At first glance, the over two-thirds majority that TISZA is set to enjoy in the new National Assembly seems to make the Hungarian transition 2.0 look much easier than might have been expected. And yet, this does not mean that there are no vital challenges or pitfalls awaiting Péter Magyar’s government in this endeavor. Quite the opposite, as the opening contributions to this Symposium suggest, serious questions arise as to how to properly design and, even more crucially, effectively carry out the promised constitutional repair or recovery processes. This blogpost will focus on two such interrelated challenges TISZA will inevitably need to face, if Hungary is to achieve a genuine democratic renewal, rather than a mere alteration between partisan systems. These challenges lie, namely, in restoring robust and meaningful accountability standards for both past and future power holders and, relatedly, in resisting the temptation to hold onto unconstrained power inherited from the predecessors under the guise of political necessity or expediency.

Restoring Accountability

Admittedly, the results of the April 12 election set the conditions for a deep transformation of the Hungarian legal and political system. In particular, TISZA’s constitutional supermajority will allow for a swift constitutional revision and the repeal of the most contested parts of the existing Fundamental Law of Hungary will become instantly possible. Secondly, and relatedly, the task of replacing FIDESZ appointees or loyalists across the top positions within the Hungarian state administration will be rendered much simpler (though not always uncontroversial), prior attempts at their constitutional entrenchment notwithstanding. In a longer-term perspective, an entirely new constitution-making process may finally be launched.

At the same time, the magnitude of TISZA’s victory carries with it a particularly weighty burden. For, simply put, the wider the powers and stronger the mandate a government is granted, the less space it has for delay, inaction, and excuses, or – particularly in Magyar’s case – for deflecting responsibility and accountability for the expected reforms and, more fundamentally, the profound regime change he and his party have pledged to deliver.

Based on his three-hour long press conference held the day after his victory (see here and here), Péter Magyar appeared to be fully aware of these problems, as he repeatedly stressed TISZA’s full responsibility for the fulfillment of their campaign promises. Accordingly, he recognized that, to mark a genuine difference between the new and the old Hungarian political leadership, the values and standards of accountability must be given back their rightful place in Hungarian public life. Finally, and perhaps more crucially, he emphasized that they should not apply only to the outgoing, but also, to the incoming government and ruling elite(s).

As regards the members and allies of FIDESZ, Magyar announced that they are now to be finally investigated and, where applicable, prosecuted and eventually brought to justice for all previously unaddressed or neglected instances of corruption, abuse of power and other legal violations they may have committed. But on the other hand, if the postulated constitutional renewal is to be achieved, Magyar added, the members of the new Hungarian administration are not to be exempt from said accountability values and standards either; rather, they should too be held accountable for how they will exercise the power conferred upon them. Specifically, three elements of accountability thus conceived stood out from Magyar’s recent statements: the new government’s responsibility for holding their predecessors to account for their wrongdoings, for not repeating such wrongdoings themselves while in power, and finally, for radically reforming the distorted system that had facilitated such flagrant abuses and allowed them to go unpunished.

This choice of framing of the key tasks and challenges awaiting his government does not appear to be accidental; rather it follows his party’s sustained campaign focus on the issues of systemic corruption, misappropriation of public funds along with other instances of state capture or partisan entanglement. According to some (see, e.g., here and here), it is those factors and the popular anger they stirred, rather than persistent rule of law or democratic erosion as such, that proved decisive on April 12. Hence, problems of legal and political accountability – which clearly underlie the aforesaid socio-economic problems – emerge as vital in the Hungarian context. If the lack of or serious deficiencies in both the ideals and mechanisms of accountability contributed to Viktor Orbán’s defeat, they are also quite likely to determine TISZA’s eventual success or failure in the years to come. The same holds true for other values or elements inherent in this concept, such as responsibility and liability, responsiveness and answerability, transparency and effectiveness, good governance and integrity, finally, the acceptance of the very notion of democratic control and oversight over one’s actions.

Temptation of Power

This last component of the notion of accountability, i.e., the normative postulate and more practical “ways of exercising controls of the exercise of power” appears even more vital in the wake of TISZA’s landslide victory and the high expectations awaiting its leaders. This is because, as suggested here and here, the latter will sooner than later face a remarkably strong temptation: namely, that of a political decision being taken to disregard their electoral promises and retain – or even further concentrate – the power that they have argued to be too excessive in the hands of their predecessors.

Pointing to the need for a substantial regime change, restoration of pluralism and checks and balances, or even the limitation of his own powers, Magyar seems to have recognized that risk. That said, the question remains whether – amplified by their unprecedentedly strong mandate and the pressure to make swift changes rapidly – the temptation will not prove too strong. The recent Polish experience in this regard offers at least two cautionary tales that Hungarian politicians and commentators should carefully consider. The first one pertains to the persistent failure to bring the Polish public media regulation in line with applicable national constitutional and, subsequently, EU standards following their 2023 controversial take-over by the Donald Tusk government. The second one concerns the stalled (or, truth be told, stopped) process of separating the Polish Prosecutor General’s Office from the Ministry of Justice, in the wake of the post-2025 presidential election replacement of Adam Bodnar by Waldemar Żurek.

