significantly from Ganghof’s ideal. Although the proposed Upper House (Senate) uses proportional representation, it is not a direct election because its members are not chosen through a separate vote by the people; rather, they are indirectly allocated based on the proportion of votes cast in the Lower House (National Assembly) elections. In Ganghof’s framework, both chambers derive authority directly from voters, ensuring mutual accountability; the CRC’s Senate, by contrast, risks becoming a secondary institution, dependent on the Lower House’s electoral results and vulnerable to partisan influence.

Tarunabh Khaitan’s concept of moderated parliamentarism also informs the CRC’s reforms. Khaitan argues that parliamentary systems need strong institutional checks to balance executive accountability with effective governance. The CRC aligns with this by introducing bicameralism and a National Constitutional Council (NCC) tasked with overseeing key appointments and emergency declarations. The NCC, made up of high-ranking multi-partisan and non-partisan state officials (e.g., the Prime Minister, President, and Chief Justice), is designed to prevent authoritarian consolidation by dispersing power. However, this structure comes with its own set of risks. If the Upper House, which is dominated by proportional representation, blocks legislation passed by the majority-led Lower House, it could lead to legislative gridlock – a problem Khaitan argues should be clearly addressed in the constitutional framework that seeks a path between unilateralism by the ruling party and intransigence by the opposition. While the move to bicameralism is welcome, a clear mechanism for resolving disagreements between the two houses is essential to avoid US-style legislative paralysis in Bangladesh. Options include German-style joint coordination committees or Indian-style joint sittings of both houses.

Institutional Checks and Decentralization

To what extent can the CRC’s proposed mechanisms to distribute power and embed accountability dismantle Bangladesh’s legacy of centralized rule, or do they risk perpetuating systemic vulnerabilities? Focusing on the Lower House’s electoral design, the Upper House’s structural gaps, executive term limits, the National Constitutional Council’s balance of power, and the rigidity of constitutional amendments, I argue that while the reforms advance democratic moderation, critical flaws (such as non-staggered Senate terms, NCC susceptibility to partisan capture, and populist referendum risks) threaten their ability to sustain inclusive governance.

1. Lower House: FPTP, Reserved Seats, and Youth Inclusion

While the First Past the Post system ensures geographic representation, it risks reinforcing polarization, as seen in Bangladesh’s history of zero-sum politics. As Khaitan recommends for the confidence chamber, a ranked-choice voting (RCV) system rather than a First Past the Post system could incentivize moderation by requiring candidates to appeal beyond core bases and build broad church parties. The 100 reserved seats for women, elected through designated constituencies, represent a significant step toward gender parity rather than tokenism, yet this progress could be further strengthened by introducing enforceable quotas for ministerial and leadership roles. A 10% youth quota (for candidates aged 21–35) and a reduced candidacy age of 21 seek to counter generational exclusion. Opposition-led parliamentary committees could enhance oversight, but their effectiveness hinges on vesting agenda-setting and convening rights and powers in the opposition parties to protect them from ruling-party interference.

2. Upper House: Proportional Representation with Structural Gaps

The Upper House’s 105 members include 100 elected via proportional representation based on Lower House votes and five nominated by the President to represent marginalized groups. While proportional representation ensures diversity in legislative representation (e.g., religious and ethnic minorities such as the Hindu, Christian, Chakma, and Garo communities), the Upper House’s four-year term – aligned with the Lower House – fails to provide institutional continuity. While Bangladesh currently has a unicameral legislature, the example of dominant party control in the 2014 and 2018 elections underscores the importance of institutional safeguards – such as staggered terms in a potential upper house – to prevent simultaneous dominance across legislative chambers in systems with bicameral parliaments.