The reasons why those two tales from Poland are particularly important for TISZA are threefold. Firstly, it is precisely media and, more broadly, law enforcement systems that, alongside the court system reform, have been identified by the EU Commission as requiring particularly profound and rapid action in Hungary. Secondly, in both countries, following the changes introduced by Law and Justice and Fidesz respectively, the influence and powers acquired by the political branches over the public media and law enforcement have been widely considered excessive and, as such, criticized by then-opposition parties, promising to swiftly roll them back. Thirdly, and in contrast to (by no means uncontroversial) legislative bills on ordinary and constitutional justice systems, in both those cases, the Polish government or coalition members failed to make even the slightest attempt to submit the promised reform proposals for parliamentary consideration; the responsible Ministers, meanwhile, proved quite eager to make use of their freshly regained executive powers in ways that oftentimes triggered serious debate and controversy.

Surely, the above remarks do not aim to offer a comprehensive analysis and legal assessment of either said developments in particular or of the overall state of the Polish rule of law restoration; this task certainly requires more work (though some such observations are likely to appear in the forthcoming contributions to this symposium, focusing on the Hungarian media or court system reforms). Be that as it may, aside from perpetuating pre-existing concerns over their structural and functional independence – the actions (or, rather, inaction) of the new Polish government and ruling coalition in respect of the public media and prosecutorial system reforms cast a long shadow on their credibility, integrity, and accountability or respect for their own electoral promises and constitutional commitments. All of which should, ultimately, represent a serious warning for the new Hungarian government, people, and commentators hoping for a genuine regime change or transition, rather than a prolonged crisis.

On Holding Power-Holders Accountable

This warning appears particularly important when it comes to the key task engaging the responsibility of both the outgoing and the incoming rulers: i.e., holding TISZA’s predecessors legally (criminally, disciplinarily or civilly) accountable for their actions. The conundrum awaiting the new Hungarian government presents itself as follows: On the one hand, there is indisputable and pressing need to introduce and enforce the appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure such accountability and liability. On the other hand, both real risks and mere appearances of instrumentalization or weaponization of those mechanisms for partisan gains need to be carefully avoided. This is even more so since, in certain cases, it may become increasingly difficult to draw the line between legitimate holding to account and political revanchism or victor’s justice. And, in any event, those who have thus far managed to avoid responsibility or accountability are most likely to be the quickest to cry foul when presented with evidence calling for an explanation.

To navigate such dilemmas, Magyar’s immediate agenda seems to be centered on three main pillars: joining the EPPO (with, most likely, retroactive jurisdiction), the replacement of the current Prosecutor General, and finally, the creation of new, specialized agencies such as the National Anti-Corruption or Asset Recovery Offices. The first of those measures seems to be the least problematic: As demonstrated by the recent Polish experience, combining both the central and the local levels, the EPPO’s operation has the potential of increasing, albeit in limited fields, the accountability of both those who have already lost the power and those who are about to gain it. With respect to the FIDESZ-appointed Prosecutor General, if he decides not to step down, as urged by Magyar, TISZA’s constitutional supermajority should make his eventual replacement less controversial from a legal standpoint. The political responsibility for both the grounds of his dismissal and the choice and appointment of his successor, however, will need to be fully assumed by TISZA; therefore, sound justification and transparent proceeding in both these cases will be of utmost importance.

But what appears to be even more crucial than those two imminent decisions as such are the future structure and organizational culture, powers of and personal appointments to the newly created anti-corruption and asset recovery agencies (or, in the event of its further remodeling suggested, for instance, by the Venice Commission, to the prosecutorial system). In all those instances, it will be vital to ensure that, first, competent and non-partisan experts are appointed to those bodies and, second, made fully independent from politicians in their investigative actions or decisions. Accordingly, powers over said law enforcement agents’, auditors’ or prosecutors’ promotions and demotions, delegations and relegations, and finally, case allocation should be taken away from active politicians or government representatives, as well as officials directly subordinate to them. This is necessary to minimize the slightest appearance of not only open interference, but any political considerations being a substantial factor behind their decisions.

In the next place, law enforcement agents should be subject to strictly (and, preferably, statutorily) defined and fairly enforced requirements of political neutrality. Based on the recent Polish experience, it is highly undesirable to have (especially high-ranking) prosecutors or investigators demonstrate open anti-Fidesz animus and support for Tisza, especially if they are to be assigned high-profile cases concerning either of them. No matter their professional skills or experience, evidence of their political engagement will inevitably raise doubts as to their impartiality and fairness of the proceedings handled by them.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if the above-outlined conditions are fulfilled, it will still be vital to have the same legal (or, e.g., in case of allegations of nepotism or clientelism, political) accountability standards applied to TISZA members or allies. This is because not only proven instances, but even mere social appearances of double standards or relative leniency towards the latter risks compromising the entire constitutional renewal or the rule of law restoration project to the extent to which it will become irreparable.

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