As Khaitan argues, a staggered term for the upper checking chamber serves two functions: (a) it decouples its composition from any single electoral wave and therefore reduces the likelihood of single party domination; and (b) it ensures that the lower confidence chamber always has a more recent mandate as a house, and therefore the sole legitimacy to hire and fire a government. Two viable models for Upper House’s staggered terms emerge, within the context of the CRC’s proposals that seek to align its elections with those of the Lower House: 12-year terms with one-third of senators elected every four years or 8-year terms with half the Senate renewed every four years. Either of these options must be combined with a two-term limit and a lifetime ban on senators contesting Lower House elections to encourage parties to nominate civil society figures, academics, or policy experts rather than career politicians. The 12-year model offers distinct advantages: it could transform the Upper House into a deliberative body of “wise elders” focused on systemic challenges like climate resilience or intergenerational equity. Such extended terms would be akin to the UK’s 2017 proposal for 15-year House of Lords tenures—encourage parties to nominate civil society figures, academics, or policy experts rather than career politicians. However, both models require safeguards against elite capture. For the five President-nominated seats representing marginalized groups, empowering the National Constitutional Council (NCC) to vet nominees – rather than creating separate bodies – could enhance transparency and shield the process from partisan interference. Ultimately, the 12-year model’s emphasis on independence and long-term vision aligns more closely with Bangladesh’s need to break cycles of majoritarian dominance, provided robust checks against entrenchment are embedded.

3. Executive Constraints: Term Limits and Ceremonial Presidency

 The proposed two-term, non-consecutive on the Prime Minister aims to address Bangladesh’s pattern of personality-centric rule (exemplified by Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year tenure). However, a term cut short by a no-confidence vote still counts as one term, which may be unduly restrictive. It might be better to only count a term lasting at least (say) two years, or alternatively, to define the term limit as two terms or eight years in office (whether consecutively or otherwise), whichever is longer. The President’s ceremonial role, acting on the Prime Minister’s advice, reduces authoritarian risks but leaves gaps in crisis oversight. On the question of inviting an MP to form a government or on dissolving the Assembly before its term is over, the President should be required to consult the leaders of the five largest parties in the Assembly as well as the Chief Justice, rather than acting solely on the Prime Minister’s recommendation

4. Checks and Balances: The NCC’s Composition and Risks

The National Constitutional Council (NCC) includes representatives from all state organs: the President, Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Speakers, Chief Justice, and opposition-nominated Deputy Speakers. While designed for balanced representation, the NCC risks de facto ruling-party dominance if key figures – particularly the Prime Minister and Speakers – align politically. A much clearer partisan balance is essential to avoid domination by the ruling party.

The appointment process must be designed to be deadlock-proof to avoid non-appointment: any member of the Council (other than the President) should be able to nominate their candidate at any point in a period that is between three months and two weeks before an incumbent is due to retire, or within two weeks of an incumbent’s resignation or death in office. All nominations received within this timeframe should then be subject to a ranked-choice vote, to be held either two weeks prior to the scheduled vacancy or within two weeks following an unexpected one.

To further ensure moderation, supermajority voting rules (such as a 7-out-of-9 vote requirement.) for critical decisions (e.g., emergency declarations) could prevent abuse of such provisions. The NCC’s role in regulating emergencies – requiring its approval to suspend rights – is laudable, but Bangladesh’s history of politicized emergencies (e.g., 2007–2008) demands clearer criteria for activation.

5. Amendment Process: Rigidity vs. Populist Override

Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both Houses and a national referendum. This rigidity aims to protect against authoritarian overreach (for example, the 2011 removal of caretaker government provisions). However, referendums—decided by a simple majority—risk populist manipulation, as seen in Turkey’s 2017 executive presidency referendum. A voter turnout threshold – such as 40% – could help legitimize outcomes, particularly when combined with a two-thirds majority in both chambers. This approach aligns with the principle of national consensus for constitutional amendments, as recognized in the African Charter for Democracy, and appears consistent with the existing Bangladeshi provisions. By contrast, India’s amendment process (no referendum required, but judicial review) is probably too flexible.

Conclusion

The CRC’s moderated parliamentary proposal is an ambitious effort to break away from Bangladesh’s history of authoritarian rule. Its reforms aim to decentralize power through bicameralism, term limits, and checks like opposition-led committees. However, gaps – such as the Upper House’s non-staggered terms, the NCC’s susceptibility to ruling-party influence, and the referendum’s populist risks – leave room for refinement. Integrating staggered elections, supermajority safeguards, and turnout thresholds could strengthen these mechanisms against Bangladesh’s legacy of majoritarian rule.

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